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For the University of Michigan Law School
The just and proper jealousy with which the law protects the 
reputation of a living man forms a curious contrast to its 
impotence when the good name of a dead man is attacked. 
When a man dies, the law will secure that any reasonable 
provision which he has made for the disposal of his property 
is duly carried into effect and that his money shall pass to 
those whom he has selected as his heirs. He leaves behind 
him a reputation as well as an estate, but the law, so zealous 
in its regard for the material things, has no protection to give 
to that which the dead man regarded as a more precious 
possession than money or lands.
 The dead cannot raise a libel action, and it is possible 
to bring grave charges against their memory without being 
called upon to justify these charges in a court of law or to risk 
penalties for slander and defamation. The possibilities of 
injustice are obvious.
—“Libelling the Dead,”  Gl asgow Herald 
(27  July 1926)
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Preface
 Rhode Island has a curious statute. It says that if you’re 
defamed in an obituary within three months of your death, 
your estate can sue. Why curious? Because as far as I know, it’s 
the only such law in the United States. Any journalist will as-
sure you it’s axiomatic that there’s no such thing as defaming 
the dead. Not that it’s impossible to publish false statements of 
fact that damage their reputations: nothing easier. Rather that 
once you’re dead, tort law will not protect your reputation. Ex-
cept, in this severely limited way, in Rhode Island.
 I think that’s lamentable. I think we have reputational in-
terests that survive our deaths. And I think tort law ought to 
protect them.
 I have five aims in this book. One: I want to develop the 
case for tort reform. It might seem quixotic to offer any expan-
sion of tort liability, given laments about the greedy plaintiff ’s 
bar, out-of-control damage awards, and the like. But I’m seri-
ous. I think Rhode Island shouldn’t be alone. Indeed I think its 
statute is too narrow.
 Two: I want to deepen and vindicate what’s now some-
times dismissed as a quaintly old-fashioned or contemptibly 
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obscure view of tort. I think tort is private law. Not just in the 
nominal sense that the typical tort suit features one private party 
suing another. Rather in the richer sense that tort is about pri-
vate wrongs, not public interests. Tort isn’t “really” about pro-
moting efficiency or making sound social policy or anything 
like that. It actually is just what it looks like on its face.
 Three: in a parallel register—but I’d be reluctant to say 
one is just the application of the other—I want to rebut the 
claim that finally all we care about, or should care about, are 
consequences. Various independent commitments often travel 
together under that rubric. I’ll be terse here and throughout, 
but there is much more to moral and political theory than 
finding strategies to maximize good across the population or 
incentivize more optimal conduct. The best way to undercut 
the appeal of consequentialism, I suspect, isn’t to offer a rival 
abstract view: much of what we evoke by talking about expres-
sive dimensions or deontological side constraints is unhappily 
vague. It’s to press its deficiencies in a concrete context—and 
exhibit an alternative as more promising.
 Four: I want to offer an account of posthumous interests, 
which have seemed to some writers hard or impossible to make 
sense of. I take skepticism here seriously; I do my best to dra-
matize and support it. But I also try to show it’s misguided.
 Five: I want to show that we can greatly enrich our under-
standing of theoretical puzzles by immersing ourselves in his-
torical cases, social practice, and legal doctrines. I have noth-
ing against what philosophers call intuition pumps: I begin 
with one and recur to it repeatedly. But I worry about relying 
solely on extravagant examples that spin free of the nitty-gritty 
contours of our social lives. That’s an exercise better suited to 
displaying the ingenuity of the author than to sharpening our 
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grasp of the world. Then too, the conventional division in po-
litical theory between those with normative and those with 
historical interests is dispiriting. We can appraise historical 
moves as attempts to solve problems—and we can wonder if 
they’ve outlived their justifications.
 These aims are connected. If you like, you can think of 
them as five aspects of one agenda, and I won’t mind if you 
label that agenda pragmatist. But I waste neither a moment of 
yours nor a syllable of mine on any metatheoretical defense 
of my approach.
I’m a political theorist, not a lawyer; but I’ve been teaching at 
the University of Michigan Law School for over twenty-five 
years now. For many years, I’ve taught first amendment and 
torts. In 2009, I taught a seminar on defamation, which got me 
started thinking seriously about these issues. The law school is 
a wonderful place: thanks to generations of my students and 
my colleagues for being so smart and savvy. I’ve quipped that 
I was abandoned as a foundling on the law school’s steps and 
they took me in and raised me. I’m delighted to dedicate this 
book to the institution.
 I presented an earlier, abbreviated, and sadly cryptic ver-
sion of this argument to my colleagues at Michigan, to John 
Goldberg and Henry Smith’s private law workshop at Harvard, 
and as the 2013–14 Kadish Lecture at Berkeley. I presented a 
relatively finished version of chapter 5 at Penn. Thanks to at-
tentive audiences for encouraging me to persevere. That’s how 
I chose to construe their incredulity, anyway.
 Doug Dion, George Fisher, John Goldberg, Scott Her-
shovitz, Jill Horwitz, Webb Keane, Daryl Levinson, Peggy Mc-
Cracken, Nina Mendelson, Bill Miller, Marguerite Moeller, 
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Julian Davis Mortenson, Sasha Natapoff, Len Niehoff, Adela 
Pinch, Jane Schacter, Carl Schneider, Andy Stark, and Hannah 
Swanson commented on earlier drafts of part or all of this 
work. Warm thanks for their generosity and insight.
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Embezzled, Diddled, and Popped
Let’s begin cheerfully: you’ve just died. Yes, Freud insists  that “it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death;  and whenever we attempt to do so we can perceive that    we are in fact still present as spectators.”1 But I’ll 
trust you to distinguish that imaginary spectator from your 
actual dead self.
 So you’re dead—and your funeral isn’t going well. Sure, 
everything seems fine. There’s an inspiring turnout: cousins 
have flown in, old friends scattered across the globe, too; more 
than a handful of colleagues from work have shown up; a 
smattering of neighbors sit there sternly. The décor is—well, I 
was going to describe the flowers, but let’s say instead that the 
décor is whatever you think best. The minister—if that’s who 
you’d want—celebrates your piety, your devotion to your fam-
ily, your volunteer work for countless charities. But some guy 
1. “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” in The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey, 
24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953–
74), 14:288.
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in the back rolls his eyes. He leans over to the woman next to 
him and grumbles, “Bullshit. Try this: Embezzled money at 
work. Diddled children in the park. Popped kittens in the mi-
crowave for fun.” Wide-eyed, she whispers, “Really?” “You bet,” 
he assures her. Your family and close friends, sitting in the 
front, are dutifully absorbed in the ceremony, or maybe (better 
yet?) ignoring it, instead rapt in their emotions, in a swirl of 
memories, not yet fretting about their own mortality, still less 
jubilantly congratulating themselves on outliving you. So they 
don’t hear this guy’s lurid charge—yet.
 That wide-eyed woman is talkative, despite our usual 
tendency to sanitize the dead. Some people caustically reject 
her story. Others believe it. Your family is blissfully unaware 
for a few weeks, but then a malicious friend insists they should 
know who’s saying what—in grisly detail. They’re horrified: 
the allegations are false. And factual. And defamatory. So it 
looks like a textbook case of slander. Indeed the claim that you 
committed important crimes makes this slander per se. That 
means that the common law wouldn’t have required your es-
tate to present evidence of special damages—if the law thought 
the dead had reputational interests. But the common law didn’t. 
Today’s law doesn’t either.
 I will be mining the law to probe some puzzles, but not 
yet. First try this: is the lurid story at your funeral an injury to 
you? No, not to your family, though I grant they’ll suffer if the 
story circulates and is believed. They’ll suffer emotional distress 
and probably more. Your daughter’s fiancé may break off the 
engagement. (No, sorry, you may not protest that the law has 
abandoned amatory torts, because we’re not up to the law yet.) 
Your son’s employer might fire him. (And no, sorry, you may 
not protest that in a world of at-will employment this would be 
fine, and any suit against the slanderers on this action wouldn’t 
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get off the ground, maybe for duty reasons, maybe because the 
employer’s act would be a superseding cause. We’re not up to 
the law yet.) I want to know if you are injured.
 I think you are. But some will be skeptical. “Look,” says 
the skeptic, “I’m dead. It’s over. I no longer have any interests 
at all, so I can’t have any reputational interests. I don’t have any 
welfare, don’t enjoy any utility or preference satisfaction, don’t 
have any plans or projects I can advance or that can be set 
back. So there’s nothing for the concept of injury to get a grip 
on. I don’t believe my soul is peering down—or up—wonder-
ing what happens after my funeral. When I die, I really die, all 
the way.”
 Is the skeptic indifferent to whether he’s defamed at his 
funeral? He pauses. “Well,” he ventures, “I guess I still care about 
how my family and friends do. My being defamed would be 
bad for them. So no, I’m not indifferent. I don’t want it to 
happen.”
 There are subtleties here about time and knowledge worth 
sorting out. While alive, the skeptic disapproves the world in 
which he’s defamed after his death, because he cringes at the 
thought of the suffering it will cause his loved ones. But they 
won’t be suffering until after his death. What’s it to him? Why 
does he care? Why should he care? Après lui, le déluge: why 
is caring about what happens to those still lumbering above 
ground any different from caring about those whose corpses 
are being munched by earthworms? If he’s still cringing, why 
shouldn’t he console himself that he’ll never know? Is the prob-
lem just that he does know what the future holds? If he could 
swallow an amnesia pill and push this bit of distressing knowl-
edge out of his head, would that solve the problem?
 Consider Samuel Scheffler’s striking argument that if you 
knew that humanity would somehow come to an end within a 
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few generations after your death, you’d lose interest in all sorts 
of things you now value.2 Nor, Scheffler holds, is this some odd 
or indefensible causal effect. Humanity’s impending end counts 
as a good reason to think there’s something futile about press-
ing on. I think Scheffler is exactly right about this. The pres-
ence of oxygen, Scheffler notes, is a causal precondition of 
things mattering to us, because we’d be dead without it.3 But 
he doesn’t suggest that there is an important respect in which 
oxygen matters to us more than our own survival. One might 
think that the future survival of humanity is in this way pre-
cisely like oxygen: “I can see that I’d lose interest in all kinds 
of projects without it, but I can’t see why I should.” We may 
be good at thrusting the prospect of our own deaths out of 
our minds—whether that thrusting is good for us is another 
matter—but we also know that it’s a settled fact we will die. It 
isn’t profoundly disorienting, Scheffler thinks, as it is to think 
of an asteroid smashing into the planet and destroying all 
human life, or all human beings somehow becoming infertile 
and the species gradually winding down. So far, one might in-
sist, so causal. We shift into the register of reasons with the 
thought that the newfound sense of futility is a suitable re-
sponse, on reflection, to humanity’s coming doom. What’s the 
point, you might properly think, of persisting when every-
thing we care about will collapse? For Scheffler’s view to have 
bite, that thought has to be distinguished from two views that 
flank it. One: what’s the point of persisting if the universe will 
collapse in billions or trillions of years? Two: what’s the point 
2. Samuel Scheffler, Death and the Afterlife, ed. Niko Kolodny (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013).
3. Scheffler, Death, 26.
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of persisting given that I’m going to die? Isn’t action itself fi-
nally quixotic?
 One might demur that it’s odd to say that “there is an 
important and neglected respect in which the survival of hu-
manity as a whole matters more to us than our own survival.”4 
One might suggest that it’s more apt to think of humanity’s 
survival, for some good long while after one’s own death, as a 
precondition of what we value, or even the very business of 
valuing. Scheffler doesn’t mean that we are or should be more 
devoted to the interests of future generations than to our own. 
The important and neglected respect he has in mind is “that 
we are more dependent for our equanimity on our confidence 
in the survival of humanity than on our confidence in our own 
survival.”5 There are no guarantees here about the right reac-
tion, and I don’t think Scheffler thinks there are, either. We can 
imagine that it’s also reasonable to doggedly continue in famil-
iar paths—damn the future torpedoes!—and even to think that 
you redeem your dignity if you keep calm and carry on. Per-
haps it’s easier to appreciate this vantage point if we give the 
scenario a Bayesian tweak. Instead of stipulating that you know 
that humanity is coming to an end soon, suppose we say that 
you have some more or less well-founded probability estimate 
that it is. Suppose you are only 90 percent confident about the 
coming disaster. You assign a 10 percent likelihood to the 
prospect that somehow humanity will survive. You might then 
well think that you should carry in with your usual plans. Then 
play limbo with the 10 percent figure and notice that as low as 
you go, even to zero, it might seem reasonable to persevere.
4. Scheffler, Death, 83.
5. Scheffler, Death, 77; and see 48, 63.
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 Back to the subtleties about time and knowledge. Schef-
fler invites us to think about how we’d react to the news that 
humanity will soon come to an end. The scenario tracks our 
beliefs, not the actual state of affairs in the future. So it’s worth 
pausing to pry apart what really is going to happen from what 
we believe is going to happen. I’ll set aside patently unreason-
able beliefs. Suppose for instance that you decide for no reason 
at all, or maybe on the most frivolous grounds—you’ve gotten 
excited about an opaque passage in Nostradamus—that when 
you would be 119 years old, the planet will explode. You will 
presumably lose interest in at least some pursuits that previ-
ously engaged you. If you were, say, researching pancreatic 
cancer, you will think, “Who gives a damn if pancreatic can-
cer could be cured some decades from now? No one will be 
around anyway.” But it’s easy here to say your loss of interest in 
your work is a mistake, pure and simple. You’re properly the 
object of pity—or contempt.
 Suppose now that you reasonably believe that humanity 
is coming to an end. Leading astronomers have agreed that an 
unpleasantly massive asteroid will collide with the earth in 
seventy-one years; NASA sees no way to deflect or destroy it. 
These predictions are wrong, but they’re the best science has 
to offer. Scheffler-style futility kicks in anyway. You can defend 
it as a perfectly reasonable response: there’s nothing epistemi-
cally suspect about how you adopted this belief. The omni-
scient observer would counsel you against it, but in his usual 
annoying style, he’s unavailable. There’s a sense in which it’s a 
shame that you’ve given up, but that too trades on an epistem-
ically unavailable or unreasonable perspective. Suppose some-
one accosts you: “Life is still worth living! Work is still worth 
doing!” She might be denying Scheffler’s thesis or thinking 
there is dignity in carrying on as if the world weren’t ending; 
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she might be especially stubborn at winning our game of limbo. 
But suppose she doesn’t believe the reports about the asteroid, 
for epistemically indefensible reasons or no reasons at all. Given 
what you reasonably believe, you will properly shrug off her 
advice.
 Suppose conversely that humanity will come to an end, 
but the process is opaque: a burst of previously unknown radi-
ation which none of our devices can detect will kill all life on 
earth. Right up until the end, you will reasonably go about 
your everyday business. Again, no omniscient observer will 
sidle up to confide in you the real truth; again, you’d rightly 
dismiss jeremiads as unfounded nonsense.
 Here’s why I’ve paused to pry apart your reasonable be-
liefs about the future from the actual future. Abstractly, my 
question—is it bad to be defamed after you die?—resembles 
Scheffler’s question. Both are attempts to elicit the intuition 
that your well-being can be affected by events after you die. 
But Scheffler’s futility thesis is tracking your reasonable beliefs 
while you’re still alive, not the actual state of affairs. Now recall 
the suggestion that being defamed after one’s death might be 
bad for one’s friends. Scrutinize the sentiment I inserted in the 
skeptic’s mouth—“I guess I still care about how my family and 
friends do; my being defamed is going to be bad for them”—
and ask the now-canonical Watergate question: what did he 
know and when did he know it? We might picture him as still 
alive, contemplating the time after he dies and knowing or rea-
sonably believing that he’ll then be defamed. Maybe he was 
peripherally involved in shadowy financial dealings at his firm, 
and though he was entirely innocent, they smell putrid, and he 
expects people to have a field day maliciously spinning the tale 
after he dies, even though they’re discreetly silent while he’s 
alive. Now we can begin to paint this picture, but I’ll leave it a 
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sketch: while alive, he is worse off, at least emotionally, because 
he knows or reasonably believes that his friends and family 
will be harmed after his death by his being defamed. He cares 
about them; he wants their lives to go well after he dies. Maybe 
the poignant thought that he’ll be unhelpfully absent from the 
scene adds an extra layer of distress.
 Such a picture would redeem the claim that it’s bad for 
you to be defamed at your funeral. But I want to contrast 
Scheffler’s enquiry with my own. Scheffler imagines us, here, 
now, knowing or anyway reasonably believing that the dooms-
day scenario will come true sometime soonish. I want to ratchet 
up the stakes by answering the Watergate query this way: while 
alive, you don’t know that you’ll be defamed when you’re dead. 
You don’t even have any reason to believe it. So I mean to rule 
out the picture I just sketched.
 I want to know whether you’re injured when you’re de-
famed at your funeral and you had no reason to think that was 
coming. That’s why I’ve positioned you as already dead, not as 
living and considering how you feel now about something that 
might happen after your death. So when I suggest that we care 
that being defamed at our funerals would be bad for our fam-
ily and friends, I don’t want to capture the thought you might 
have right now, reading, that you object to that future. I grant 
that the skeptic can identify some reason it’s rational to worry 
about being defamed when he’s dead because of how it re-
dounds on his loved ones, but irrational to worry about how it 
redounds on himself. “They’ll still have interests,” he points 
out, “and I now care about whether they’ll flourish or not, even 
though I won’t be around to see it. Look, I don’t pump up my 
air conditioning and shrug at global warming as something 
that will matter only after I’m dead. It’s not only my loved ones. 
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I want humanity to do well. But humanity doesn’t have any-
thing at stake in whether I’m defamed. Only my loved ones do.”
 But again I want to rule out that thought as unrespon-
sive. Instead, I want to ask why it should matter to you if some-
thing bad happens to people you cared about when you were 
alive, but it happens after you die and you had no reason to 
think it was coming. Imagine yourself as a hypothetical spec-
tator at your own funeral, but not as your still living self pon-
dering that future possibility.
 So too I want to block another line of response that tries 
to loop back from the posthumous defamation to your welfare 
while still alive. The defamation at your funeral might reveal 
something about your life. Not the fact that you actually em-
bezzled money or diddled children, because I’m stipulating 
that such charges are false. Still, that people are willing to press 
them, that some would believe them, might well count as evi-
dence that you weren’t as highly esteemed as you’d imagined. 
“I thought these people were my friends,” your dead self might 
comment dolefully, if it could comment at all. “I thought they 
had a surer grasp of my character. If they could fall for these 
repulsive stories, what must they have actually thought of me 
all those years? What must they have been saying—and doing—
while I was still alive?”
 Does this response show that the defamation makes you 
worse off? That will depend on how we conceive of welfare. If, 
following a distinguished view in classical utilitarianism, you 
think welfare just consists, or bottoms out, in agreeable or de-
sirable consciousness,6 then you’ll be inclined to think that it 
6. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 
1907), 396–400. Sidgwick wants to press this view about “ultimate good,” 
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was a good thing you spent your whole life confused in this 
way. You’ll be inclined to think that blissful ignorance is wor-
risome only if it gets punctured. (Its being fragile would be 
worrisome ex ante, but irrelevant if you manage luckily to 
stumble through without any puncturing.) Even then, you’d 
want to sum the enhanced agreeable consciousness you en-
joyed while suffering—enjoying—the illusion and whatever 
mortification surrounds its puncturing, and consider whether 
you’d have experienced more or less agreeable consciousness 
over time had you been well informed from the beginning.
 But if you think welfare at least has to include consider-
ations besides your subjective experience, you’ll be inclined to 
reject this view. There’s still room to embrace blissful ignorance. 
Suppose some facts are so shattering that if you ever learned 
them, you’d never regroup. So maybe you’d be better off if you 
didn’t know that your friends and family thought you were a 
scoundrel, that your partner was cheating on you, that your 
best friend fathered your second child. . . . But that’s different 
from thinking that in principle blissful ignorance is nothing to 
worry about, or is actually choiceworthy, or again is worrisome 
only if the collapse turns out to be on balance a felicific loser. 
Still, let’s distinguish your (hypothetical dead self ’s) newly 
vivid appreciation of the facts about your life from whether 
you’re any worse off. I agree that you’ve learned you weren’t as 
well off during your life as you thought you were. In that way 
the defamation is newsworthy: it reveals an independent fact. 
But I want to know if the circulation of the charge that you 
not welfare. In some contexts this would matter: one might think his is the 
best account of welfare but insist that ultimate good is something else, or 
anyway includes components besides welfare. I set aside these complications 
as irrelevant here.
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embezzled, diddled, and popped actually makes you worse 
off—whether it changes the facts.
 If you’re still trying to reconstruct the intuition that the 
real injured parties are your family and friends, then that some-
how transfers into an injury to you, I can make matters bleaker. 
Let’s strip you of loved ones. You never married or had chil-
dren. Your birth family is already dead. Your more distant rel-
atives don’t know you well and don’t much care. If you ever had 
close friends, they’re already dead too. I could pause to let you 
complain that my conscripting you in this increasingly dreary 
hypothetical is unfair, even repellent, but I won’t: it helps iso-
late the question whether the defamation at your funeral—
you’re not such a loner than no one shows—is an injury to 
you, as against to those living people you actually cherish.
 “Okay,” concedes the skeptic, “if that’s the hypo, it doesn’t 
matter whether I’m defamed. Because I’m dead.” So if it doesn’t 
matter whether he’s defamed, he’s strictly speaking indifferent 
to whether he is, right? “Okay. Right.” So if he’s indifferent to 
whether he’s defamed, he prefers the world in which he is de-
famed, as vividly as I can imagine, as long as the French fries 
he’s going to eat two weeks from Thursday—hell, two years 
from Thursday—are marginally better than the French fries 
he’d otherwise get. The skeptic might respond that he’s already 
declared his interests in the future: he doesn’t crank up his air 
conditioning on the theory that global warming will become 
bothersome only after he dies. So here he might insist that he 
dislikes the future world in which someone says something 
flagrantly false. But I want to know if it’s good for him to take 
the better French fries and the defamation. Does prudence or 
self-interest dictate that choice?
 Are you wondering whether such a trivial welfare benefit 
would really outweigh the hideous defamations circulating after 
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you die? But it has to if you’re indifferent to the defamation. If 
posthumous defamation is weightless, of no moment to you, it 
looks like it has to be outweighed by that slight improvement 
in the French fries. In fact it looks like it would then be irratio-
nal to prefer (1) not being defamed and getting worse French 
fries to (2) being defamed and getting better French fries.
 At the risk of impiety, let’s stipulate that you don’t enjoy 
any consciousness, agreeable or disagreeable, after you die. I re-
nounce any appeal to religion or the afterlife, here and through-
out this book. Let’s stipulate too that you have no magical abil-
ity to reach back and revise the timbre of consciousness of 
your actual life with this unhappy new information of what 
others are willing to say, and apparently to believe, about you. 
Then if welfare is exclusively a matter of agreeable conscious-
ness and injury is exclusively a matter of reducing welfare, 
being defamed at your funeral can’t conceivably injure you. If 
welfare is more than agreeable consciousness, the stipulations 
don’t bar the possibility that being defamed at your funeral 
injures you.
 “What I don’t know,” the skeptic now announces, “doesn’t 
hurt me.” But I want to put more pressure on the thought that 
there’s nothing wrong with blissful ignorance, because I think 
that that announcement is silly. (And that entails that the de-
sirable-consciousness picture is at least suspect for apparently 
teetering into this view about blissful ignorance, so maybe not 
just suspect but silly itself.) Suppose your spouse is a cleverly 
programmed AI robot, not a human being, but you never find 
out. No problem? If we could trade in your actual spouse for a 
mostly identical AI robot, but one without a mildly annoying 
habit of your spouse—the robot doesn’t leave its dirty socks 
on the bedroom floor—and you never found out, would you 
be better off? Does rationality require you to approve of that 
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trade? You might not know you have cancer of the pancreas, 
but it’s killing you. You might not know that your bank has 
filched $500,000 from your plump retirement account, but 
you’re worse off without it, as you’ll learn when you try to buy 
that condo on Longboat Key. Are you thinking it’s hardheaded 
to say that you’re injured only once you become aware of the 
problem?7 But surely what you become aware of is that you’ve 
been injured for some time. Or suppose the cancer produces 
no symptoms, goes undiagnosed, and kills you while you’re 
sleeping. You’re worse off if you’re raped while you’re sleeping 
and drugged, even if you don’t get pregnant, even if you don’t 
get an STD, even if no one else ever knows about it and the 
rapist happens to die an hour later, even if you never know it 
happened: and if you’re skeptical about that I hardly know what 
to say. But I’ll persevere and say this: suppose the would-be 
rapist explains that he is thinking of raping you, and it’s going 
to be traumatic and awful. But, he continues, all you need do 
is swallow this little dose of GHB, now infamous as a date-rape 
drug, and some Demerol, which will erase your short-term 
memory. He assures you that he has no STDs and he’s sterile, 
and he promises not to tell anyone what he’s done: or he shows 
you that he’s arranged things so that he’ll be shot to death as 
he leaves your apartment. All this, he purrs, doesn’t mean only 
that you’ll find the experience less traumatic. It doesn’t merely 
mitigate the injury or abolish further injuries—such as emo-
tional turmoil and mortifying publicity—that could ordinarily 
follow on the rape itself. It means also that you’re not being 
injured at all. Isn’t that nuts? If you’re skeptical, if you’re shrug-
7. I have the same sort of view as Thomas Nagel, “Death,” in his Mortal 
Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4–5; and Joel 
Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 86–87.
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ging off what you don’t know as stuff that doesn’t hurt you, 
should you be proud of yourself for being hardheaded? or 
should you fret that you’re confused, in the clutches of high-
level bromides that don’t always or even often make sense? Are 
you tempted by the thought that the real problem here is that 
Demerol doesn’t always induce short-term memory loss? If 
you’re fighting the hypo with some such goofy complaint,  aren’t 
you seeking the right answer for the wrong reason?
 The skeptic now tries to shift the burden of proof: “Noth-
ing that happens after I die,” he repeats, “can benefit or injure 
me. Death really is the end. You say offhandedly that you agree, 
that you’re stipulating that we don’t have any consciousness 
after we die. Are you fully serious about that? You remind me 
of the dead butcher in the Tibetan Book of the Dead, appalled 
to confront his judge. The poor guy can still bluster and lamely 
explain his many negative deeds before being condemned. 
Yes, he concedes, people warned him that he would ‘go to the 
hells’ for these deeds. But
even though they advised me by saying these things, 
I thought, “I don’t know whether I believe in the 
hells or not, and anyway there is no one who says 
they have been there, and then returned [to prove 
it].” So, I said to those people, “Who has gone to the 
hells and then returned? If the hells exist, where are 
they? These are just the lies of clever-talking peo-
ple. Under the ground, there is just solid earth and 
solid rock. There are no hells. Above, there is only 
empty sky. There are no buddhas. So now while I’m 
alive, if I kill for my food, it doesn’t matter. When I 
die, my body will be taken to the charnel ground 
and it will be eaten by birds and wild animals. Not 
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a trace will be left. My mind will vanish, so at that 
time who will be left to go to the hells. ha! ha!”8
“You too bluster about not believing in the afterlife,” he growls. 
“But I think you do believe. I bet that’s why you’re concerned 
about defaming the dead. You too think a trace will be left. For 
devout Buddhists, the laugh’s on the butcher, because he was 
wrong. But the laugh’s on you, because outside the Book of the 
Dead, the butcher is exactly right.”
 If you’ve been chafing that so far I’ve been handing the 
skeptic crummy lines, here I’m going to allow him to deepen 
a powerful attack. He’s going to remind us that folklorists, an-
thropologists, and historians have had a field day canvassing 
the extraordinary range of cultures entertaining the beliefs that 
the dead are still with us, that they must be propitiated, that 
they take a pointed and sometimes malicious interest in how 
we treat them. He’s going to deepen the argument that I can 
flatter myself all day long on how secular and modern I am, 
how much I’ve wrested free of such beliefs, but insist that I too 
am inescapably in their clutches. To be clearheaded about 
death, he’s going to conclude triumphantly, is to agree that 
nothing that happens after you die can benefit or injure you. 
To continue to rely implicitly on background beliefs you offi-
cially don’t hold, let’s say, is to suffer a hangover effect.
 The skeptic can start with a surprisingly frequent practice 
that should mystify hardheaded economists: burying wealth 
8. The Tibetan Book of the Dead, trans. Gyurme Dorje, ed. Graham Cole-
man with Thupten Jinpa (New York: Viking Press, 2006), 323; bracketed 
phrase in the translation. Such outbursts seem to be a staple of world litera-
ture: consider for instance the senator’s speech in Victor Hugo, Les misérables, 
bk. 1, chap. 8.
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with cadavers. From the gold and food lavished away in Egypt’s 
pyramids,9 to the beads, tobacco pipes, and crockery Ameri-
can slaves buried with their dead,10 people have long tried to 
comfort the dead or ease their transition into the afterlife or 
nourish them there—or to make damned sure that they stay 
there. In the fall of 2012, www.catacombosound.com—the 
web site is itself now defunct—advertised a $29,000 coffin with 
a superb sound system and an accompanying touchscreen for 
the tombstone, so the living could update the music on offer. 
Said the Stockholm inventor, “People in Sweden are so stuck 
up about death—I wanted to give them something to laugh 
about. I was very afraid of death and I wanted to lighten it up 
a bit.”11 From wealth buried in deadly earnest—sorry, make 
that in grave earnest—sorry, anyway, wealth buried in earnest, 
to an odd joke. I don’t know if a single such coffin was pro-
duced, let alone sold, let alone used. But you’d have to wonder 
about someone who bought and used one today. What could 
she possibly think she was up to?
 More serious: take Fustel de Coulanges’s stunning ac-
9. Françoise Dunand and Roger Lichtenberg, Mummies and Death in An-
cient Egypt, trans. David Lorton (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 
esp. chap. 7. On the difficult Egyptian transition to the afterlife, see John H. 
Taylor, Death and the Afterlife in Ancient Egypt (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2001); Journey through the Afterlife: Ancient Egyptian Book of the 
Dead, ed. John H. Taylor (London: British Museum Press, 2010). On the 
elaborate burial mounds of some Native Americans, see A. J. Waring, Jr., and 
Preston Holder, “A Prehistoric Ceremonial Complex in the Southeastern 
United States,” American Anthropologist (January–March 1945).
10. John Michael Vlach, The Afro-American Tradition in Decorative Arts 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), chap. 9. Compare Roy Porter, 
Flesh in the Age of Reason (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 217–18.
11. Simon Tomlinson, “One Foot in the Rave: The £20,000 Hi-Fi Coffin 
that Plays Music on a Loop so You Can Listen to Your Favourite Tunes in the 
Afterlife,” Daily Mail (14 December 2012).
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count of the religious beliefs of ancient Greece and Rome and 
how those beliefs structured social practices.12 There’s plenty 
to object to in Fustel’s account: his willingness to argue that 
Greek and Roman and for that matter Hindu sources all reveal 
the same thing; his insistence on religion’s fundamental role, 
which is like vulgar Marxism in reverse; and more. But it re-
mains a model of how to deploy literary texts to resurrect a 
dead social world.13
 Fustel argues that the ancients worshipped their ancestors 
—each family with its own gods, traced through the male line. 
(This religion is older, he argues, than that of Zeus and the 
Olympians, but the latter never simply displaces it.) The dead 
had to be buried for their souls to rest. And the dead had to 
be nourished: libations were duly poured on the grave, food 
brought there too. They became gods of the family, though 
they could be peevish, sickening living family members and 
making their soil sterile if they weren’t treated properly. So too 
the family was obliged to keep a hearth fire burning. (The Ro-
mans put out their fires every year on the first of March and 
promptly lit new ones.)
 Fustel charts the conceptual changes enabling a city to 
have its own gods and hearth, the prytaneum. And—here’s an-
other version of the hangover effect—he notes wryly that the 
ancients kept stumbling through religious motions even after 
their belief had crumbled: “They continued to keep up this 
12. Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City: A Study on the 
Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome, trans. Willard Small 
(Boston, 1874).
13. I think too in this context of M. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus (New 
York: Viking Press, 1954); and, although it makes him flinch to be in such 
august company, William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, 
Law, and Society in Saga Iceland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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fire, to have public meals, and to sing the old hymns—vain 
ceremonies, of which they dared not free themselves, but the 
sense of which no one understood.” What’s going on at this 
stage? You might imagine the locals as fully aware of the reli-
gious understanding of these practices, no longer themselves 
subscribing to them, but somehow feeling guilty or anxious 
about letting go. Or you might imagine them as mechanically 
showing up for the rituals, with no clue what they once trans-
parently meant. If strategic rationality is your cup of tea, you 
can imagine that maybe not a single person believes in the 
ritual, but everyone suspects that at least some others do, so 
the safest bet is to play along with a straight face.
 If you want to think about the staying power of rituals, or 
hangovers with a vengeance, consider Lawrence Durrell’s re-
ports on Corcyra in the late 1930s, that is, Greece many centu-
ries after the world Fustel conjures up.14 After bantering about 
the island’s role in Homer—Odysseus visited Nausicaa there, 
Durrell explains to a baffled local—the presence of Judas Is-
cariot, and more, Durrell reports that he and his companions 
“attended a ceremony which furnished the seed for a whole 
train of arguments about pagan survivals.” The count, a local 
notable, held “a beautiful Venetian dish, full of . . . ‘pomegran-
ate seeds, wheat, pine-nuts, almonds and raisins, all soaked 
in honey. Here, it really tastes rather nice. Try some.’ ” After a 
walk through the cypresses, he unlocked “what appeared to be 
the family vault” and the group descended three steps to some 
“uncouth stone tombs. . . . ‘There is no need for the unearthly 
hush,’ said the Count quietly. ‘For us death is very much a part 
of everything. I am going to put this down here on Alecco’s 
14. Lawrence Durrell, Prospero’s Cell: A Guide to the Landscape and Man-
ners of the Island of Corcyra (London: Faber and Faber, 1945), 98–99.
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tomb to sustain his soul. Afterwards I shall offer you some 
more of it at home, my dear Zarian, to sustain your body. Is 
that not very Greek? We never move far in our metaphysical 
distinctions from the body itself. There is no incongruity in 
the idea that what fortifies our physical bowels, will also com-
fort Alecco’s ghostly ones. Or do you think we are guilty of 
faulty dissociation?’ ” That last question from this most urbane 
figure means that he knows that his audience might, to put it 
politely, doubt that Alecco’s soul—if he has one!—needs luxu-
rious pomegranate sustenance. The count notices Zarian ex-
amining an apparently empty tomb with a “cracked stone lid” 
next to it. “ ‘Ugly things, these tombs,’ says the Count. ‘Like the 
bunkers of a merchant ship. Ah! you are looking at the empty 
one. It used to belong to my Uncle John, who caused us a lot of 
trouble. He became a vampire, and so we had him moved to 
the church behind the hill, where the ecclesiastical authorities 
could keep an eye on him. You did not know that the vampire 
exists?’ ”
 Again, that last question—teasing? ironic? reproachful?—
means the count knows he might be addressing skeptics, even 
if it ironically positions the skeptics as merely ignorant. The 
count’s further tales of his vampire uncle trigger a lecture from 
Theodore, with his “vague Edwardian desire to square applied 
science with comparative religion. . . . The Count listens with 
exquisite politeness. . . . No one could guess that he has already 
heard it on several occasions.” Zarian feverishly scribbles more 
illegible notes for an ethnography he’ll never actually write. 
Durrell—his use of the passive voice leaves open just whom he 
has in mind—reports, “The vampire is still believed in.”
 By the locals? By the count? Well, the count himself might 
be a skeptic. He drily recalls the locals’ digging up the uncle’s 
body and plunging “a stake into his heart in the traditional 
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fashion. I felt it was more politic to move him off the estate 
into the precincts of a church in order to avoid gossip.” I don’t 
know quite what the count did and didn’t believe. I doubt that 
Durrell knew. And of course the count himself might not have 
known. The exchange is a nice reminder of how messily ar-
chaeological culture is, buckling and folded over, not neatly 
layered, so that older formations survive right next to later ones.
 Ancestor worship is common. Some anthropologists have 
argued that, with reasonably capacious understandings of an-
cestor and worship, ancestor worship features in all religions, in 
every culture.15 Another has warned that, at least in much of 
Africa, reverence is owed not strictly speaking to (deceased) 
ancestors but to elders, whether alive or dead; but he’s noted 
too that the Suku of Kinshasa offer the dead (and not the liv-
ing) their favorite foods, including certain mushrooms and 
palm wine.16 The living can appeal to the dead for guidance 
and succor, and they can reproach them for not helping as they 
should.
 Consider one last setting in which a practice lingers past 
the beliefs that arguably make sense of it. The Yasukuni shrine 
in Tokyo, next to the imperial palace’s moat right in the mid-
dle of the city, memorializes Japan’s war dead. Because the 
shrine includes war criminals from World War II, it pops up 
in the news now and again, for instance when then Prime Min-
ister Junichiro Koizumi visited repeatedly. The visits irritated 
South Korea and helped to produce anti-Japanese riots in 
15. Lyle B. Steadman, Craig T. Palmer, and Christopher F. Tilley, “The 
Universality of Ancestor Worship,” Ethnology (Winter 1996).
16. Igor Kopytoff, “Ancestors as Elders in Africa,” Africa (1 January 1971). 
Thanks to Webb Keane for the reference. For further complications, see 
James L. Brain, “Ancestors as Elders in Africa—Further Thoughts,” Africa 
(3 January 1973).
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 China.17 The shrine attracts some five million visitors a year.18 
But the geopolitics of modern Japan’s relationship to its impe-
rial history and World War II isn’t my concern here. Dolls are.
 Or anyway a particular kind of doll. There’s an old Bud-
dhist tradition of using dolls to bring peace to wandering souls, 
to assist them in their decades of transition and absorption 
into Buddahood. In the early 1980s, for instance, a Mrs. Tanno 
in northern Japan went to consult a kamisama spirit medium 
on behalf of her distressed mother-in-law. “The medium spoke 
in the voice of the mother-in-law’s dead son, killed as a soldier 
in World War II. The soldier, who had died before being mar-
ried, spoke of his bitter loneliness in the void between the 
worlds and pleaded for his living relatives to perform a special 
rite for him, marrying him to a spirit in the form of a tradi-
tional bride-doll.” The family did just that. A decade later, Mrs. 
Tanno went to see a kamisama medium to deal with her own 
distress. She learned that her daughter, who’d died as an in-
fant, sought a bridegroom-doll, so she bought one—her bud-
get meant it had to be cheap—and had it consecrated. Such 
ceremonies, not uncommon around East Asia, vary, as you 
17. Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan Lodges Protest in Response to Demonstra-
tions in China,” New York Times (10 April 2005); Onishi, “Tokyo Protests 
Anti-Japan Rallies in China,” New York Times (11 April 2005); Onishi, “Koi-
zumi Visits War Shrine, as He Pledged,” New York Times (17 October 2005). 
More recently, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sent a shrub as a gift: Martin 
Fackler, “Shinzo Abe, Japanese Premier, Sends Gift to Contentious Yasukuni 
Shrine,” New York Times (21 April 2015). More generally, see Ann Sherif, 
“Lost Men and War Criminals: Public Intellectuals at Yasukuni Shrine,” in 
Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia, ed. Sheila 
Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 126–29.
18. Yuka Hayashi, “Tokyo Shrine in Limelight Again,” Wall Street Journal 
(13 August 2013).
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might expect. In central Japan, since the 1930s, the doll carries 
the spirit of Jizō, a Buddhist bodhisattva who assists lesser be-
ings, especially children, through the stages of the soul’s trans-
migration. In northeastern Japan, the doll carries the spirit of 
a living woman, usually paid for her service: the transaction 
triggers anxiety about whether the dead man will summon her 
to join him by dying. Ordinarily the dolls are rededicated every 
five years. After thirty years, having finished their task, they’re 
burned or sent out to sea.19
 So what have these dolls got to do with Yasukuni? Around 
the same time as Mrs. Tanno’s earlier consultation, another 
woman, Sato Nami, sought permission to dedicate a doll to 
her dead son, buried at Yasukuni. The fiftieth anniversary of 
World War II’s end saw more dolls show up; a display of the 
dolls in the site’s museum a few years later generated more pub-
lic interest. Well over a hundred dolls have shown up in Yasu-
kuni. Now here’s the puzzle: Sato Nami’s relatives say she knew 
nothing about this Buddhist tradition, but simply thought a 
bride-doll would be a nice gift.20
 We have enough examples for the skeptic to press what 
looks like a decisive objection. I think it’s an injury to be de-
famed after you die, and I disclaim any belief in any kind of 
afterlife. So, the skeptic concludes, I am like a guy who lavishes 
money on a casket with a superb sound system for a cadaver I 
concede is deaf. I am like those ancients furtively shuffling 
19. Ellen Schattschneider, “ ‘Buy Me a Bride’: Death and Exchange in 
Northern Japanese Bride-Doll Marriage,” American Ethnologist (November 
2001).
20. Ellen Schattschneider, “The Work of Sacrifice in the Age of Mechani-
cal Reproduction: Bride Dolls and Ritual Appropriation at Yasukuni Shrine,” 
in The Culture of Japanese Fascism, ed. Alan Tansman (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2009), 206–7.
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around at the prytaneum, not believing they owe anything to 
any alleged ancestral gods. I am like the count, if we imagine 
him as ironically going through ancient motions and wasting 
a delicious pomegranate dish on dead family members. I am 
like Sato Nami, not Mrs. Tanno, wasting money on a doll. It 
may have made sense for people with the requisite beliefs about 
ancestor worship to do these sorts of things. (You could put 
pressure on whether it made sense for them to have the requi-
site beliefs. But let’s concede that given those beliefs, their ac-
tions were sensible.) But once we wrest free of such beliefs, we 
should stop the associated conduct. And now the skeptic tri-
umphantly brings the argument home: we should care about 
defaming the dead only if we imagine the dead as somehow 
sentient. Surrendering belief in the afterlife should then entail 
surrendering any and all concern about the dead’s reputational 
interests.
 Not so fast! I’ll grant that concern for the dead’s reputa-
tion could straightforwardly be justified by the thought that 
they remain conscious and concerned about such things, and 
could be buttressed by the further thought that they’re in a 
position to benefit or injure us. I’ll grant for the sake of argu-
ment that that is the correct explanation of how anyone ever 
came in the first place to worry about defaming the dead. But 
it doesn’t follow that without such background beliefs, the be-
lief that defamation injures the dead becomes unmotivated or 
irrational. It might have other justifications. Notice for instance 
that even if people started burying corpses to enable the dead’s 
souls to come to rest, us boring secular humanist types might 
remain committed to burial not in some superstitious haze, 
but as a way of symbolically marking the end of a life and fo-
cusing the grieving of the living. For that matter, the count and 
Mrs. Nami might be able to justify their conduct and repel the 
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claim that they are stumbling through routines that no longer 
make sense. But they’d have to tell some story. “Okay, but so 
do you, to redeem your concerns about defaming the dead.” 
All in good time.
 Notice that the skeptical view seems to furnish a whole-
sale line of attack or bludgeon against any and all claims about 
injuring the dead. It doesn’t single out their reputational inter-
ests as uniquely or especially suspect. At the risk of raising the 
skeptic’s eyebrows further, I’ll blithely reveal that I think the 
dead, or anyway the recently dead, have all kinds of interests 
and claims on us. I think you owe it to your treasured col-
league, not just to yourself and not just to his family, to attend 
his memorial service. (At memorial services, speakers regu-
larly address the deceased. Goofy religious sentiments? But 
some of those speakers are emphatic unbelievers, they don’t 
imagine that the deceased actually hear them, and they’re not 
pandering.) I think biographers owe it to their deceased sub-
jects, not just to their readers, to get the story right. None of 
this seems the least bit startling. We talk this way all the time. 
In “The Cornish Mystery,” Hercule Poirot explains one of his 
odd moves: “I represent—not the law, but Mrs. Pengelley.” Mrs. 
Pengelley is dead. Poirot blames himself—he heard her fears 
that her husband was trying to poison her (he wasn’t, as it 
turns out), but arrived too late to save her. Still, he thinks, she 
has interests that he should vindicate.21
 There’s a depressingly familiar consequentialist strategy 
for reconstructing such intuitions. It offers yet another way of 
21. Agatha Christie, The Complete Hercule Poirot Short Stories, 3 vols. 
(London: Folio Society, 2003), 1:343. So too in Christie’s Dumb Witness (Lon-
don: Harper Collins, 1937), Poirot pursues a charge from Emily Arundell 
even though she’s already dead by the time he receives it.
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suggesting that there’s something illusory about our concern 
for the dead, that the real parties in interest are, as they must 
be, living people. Take the intuition that we owe it to the dead 
to respect the terms of their trusts. One might argue that we 
do so only in order to encourage other living people to con-
sider making their own trusts.22 True, that’s not what we think 
we’re up to. But in one view, whether the theory captures our 
self-understanding is neither here nor there. It matters only 
that it offers a(n allegedly hardheaded) reason justifying the 
same sorts of things our everyday views do.23 I’m inclined to 
resist the thought that our everyday views are really deep mis-
understandings. Not that there are any guarantees. We say “the 
sun rises” though Copernicus was right. But it’s more illumi-
nating to save the phenomena, as an Aristotelian or a pragma-
tist might say. So we should turn to such error theories only as 
a last resort.24 We might have to do so when it comes to injur-
ing the dead, because our everyday intuitions can seem coun-
terintuitive, even indefensible.
 How might a consequentialist reconstruct the allegedly 
indefensible claim that it injures the dead to defame them? 
What, exactly, do we gain by incentivizing people not to do 
that? Well, that others won’t defame the dead. But why do we 
care? Well, because it bothers the living. But in this view, it’s 
irrational of the living to be bothered. I suppose you could 
22. Ernest Partridge, “Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect,” 
Ethics (January 1981): 260–61.
23. Such positions can be dressed up more or less elaborately: consider 
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. 5; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Lev-
els, Methods, and Point (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); and Derek 
Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 40–43.
24. To use the felicitous language of J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right 
and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977).
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shrug and say that it seems to be a psychic brute fact about 
people that they hate hearing defamatory comments about 
their dearly beloved. But this reconstruction is wacky. In the 
name of realism, it takes an everyday intuition—that it injures 
the dead to defame them—and urges that it’s doubly confused: 
it injures the living, not the dead, and it shouldn’t injure the 
living anyway. Or, again, it injures the living only if and insofar 
as they are worse off: their income goes down, say. So here the 
“realist” thing to say is that the living might be right to feel 
wounded, but they’re clueless on the location of the wound. 
Still, the consequentialist reconstruction goes, we should have 
a norm against defaming the dead, in the name of not impos-
ing a utility loss on the living. Let’s just say that you have to be 
quite sophisticated to imagine that that counts as realism. But 
you don’t have to endorse such rococo reconstructions to play 
skeptic. You can have the courage of your skeptical convic-
tions and insist that we banish regard for the alleged interests 
of the dead.
 Either way, we can crystallize the skeptical view into two 
theses. First is the oblivion thesis. Death, on this view, is the 
end of the person, and therefore the end of the person’s welfare 
and interests. That leaves nothing for the concepts of wrong 
and harm to latch onto. Second is the hangover thesis. This 
is an explanation of why we nonetheless have intuitions that 
the oblivion thesis denies make any sense: it’s because we con-
tinue, however embarrassedly, to cling to beliefs about the af-
terlife that we officially disavow.
 These two theses are plausible, even powerful. But I’m 
convinced they’re wrong.
II
Tort’s Landscape
Here I sketch the terrain of tort law. I don’t mean  that I’ll offer a hornbook or “nutshell,” in the now  generic name of a trademarked series of little books. (Law students use those little books, 
crammed with doctrine, to cram for exams.) I mean instead 
that I’ll offer a picture of what sort of thing a tort is, how and 
why the law takes an interest in it, and what we can learn not 
from particular finicky rules, but from the basic structure of 
the terrain. I’ll then zero in on defamation and offer an initial 
appraisal of what the law suggests about skepticism about de-
faming the dead.
 Why turn to the law? Because the law embodies a nor-
mative order worth some sustained consideration, some epis-
temic deference too. I want to disavow the extravagant claims 
made in this ballpark. I’m not tempted by the thought that the 
law, or any other tradition, embodies a collective wisdom far 
more impressive than any we puny mortals can muster. (You 
can find a few sentences in Edmund Burke’s voluminous writ-
ings treating tradition that way. They’ve assumed outsized im-
portance in our grasp of his work, perhaps because so much of 
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that work is so unsavory.)1 Nor am I tempted by the thought 
that legal doctrines are somehow selected for, in even a roughly 
Darwinian sense, or that we should expect them to be effi-
cient, in the Kaldor-Hicks sense of economists. (Economists 
say that a change is efficient if and only if the winners gain 
enough to compensate the losers and still remain better off. But 
the winners don’t actually have to compensate, so this is just 
an elliptical way of saying, maximize [or increase, if you want 
to keep the focus on marginal change] something—utility, 
wealth, whatever—across the population. One wonders why 
economists don’t say that straightforwardly.) Like other hand-
waving about evolutionary explanation in the social sciences, 
painfully reminiscent of a structural functionalism long since 
abandoned, this move will get nowhere until and unless some-
one furnishes a cogent account of what the transmission and 
selection mechanisms are. I’m not persuaded by the accounts 
on offer.2 Absent a good account, we can contemplate the eye- 
popping spectacle of allegedly hardheaded social scientists in-
toning a secular theodicy.
 But for centuries the law has had to wrestle with claims 
on behalf of the dead. It is one thing to puzzle over your intu-
itions, and I emphatically don’t say that pursuing the kind of 
puzzles I did in the last chapter is pointless. We can use all the 
leverage we can get. But you’d be forgiven for throwing up your 
hands and confessing that you’re deeply uncertain whether 
defaming the dead injures them—or that even if you now 
have strong views, you don’t trust them, because they’re remote 
1. See my Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1998).
2. In this domain, the savage skepticism of Adrian Vermeule, Law and the 
Limits of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), is indispensable.
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from any concrete choices you’ve ever had to make. Again, the 
law has had no such luxuries: parties file actions and the law 
has to respond. “But ‘the law’ isn’t an actor. Don’t be mystical.” 
I could quibble about that, but the allegedly more concrete 
translation helps my argument. In the common law, many 
judges over many decades gnawed away at this puzzle. As we’ll 
see, legislatures intervened, too. That’s the case for sustained 
consideration and some epistemic deference.
 Again, I don’t want to lean too hard on this. One worry is 
about contingency, more pointedly what social scientists call 
path dependence. Once the common law lurches in a particu-
lar direction, stare decisis or deference to precedent is going to 
tend to refine and sharpen that approach over time, but make 
it harder to junk it and start afresh. Harder, not impossible: the 
common law sometimes narrows or even overrules bad doc-
trine.3 But it is another kind of theodicy to count on its doing 
so—worse, to count on its having done so already. So if the 
common law’s initial moves are mistaken, perhaps all we should 
expect is an increasingly polished mistake. Another worry is 
that our history is not a timeless present, where the law for 
centuries wrestles with the same problem, staggering or trian-
gulating or marching methodically to the right answer. Our 
grasp of reputation, of defamation, of death, of the problems 
and possibilities of legal action, and apparently far-flung con-
textual considerations that reframe the core issues: all have 
shifted. (For an example of how far-flung context can matter, 
consider the doctrine of transubstantiation, on which during 
mass the host and wine literally become the body and blood 
of Christ. When the best reigning theories of matter describe 
3. A classic modern case is Cardozo’s burial of the rule of privity in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
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an unobservable substance that supports observable “accidents” 
or qualities, transubstantiation is straightforward: why hesi-
tate at the claim that the substance has changed but the acci-
dents have not? As those theories crumble, for reasons having 
nothing to do with Christian infighting, transubstantiation 
starts looking mysterious.) So it’s possible that yesterday’s legal 
solutions have outlived their usefulness or that they aren’t even 
fully intelligible now. Since I’ll be arguing that the law has got-
ten defaming the dead all wrong, I have no interest in dismiss-
ing such possibilities out of hand. Far from it.
 Time to begin to map the terrain; first, a formal consid-
eration. Tort is private law: in tort, someone sues someone else 
over an injury, seeking cash compensation or sometimes in-
junctive relief, that is, a court order requiring that the other 
party stop doing something. Criminal law, by contrast, is pub-
lic law. For all the recent interest in victim impact statements, 
remedial justice, and the like, the law conceives of crime as an 
offense against the community. So ordinarily a public prosecu-
tor brings the charges and they’re filed on behalf of the state or 
the people. The same alleged event in the world can produce 
both a tort action (or actions) and a criminal prosecution (or 
prosecutions). So for instance the claim that O. J. Simpson 
murdered Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Lyle Goldman 
led to an acquittal in the criminal prosecution but to success-
ful tort actions for wrongful death. These contradictory ver-
dicts needn’t be thought of as incoherent, as if the law decided 
that Simpson both was and wasn’t a murderer. To prevail in a 
criminal prosecution, the state has to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. To prevail in a typical tort action, like this 
one, plaintiff has to show only a preponderance of evidence, 
or that more likely than not defendant is responsible for her 
injury.
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 Next, let’s distinguish misfortunes from wrongs. Each 
harms the victim. But if no one has wronged the victim, if it’s 
merely tough luck, then it’s a misfortune. So it’s a misfortune 
when you’re out for a stroll on a brisk autumn day and a storm 
rolls in. The next thing you know, you’re soaked in a frantic 
downpour. Running back home, you turn the corner—and 
you hear the crack of a gigantic old elm tree, broken by a gale 
of wind. A huge branch falls and knocks you to the sidewalk. 
Lucky, or less unlucky than you might have been, you escape 
with bruises and a broken shoulder.
 Of course there’s a straightforward sense in which a bro-
ken shoulder counts as an injury: when you’re in a cast, your 
friend will ask how you were injured. English injury does dou-
ble duty as both harm or setback of interest4 and wrong or il-
legitimate invasion of another’s interest. But as I’ve described 
matters so far, I want this on the misfortune side of the ledger. 
You’re worse off: you’re in pain; some of your treasured pur-
suits will be difficult or impossible for some time; you might not 
be able to work and so might not be paid; you’ll require medi-
cal care, which might be costly. But no one has wronged you.
 We could press the same point by saying no one is to 
blame. But someone can act wrongly without being blame-
worthy. Vaughan v. Menlove, a canonical English tort case, dra-
matizes the point.5 Menlove had stacked his hay. His neighbors 
feared spontaneous combustion. They warned him repeatedly, 
but he said he’d “chance it.” The hay caught fire and Vaughan’s 
cottages were burned (along with Menlove’s own barn and sta-
4. I follow the familiar account in Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others: The 
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
chap. 1.
5. Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Ct. Com. Pl.).
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bles). Vaughan sued Menlove, whose lawyer suggested that 
Menlove, a stupid fellow, had acted to the best of his ability. It’s 
not clear how that fits with the repeated warning, but the court 
ruled that even if Menlove had done the best he could, he was 
liable in tort. If you do the best you can, it seems hard to say 
you’re blameworthy. (Though you could be blameworthy for 
getting engaged in an activity that you know or should know 
will make it too hard for you to care for others’ interests. The 
drunk driver is to blame for getting behind the wheel in the 
first place. We don’t absolve him of blame by acknowledging 
that given his sky-high blood alcohol level, he drove awfully 
well.) But what you’ve done can still be wrong.
 Whether we put the point in terms of blame or wrong, it 
has both normative and causal strands. First, someone else has 
to have misbehaved. Not that he failed to do something admi-
rable but not required: we’re not concerned here with super-
erogatory action. So we might think it admirable for you to 
donate half your salary to poor children, but most of us don’t 
think you’re morally required to do so. Absent any such ob-
ligation, you are not to blame if those children suffer more; 
you haven’t wronged them. The misbehavior that matters here 
consists in not fulfilling a duty or obligation. And then that 
misbehavior has to have a causal impact. If I’m driving and 
fiddling with my iPhone at the intersection, fail to see you 
walking across the street, and drift right through my stop sign 
into the intersection, I’m culpably careless. But if you don’t 
know I’m coming and I don’t hit you, I haven’t injured you. 
Does it wrong someone to subject her to a risk of harm that 
doesn’t eventuate? (You’re sleeping. I decide to play Russian 
roulette with—on—you. I have two bullets in the six chambers 
of my pistol; I pull the trigger once; that chamber was empty 
and I leave.) I’ll set aside that question, because I don’t need it 
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to get defaming the dead into sharper focus. I’ll report bluntly 
that the basic rule of tort law is no harm, no foul; and that the 
law does not think exposure to a risk of harm is itself a harm.
 Such complications aside, again, I want to describe the 
case in which the tree branch happens to break your shoulder 
as a misfortune, not an injury, because no one has wronged 
you. Contrast a case in which there’s clearly a culprit. You’re 
zipping downhill on your bicycle on a lovely spring day when 
the quick release on your front wheel fails. The wheel hurtles 
away from the bike frame, the fork slams to the ground, and 
your momentum hurls you over the handlebars. You crash 
onto the pavement and, you guessed it, break your shoulder 
and get a couple of bruises. There’s a limit to what your helmet 
can do for you.
 On the cursory description I’ve offered so far, you might 
well think that this too is a misfortune. But suppose I now add 
that your malicious neighbor slipped into your garage the night 
before and loosened the quick release, just enough that you’d 
be able to ride a few miles before it gave way. Or suppose I add 
that you don’t trust yourself with bike maintenance, so you 
dutifully took your bike to the local shop for a tune-up. This 
is your first ride since you picked it up. The guy behind the 
counter assured you they’d cleaned, lubricated, adjusted, and 
tightened everything and the bike was ready to go. And they 
had—almost. But the fellow who last inspected the bike wasn’t 
paying attention and didn’t notice that the quick release was 
still loose.
 Two broken shoulders: one a misfortune, one a wrong. 
The difference is not that a storm is a “natural” event, whatever 
that might mean, and a bicycle is an “artificial” implement. 
Notice that we can spin either example the other way: I’ll show 
how to flip the case of the tree into a wrong and leave you to 
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turn the bike crash into a misfortune. Suppose that three 
months ago, the city notified the elm’s owner that her dying elm 
was a safety hazard and she had to have it taken down within 
a month. Suppose she ignored the notice or figured that she 
wouldn’t bother dealing with it until next year. Now we have a 
blameworthy agent and an argument that you suffered an in-
jury, not a misfortune. Yes, there still had to be a storm with a 
particular gale of wind, and the owner of the elm can’t con-
ceivably be responsible for that. And you had to be in just the 
wrong place at the wrong time, and she’s not responsible for 
that, either. Still, had she complied with the legal requirement, 
you wouldn’t have been injured. And the point of that legal 
requirement is precisely to protect the safety of people like you. 
(In bald outline, these are the elements of a negligence per se 
action: the unexcused violation of a statute or regulation de-
signed to protect plaintiff against the sort of injury plaintiff 
suffered isn’t merely evidence of a breach of duty; it settles the 
question.)6
 Not that it takes breaking a law to make an act wrong. 
Maybe the city has no rules about old trees. Still, if it’s incum-
bent on a homeowner periodically to inspect old trees or at 
least to hire an expert to inspect, the homeowner could be re-
sponsible for ignoring the hazard. It’s wrong to shrug and think, 
“I don’t care if the tree is in bad shape and might fall.” But it’s 
wrong, too, to remain ignorant—if it’s incumbent on you to 
find out, or anyway to take reasonable steps to find out. The 
6. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164 (1920), at least partly undone by the 
rider about an “unexcused” breach of the law. See for instance Tedla v. Ell-
man, 280 N.Y. 124 (1939) (despite statute requiring pedestrians to walk on 
left side of the road, permissible to be on right when traffic on left is much 
heavier).
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eccentric homeowner who genuinely doesn’t know that old 
trees can fall, or that branches can be dismembered in a storm, 
isn’t callous. (Contrast the one who knows, shrugs, and de-
cides she doesn’t care.) He might well be contrite, even aghast, 
when his tree breaks your shoulder in a storm: “I had no idea!” 
he’ll exclaim. But he can still be at fault, because he should 
have known and then he should have taken precautions.
 Notice too that you might be wrong in not being more 
careful about your route home. You know that trees or branches 
can come crashing down in a storm: even from healthy trees. 
(Suppose the homeowner who failed to deal with the giant old 
elm argues that the storm was so severe that even a fully healthy 
tree would have been shattered by the storm. Would that mean 
she did no wrong? No, because we’re not faulting her for not 
having a healthy tree. We’re faulting her for failing to deal with 
her ailing tree. When you blame someone, you identify a coun-
terfactual that she should have pursued and that would have 
prevented your injury. So too in negligence actions in tort, it is 
incumbent on plaintiff to identify defendant’s breach of duty 
and show what better course of action would have avoided her 
injury. Promising tort actions founder when plaintiff botches 
this part of her job.) So maybe you should have avoided being 
under trees, or anyway big old trees. Maybe then it’s your fault: 
maybe you injured yourself. So too even if the bike shop as-
sures you that your bike is ready to go, maybe you’re at fault for 
not even glancing at it yourself. Doesn’t a responsible bicyclist 
always check her bike before she goes for a ride?
 But we don’t ordinarily think that only one agent can be 
to blame, so that if you’re to blame, the bike shop must not be. 
You can both be at fault. And two or more other agents can 
be at fault when you’re injured. Maybe the city is at fault for 
not alerting the homeowner that her elm was rotting and the 
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homeowner is at fault for not herself figuring it out. (But a 
homeowner who knows the city is supposed to inspect trees 
might well argue that she’s not obliged to pay attention, not 
least because the city inspector will be better at the job than she 
will.) We don’t have a bucket theory of responsibility, on which 
the magnitude of the injury fixes the total quantity of wrong-
doing and then we divvy up that wrongdoing among the blame-
worthy parties. Put differently—Agatha Christie to the rescue 
again—when everyone on the Orient Express is guilty of mur-
der, we don’t think that each one should receive a small frac-
tion of the punishment that a solo murderer should receive.
 But there’s an intriguing difference here between tort and 
crime. In the Orient Express case, everyone deserves the full 
punishment for murder. But in a tort case where multiple de-
fendants are responsible for plaintiff ’s injury, the damages she 
can win are still fixed by her injury, so each defendant might 
pay less than he would if, say, he were the only defendant. 
(States have different and sometimes complicated rules on 
how to allocate fault. Those rules confusingly mix up how 
wrong each defendant’s conduct was and how much it causally 
contributed to the injury. And in states with joint and several 
liability, any individual defendant could end up paying all the 
damages.) Nor do we think that agents are only either blame-
worthy or not: they can be more or less to blame. Blameworthi-
ness is dimensional, not binary. The same is true about wrong-
ful conduct. Yes, conduct is either wrongful or not. But conduct 
can still be more or less wrong.
 So far, these observations track everyday morality. But—
no accident—they also frame the contours of tort law.7 We can 
7. No wonder tort scholars are mining Stephen Darwall, The Second- 
Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: 
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begin to get a grip on tort law with this conjecture: tort law 
makes injuries, but not misfortunes, legally actionable. If some-
one wrongs you, that is, you can sue them and seek compensa-
tion for your injuries. To stylize an intricate body of law, I’ll 
begin with two standard routes to finding agents liable. Some-
times they intend to harm you. The neighbor who sabotages 
your bicycle intends that, even if he doesn’t know quite how 
your bike will collapse or quite how you’ll be harmed. (If he 
claims that he never intended to harm you, that it was only a 
prank, that he thought the wheel would come off as you started 
to mount the seat and that you wouldn’t even fall down, things 
would get stickier, in part because we might not credit his tes-
timony. As in life, so in law: often we read back from apparent 
action to intention.) And sometimes they are careless or, as the 
law puts it, negligent. The homeowner who fails to do any-
thing about a big cracked dead elm, or who doesn’t even notice 
it but should, is also liable. Or, as the law puts it, following 
everyday intuition, she’s liable if it was unreasonable not to 
notice and remedy.
 The approach is reminiscent of recent contractarian 
work in ethics, so it’s worth flagging a problem with that work. 
Contrast the approaches of Thomas Scanlon and John Rawls. 
Scanlon “holds that thinking about right and wrong is, at the 
most basic level, thinking about what could be justified to oth-
ers on grounds that they, if appropriately motivated, could not 
reasonably reject.”8 Rawls suggests that for terms of social co-
Harvard University Press, 2006). See Stephen Darwall and Julian Darwall, 
“Civil Recourse as Mutual Accountability,” Florida State University Law Re-
view (Fall 2011).
8. T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 5. Contrast Scanlon’s Being Realis-
tic about Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 96: “If it would 
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operation “to be fair . . . citizens offering them must reason-
ably think that those citizens to whom such terms are offered 
might also reasonably accept them.”9 There’s a Goldilocks worry 
about finding the right fit. Across a very wide range of pressing 
issues, Scanlon’s view threatens to lapse into a kind of moral 
skepticism on which no claims of right can be justified. No 
matter what your views are on abortion, affirmative action, 
capital punishment, and scads of less feverish topics, can’t even 
a suitably motivated other person reasonably reject each and 
every one of them? Isn’t the problem that there are lots of rea-
sonable alternatives? Rawls is on the other prong of the di-
lemma: it’s way too easy to show that it’s reasonable to think 
others might reasonably accept one’s view of the proper terms 
of social cooperation. (The doubled reasonable makes the con-
dition even more permissive: it’s presumably possible that ac-
tually no one else could reasonably accept your view, but you 
could reasonably think someone would.) The difference prin-
ciple passes that test. But so does libertarianism. So do views 
more egalitarian than Rawls’s. (Rawls’s argument for his two 
principles of justice, to recur to his earlier work, is that parties 
in the original position would prefer them to some familiar 
alternatives. That’s different from saying it would be unreason-
able to choose the alternatives: and his later suggestion about 
reasonableness is about real agents not behind the veil of igno-
rance.) If we agree that all these rival views are fair, we still 
have to figure out how to choose among them.
be reasonable to reject any principle that would permit a certain action, then 
that action would be morally wrong.”
9. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), xlii. I don’t want to pursue the full contrast between 
Rawls’s and Scanlon’s views, but note Rawls, Liberalism, 49–50 n. 2.
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 So reasonableness, at least standing alone, seems too thin 
or manipulable to furnish a formula for deciding what’s right 
or fair. But it’s still enough to say that it’s wrong to act unrea-
sonably, so we can more easily agree with the part of Scanlon’s 
formulation about how to think about what’s wrong. After all, 
it’s not as if there is ordinarily only one reasonable option on 
the table. Then there’d be no room for the contrast I’m drawing 
between how we think about what’s wrong and how we think 
about what’s right or fair. But we can often agree that some 
courses of conduct (or inaction) are unreasonable.
 So others can be liable if they act unreasonably. That’s 
different from their taking reasonable steps and your nonethe-
less being harmed. Suppose the homeowner knows she isn’t a 
tree expert, so she hires a professional who inspects the tree 
and assures her it’s fine—but it isn’t. Now the homeowner has 
done nothing wrong and maybe the professional hasn’t, either. 
Maybe the tree’s faults are so well hidden that even a compe-
tent professional wouldn’t spot them. Or suppose that the elm 
was robust and healthy, but was cracked badly by lightning the 
day before it fell on you; the alert homeowner had noticed and 
already hired a tree service firm to come remove it, but they 
couldn’t come for two weeks. You and the storm happen to 
show up before the tree service firm. Nothing wrong with that, 
though you could plausibly argue that the homeowner should 
have put up a neon orange warning sign when she noticed the 
problem, and kept it up until the tree service dealt with it. Still, 
the homeowner can’t be to blame for the cracked branch still 
being there during the storm.
 Recall the conjecture: tort allows you to sue others for 
injuring you—for their wrongful conduct when it causes you 
harm—but not for misfortunes. I have to consider two refine-
ments to this way of picking out tort’s territory. There’s room 
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to hedge over the first, but not the second. First: an important 
body of tort law holds agents legally liable when they neither 
intended harm nor were negligent. Under this strict liability 
standard, one might think, it’s enough that you’ve caused an 
injury, even if you’ve done nothing wrong. At least as con-
strued by American courts, Rylands v. Fletcher, another canon-
ical English case, holds that if you bring large amounts of water 
onto your property (or do something else that qualifies as an 
“unnatural use”) and it escapes and damages someone else’s 
property, you’ll be liable without any further showing that 
you were at fault.10 It’s easy to read the case as still insisting on 
the fault of the person who brought the water onto his land. 
After all, he knew he was exposing others to considerable risk, 
but went ahead anyway. So the fault might be located not in 
whatever precautions he did or didn’t take to keep the water 
under control, but in bringing it onto his land in the first place. 
Yet Rylands specifically sets aside vis major (an overwhelming 
force of nature) or acts of God as instances where defendant 
would not be liable.
 I don’t want to quibble over Rylands. Arguably, modern 
tort law extends strict liability to settings where talk of wrong-
ful conduct would be too attenuated. Consider manufacturing 
defect actions in product liability law. You buy a glass bottle of 
iced tea. You screw off the cap and don’t notice a crack in the 
bottle which gashes your lip. You can sue any seller of the prod-
uct, from the mom-and-pop corner store where you bought 
the iced tea to the company marketing the product. (Don’t fret 
about the plight of the poor corner-store owners facing crush-
ing liability in tort: ordinarily manufacturers’ contractual terms 
will indemnify such actors.) The law will not let such defen-
10. Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 L. R. H. L. 330 (Eng.).
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dants urge that they’re not liable by arguing that their conduct 
was fully reasonable. It will not let the bottler, for instance, 
introduce evidence that all technically available procedures 
for bottling plants, from how to melt and mold the glass to 
how to test the bottles, leave a tiny fraction of cracked ones 
coming off the assembly line. The law will not let the bottler 
argue that his bottling plant boasts the lowest rate of cracked 
bottles in the industry, that he liberally invests in researching 
even safer technology, and so on. The law will not let the cor-
ner-store owners argue that they didn’t produce the bottle and 
couldn’t have known it was defective. Or again, in many juris-
dictions, if your dog, unprovoked, bites someone, you’re auto-
matically liable.11 You may not defend by urging that you had 
the dog securely tied up, that you have a high fence, that you 
have warning signs, or by insisting on any other precautions 
you’ve taken. You might think that just as a landowner can be 
at fault for bringing large amounts of water on his property, 
just as a drunk driver can be at fault for getting behind the 
wheel, so too an iced-tea manufacturer can be at fault for going 
into the business and a dog owner can be at fault for having a 
dog. That would rescue the conjecture that tort is all about 
injury, not misfortune. But it seems contrived. There’s nothing 
wrongful about marketing iced tea, and the bottler who has 
such a low rate of defective bottles coming off the line and 
who’s working so hard to reduce that rate even further seems 
admirable, not blameworthy at all. You could suggest that like 
the landholder in Rylands, he’s engaged in an activity that he 
knows or should know poses risks to others. But the easiest 
11. See for instance Pingaro v. Rossi, 322 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 1999), 
and the statute at issue, N.J. Stat. § 4:19–16; Hill v. Sacka, 256 Mich. App. 443 
(2003), and the statute at issue, MCLS § 287.351.
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way to unpack that analogy suggests that if the Rylands land-
holder took reasonable care with his water—and reasonable 
care is quite a lot of care when you’re dealing with something 
so dangerous—he wasn’t blameworthy, either.
 What about the wedge between wrongful conduct and 
blameworthy conduct that we saw in Vaughan? There is a sense 
in which it’s wrong to sell someone a cracked bottle or to let 
your dog bite them, even if you’ve worked hard to avoid such 
bad outcomes—even if you’ve done far more than you’re rea-
sonably required to do, so you can’t conceivably be blamewor-
thy. Like Menlove, you’re doing the best you can: but here it’s 
not that you’re a bungler, it’s that anyone’s best might not be 
good enough. You can wrong someone else without doing some-
thing wrong. The latter description is just another way of point-
ing to blameworthiness: if you did something wrong, we ought 
to be able to identify what it was, and the commendable or 
anyway permissible thing you should have done instead. But 
even when we can’t do that, you can wrong someone else. You 
wrong someone else, again, when you sell them a cracked bot-
tle or when your dog bites them. You do so even if you didn’t 
do anything wrong. In this view it makes perfectly good sense 
to say that the fellow with the gashed lip or the bleeding leg 
hasn’t suffered a misfortune, he’s been injured. So there’s no 
reason here to qualify the view that tort liability attaches when 
someone wrongs someone else.12 Notice again that the locu-
tion “you’re to blame” wobbles between “this is your fault: you 
wronged me” and “your conduct was blameworthy.” And again, 
tort law tracks the former. If we embrace the sense in which it’s 
wrong for you to sell someone a cracked bottle no matter how 
12. Consider John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, “Tort Law 
and Moral Luck,” Cornell Law Review (September 2007).
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hard you try to avoid it, we don’t have to refine the conjecture 
and concede that these sorts of torts are misfortunes, not inju-
ries. But if we broaden the frame—if we say, it can’t be wrong 
to market iced tea and do your utmost to ensure that the bot-
tles are safe; it can’t be wrong to own a dog and be incredibly 
careful to keep it from biting people—we’ll have to modify the 
conjecture and concede that sometimes tort law makes defen-
dants liable for plaintiffs’ misfortunes.13
 So the first refinement to the suggestion that tort is about 
injury, not misfortune, would be that certain kinds of misfor-
tune can qualify as torts. The second is that not all injuries—
again understood as cases where someone is worse off because 
another has wronged him—are tortious. Take for instance caus-
ing someone else emotional distress. It has long been true that 
plaintiffs could be compensated for “pain and suffering” if 
those damages flowed from conduct already deemed tortious. 
If you batter people—if you wrongly and intentionally make 
harmful or offensive contact with them—you will be liable not 
just for their medical bills, not just for their lost wages, and so 
on, but also for their pain and suffering. But for a long time, 
tort law resolutely resisted the thought that emotional distress, 
standing alone, could ground a tort action. The central con-
cern seems to have been worries about proof. So first the law 
decided that you could win damages for emotional distress if 
that distress was severe enough to produce physical symptoms. 
Today, most states make the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (IIED) tortious—if and only if the conduct was “out-
13. Compare the manipulation of time frames in Mark F. Grady, “Res 
Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
(January 1994); and Gary Peller, “The Metaphysics of American Law,” Cali-
fornia Law Review (July 1985).
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rageous” and the emotional distress is severe or unendurable. 
The Second Restatement, still an authority, glosses outrageous: 
“Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts 
to an average member of the community would arouse his 
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Out-
rageous!’ ”14 Yes, the gloss violates your third-grade teacher’s 
mandate that you not use a word to define that same word. But 
it has real content: its reference to “average member of the 
community” makes outrageousness a question of social fact, 
what the local standards are, not a normative standard allow-
ing plaintiffs to appeal to how people should act. One wonders 
whether in a violently racist or homophobic community, one 
without reservations about such repulsive sentiments, racist and 
gay-bashing acts can’t qualify as outrageous and so victims 
must be advised that IIED actions would fail.
 That means that as far as accountability in tort goes, some-
one else is free to deliberately make you miserable as long as 
his conduct is not quite outrageous or your distress not quite 
unendurable. Surely we count that as an injury. It’s blamewor-
thy conduct; it wrongs you; it harms you. But it is not tortious. 
Nor is “pure economic loss” an injury that tort law protects 
against. Suppose your neighbor paints his house an ungodly 
mauve and so drives down the value of your house. Outside the 
law, I think we might well say he has wronged you. (Suppose 
he rudely refuses to consider your interests.) From the law’s 
point of view, your house is the same as it always was. If he 
painted your house mauve, without your consent, that would be 
something else. In this way—and I could multiply examples—
not all injuries qualify as torts.
 The conjecture, again, was that tort law makes injuries, 
14. Restatement (Second) Torts, § 46, cmt. d.
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not misfortunes, legally actionable. The first refinement is the 
thought that some harms best seen as misfortunes might yield 
tort actions. The second refinement is the reminder that not all 
injuries are tortious. So even if we reject the first refinement, 
we have to agree that injury is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of tort liability. Despite the two refinements, the 
conjecture captures a crucial feature of tort law. I can under-
line it by stressing a couple of formal features of the practice.15 
Only the injured party has standing in law to launch a tort 
action. If you were injured but don’t want to sue, and I am in-
dignant on your behalf, I can’t sue. (I could file a complaint 
with a court claiming that someone has injured you. That com-
plaint will be dismissed instantly.) Nor can I purchase from 
you the right to sue on your behalf: an economist might decry 
deadweight loss, but the law doesn’t budge. (Your insurance 
contract may require you to cooperate if the insurance com-
pany decides to sue to reclaim assets they’ve paid you, but you 
have then agreed to file, and you will file in your name, even if 
they do all the legal work.) And you can sue only those who 
you can argue are responsible for your injury. Compare the 
familiar suggestion that the purposes of tort law are deterrence 
and compensation, and consider again the example of the in-
tersection where I’m driving, fiddling with my iPhone, and 
drift through the stop sign without hitting you. But suppose 
this time you happen to stumble and break your ankle. My bad 
driving doesn’t cause you to do that; it’s sheer coincidence of 
timing. I can imagine a body of law that would let you sue me 
and win a monetary award: such legal actions would deter my 
15. Here I muster the sort of observations pressed forcefully against eco-
nomic analyses of tort by Jules L. Coleman, “The Structure of Tort Law,” Yale 
Law Journal (May 1988).
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bad driving and compensate you for your injury. But any such 
action would be a nonstarter in tort law, because I haven’t 
wronged you.
 These structural features underwrite the claim that tort 
is private law: that it’s about illegitimate invasions of one per-
son’s interests by another. Some scholars have urged that really 
tort law is public after all: that it is or should be a body of law 
maximizing wealth or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,16 or promoting 
welfare and rejecting moves that would make some worse off 
and no one better off;17 or a body of law, especially but not only 
in products liability, permitting judges to do end-runs around 
captured regulatory agencies and vindicate popular interests.18 
Such scholars concede that tort plaintiffs are thinking about 
their own interests, but, they maintain, tort is justified by the 
larger social ends it serves, and we should see plaintiffs as pri-
vate attorneys-general. We might even see restrictive standing 
rules as ensuring that people who bring actions have the in-
formation and incentives to make the best case available. Even 
scholars agreeing that tort law is private have disagreed on 
how we should see it. We have the paradoxical or mischievous 
suggestion “that the purpose of private law is to be private law,” 
coupled with the more helpful suggestion that tort law is about, 
or embodies, corrective justice.19 We have the thesis that tort 
16. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 9th ed. (New York: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2014), chap. 6.
17. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), chap. 3.
18. Thomas H. Koenig and Michael L. Rustad, In Defense of Tort Law 
(New York: New York University Press, 2001), esp. for instance 123–26, 
175–76.
19. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 6.
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law offers a right of redress.20 We have the claim that tort law 
lets wronged parties get even.21
 So we have two camps. One urges that tort’s appearance 
as private law is illusory, that the real stakes are public. The 
other wants to vindicate that appearance. The divide here 
roughly parallels—and sometimes piggybacks on—disputes 
in ethics between consequentialists and their opponents. We’ve 
already caught glimmerings of this sort of dispute in beginning 
to probe the suggestion that it’s not really the dead who are 
injured by defamation, but their aggrieved family and friends, 
and we want to incentivize others not to impose those injuries. 
Plenty of thoughtful people embrace such consequentialist 
stances and in turn embrace the public perspective on tort law. 
I find myself stubbornly opposed; I’ll return to these disputes 
later. I turn next to laying out the basic structure of the tort of 
defamation.
The Tort of Defamation
The Supreme Court has changed the common law of libel, 
sometimes in unhappily complicated ways, because of con-
cerns about the First Amendment.22 If “almost everyone agrees 
20. See esp. Benjamin C. Zipursky, “Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Jus-
tice,” Georgetown Law Journal (March 2003); John C. P. Goldberg and Ben-
jamin C. Zipursky, “Torts as Wrongs,” Texas Law Review (April 2010).
21. Scott Hershovitz, “Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists,” 
Florida State University Law Review (2011); for a shift in his view, see his 
“Tort as a Substitute for Revenge,” in Philosophical Foundations of the Law of 
Torts, ed. John Oberdiek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
22. I have in mind the law flowing out of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). Here’s one strand of that law. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 
U.S. 323, 349 (1974), holds that “the States may not permit recovery of pre-
sumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing 
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that defamation law, to put it simply, is a mess,”23 I’m inclined 
to say it’s the Court’s fault, not the common law’s. Happily we 
can leave these issues aside. If you want to sue someone for 
defaming you, you ordinarily have to argue that he published 
a false and defamatory statement of fact about you. He needn’t 
have intended to injure you. Nor need he have known that 
the statement is false. Put as skeletally as possible, those are 
the  constituent elements of the tort. As you’d expect, there 
are intriguing disputes about the boundaries of every one of 
those elements. The allegation that you embezzled, diddled, 
and popped would unequivocally count as defamation—if you 
were still alive.
 Before I canvass the elements, consider a threshold puz-
zle. I’ve insisted that torts are wrongs. But surely sometimes it’s 
not wrong to publish a false defamatory statement of fact about 
someone. Journalists sometimes enjoy what the law calls a 
of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.” “Reckless disre-
gard” sounds like a legal term of art for heightened negligence, but here it 
means subjective doubt or disbelief in what’s being reported. Likewise, New 
York Times’s “actual malice” sounds like a legal term of art for bad motive, 
but it means “reckless disregard” in the sense just defined or actual knowl-
edge of falsity. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). The language 
of Gertz is clarified or modified by Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 
472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985): “In light of the reduced constitutional value of 
speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest 
adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even ab-
sent a showing of ‘actual malice.’ ”
For the contemporary state of play in state law on what showings plain-
tiffs do and don’t have to make, see Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: 
Libel, Slander, and Related Problems, 4th ed., 2 vols. (New York: Practising 
Law Institute, 2014), §§ 2:4.17, 2:8.3.
23. Dan B. Dobbs and Ellen M. Bublick, Cases and Materials on Advanced 
Torts: Economic and Dignitary Torts (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 2006), 
174.
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qualified privilege to do that, say in offering good-faith cover-
age of criminal charges that turn out to be false. So too lawyers 
during a trial enjoy what the law calls an absolute privilege—it 
serves as an ironclad defense regardless of their motives—to 
defame witnesses. (Picture the sneering lawyer impeaching the 
witness’s credibility: “But you have your own history of having 
embezzled, diddled, and popped, don’t you?” The law wants to 
secure clients’ right to a vigorous defense. No, the law doesn’t 
think flinging such charges maliciously or gratuitously is choice- 
worthy. It thinks that attempting to police a more refined line 
by allowing tort actions even in flagrantly abusive cases would 
chill vigorous advocacy we want to protect.) In such cases, def-
amation is not a wrong—and then it gives rise to no liability 
in tort. Or consider the tort of battery. We usually define its 
elements as intentionally making harmful or offensive contact 
with another. But sometimes such contact is perfectly permis-
sible. The linebacker can smash into the opposing team’s player 
and bruise him, even break a bone. Here the law says the play-
ers have consented to such contact by playing the game, so it 
isn’t wrongful: and then once again, it gives rise to no liability 
in tort. There are interesting disputes about the scope of con-
sent: the players surely consent to more than the official rules 
permit, but not anything and everything: if a linebacker pulls 
out a pistol and shoots another player, he will surely be liable. 
It matters, too, whether plaintiff has the burden of showing 
that he never consented to the contact in question or whether 
defendant can try to show consent as what the law calls an 
affirmative defense. Such considerations are often crucial in 
litigation. But at the end of the day, regardless of the practical 
urgencies of who has to show what, if the conduct isn’t wrong, 
it won’t qualify as tortious.
 So back to the elements of defamation. Publication means 
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passing on the charge to at least one third party. If someone 
confronts you in private and explodes, “you’ve embezzled, 
diddled, and popped!” there’s no publication. If the publica-
tion is oral, we call the defamation slander; if it’s written, we 
call it libel. (Increasingly the law treats broadcasts of various 
kinds as libel: so the underlying issue may be the relative per-
manence of the publication, not literally whether it is words on 
a page or spoken words.) Common law used to hedge about 
truthful defamatory claims.24 A standard formulation was that 
it was permissible to publish such claims only “with good mo-
tives and for justifiable ends.” State statutes, even constitutions, 
are still heavily peppered with that language.25 But it’s likely 
unenforceable, surely so when the claim is on a matter of pub-
lic interest, probably across the board.26 Today American law 
is adamant that the statement has to be false. If you did in fact 
embezzle money from your employer, it is not defamatory to 
publish that fact. (States have varied on whether plaintiff has 
the burden of showing the statement was false or whether de-
fendant has the burden of showing that it was true.) Republi-
cation is tortious, too. Ordinarily we sharply distinguish as-
serting something from reporting that it has been asserted. 
(“Matt hates you” is different from “Rebecca says that Matt 
hates you.”) Tort law deliberately smudges that distinction, lest 
24. Roy Robert Ray, “Truth: A Defense to Libel,” Minnesota Law Review 
(December 1931), remains helpful.
25. For instance, Illinois Const., Art. I, § 4; MCLS Const. Art. I, § 19; 
Miss. Const. Ann. Art. 3, § 13; Ne. Const. Art. I, § 5; W. Va. Const. Art. III, 
§ 8.
26. No wonder the Restatement (Second) Torts, § 558, takes falsehood as 
a constitutive element of the tort and emphasizes (§ 581A) that truth is a 
complete defense. The first Restatement (Torts), §§ 558, 582 already did the 
same. See Sack on Defamation, § 3:3.2.
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defamers have a foolproof recipe for defaming and getting 
away with it: they could always say, “I’ve heard people say he’s 
embezzled, diddled, and popped,” and then shrug off a defa-
mation suit by insisting they were reporting, not asserting.
 The statement has to be defamatory: it has to tend to 
lower your reputation in at least some reputable segment of the 
community. It might not if your reputation is so very bad—or 
so very good—that the charge won’t make a difference. Simi-
larly, it might not if the putative defamer has no credibility. 
If everyone knows that when he’s plastered, the town drunk 
spouts malicious fantasies, his drunken claim that you’ve em-
bezzled, diddled, and popped won’t qualify, either. Nor do dis-
reputable communities count. His fellow criminals will think 
worse of Johnny the Thug if a rival sneers that Johnny is such 
a wimp that he has never murdered anyone. That will injure 
Johnny: it will deprive him of his livelihood and it will lead 
his peers to hold him in contempt. But the law will not allow 
Johnny to vindicate this reputational interest. Most people 
might not care about or even understand the claim that Dr. 
Zimmerman can’t figure out when to do a ventriculostomy in-
stead of a vertebrectomy, so they won’t think worse of her. But 
her fellow neurosurgeons will, so tort law will let her press a 
defamation charge on that basis. In cases of defamation per se, 
the law assumes without further evidence that the plaintiff has 
suffered reputational harm: the classic ones are violation of a 
serious criminal statute (embezzled and diddled surely qualify; 
popped might); incompetence in one’s profession (Zimmerman 
would seize on this); and having a loathsome disease or—in 
the case of a woman—lacking sexual chastity. That last has 
morphed in modern law into serious sexual misconduct, by 
men or women alike.
 Why doesn’t the law require evidence of injury in some 
52 Tort’s Landscape
cases? One view: the law doesn’t want to waste time hearing 
the evidence, since we’re confident that such charges do harm 
plaintiff ’s reputation. Another view: the law itself condemns 
publishing these particular false claims about others. In all 
other putative defamation cases, the law is agnostic: it hands 
off to whatever community is at stake the question of whether 
the claim does reputational harm. In these latter settings, at 
least, plaintiff will seek to provide evidence of actual injury.
 The statement has to concern a matter of fact, not opin-
ion. “Ezra stole $50,000 from his law firm” is unequivocally 
a factual claim. “Fred is a fucking asshole” is unequivocally a 
matter of opinion.27 But it can be defamatory to imply a factual 
claim: “I don’t get it. Cora must still have tons of debt from 
college and law school, and she can’t be making serious money 
as a public defender. But she eats out at fancy French restau-
rants all the time and is off for a lavish vacation in the Swiss 
Alps. Oh, and people have been muttering about $500,000 
mysteriously missing from a government grant in her office.” 
These issues were in play when William F. Buckley, Jr., sued 
Franklin Littell for libel. Littell had described Buckley as a fel-
low traveler of fascists and intimated that he smeared and li-
beled others in National Review: “Like Westbrook Pegler, who 
lied day after day in his column about Quentin Reynolds and 
goaded him into a lawsuit, Buckley could be taken to court 
by any one of several people who had enough money to hire 
competent legal counsel and nothing else to do.”28 Buckley 
won nominal compensatory damages of $1, because the court 
27. See the hilarious list of examples from actual cases in Sack on Defa-
mation, § 2:4.7.
28. Franklin H. Littell, Wild Tongues: A Handbook of Social Pathology 
([New York]: Macmillan, 1969), 51.
Tort’s Landscape 53
doubted his reputation had suffered, but also $7,500 in punitive 
damages.29 (Today this judgment might be unconstitutional, 
because the Supreme Court has ruled that it probably violates 
due process when punitive awards exceed some unspecified 
multiple of compensatory damages.)30 On appeal, despite vig-
orous argument by Buckley, the court decided that the claim 
that someone is a fascist was, at least in this context, a matter 
of opinion. It left standing the finding of libel for the claim that 
Buckley was himself a libelous journalist, but reduced the pu-
nitive damages award to $1,000.31
 Finally, the defamatory charge has to refer to you, or, in 
the law’s stilted cadences, it has to be “of and concerning” you. 
That was one problem Kimerli Jayne Pring faced when she sued 
over a Penthouse short story about a Miss Wyoming named 
Charlene, a baton twirler whose oral sex made men levitate— 
a stunt she performed onstage during the competition, to the 
audience’s applause. Pring was the actual Miss Wyoming that 
29. Buckley v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
30. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
31. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976). Painter James McNeill 
Whistler won nominal damages of one farthing after John Ruskin published 
these words: “I have seen, and heard, much of Cockney impudence before 
now, but never expected to hear a coxcomb ask two hundred guineas for 
flinging a pot of paint in the public’s face.” For a loving reconstruction of the 
1878 case, see Linda Merrill, A Pot of Paint: Aesthetics on Trial in Whistler v 
Ruskin (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press in collaboration with 
The Freer Gallery of Art, 1992). The defense focused on whether Ruskin had 
“criticized the plaintiff ’s productions in a fair, honest, and moderate spirit,” 
or “whether Mr. Ruskin’s criticism is a fair criticism, and whether it over-
steps the reasonable bounds of moderation,” and conceded that he “did sub-
ject [Whistler’s work] to a severe and slashing criticism—or, if you choose, 
to ridicule and contempt” (162–63). The salient question here is about the 
boundaries of the privilege of fair comment, which goes to the question of 
whether Ruskin’s publication was wrongful.
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year and she was a baton twirler. The jury found that the story 
did refer to her and awarded her $26.5m.32 The judge reduced 
that award to $14m. An appeals court overturned it on the 
grounds that the story pressed no factual claims: “It is impos-
sible to believe that anyone could understand that levitation 
could be accomplished by oral sex before a national television 
audience or anywhere else. The incidents charged were impos-
sible. The setting was impossible.”33 Not to put too fine a point 
on it, this is dumb. The appeals court can say this if and only 
if they think no reasonable jury could find a factual claim 
here. But surely a reasonable jury conversant with fiction—
and  hyperbole—could find claims that Pring used a sensa-
tional skill at oral sex to advance in the competition.
 The law distinguishes compensatory and punitive (or 
exemplary) damages. The former compensate plaintiff for his 
injuries. We can break down this category into pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary damages. The former, easily calculated, compen-
sate for cash losses: the cost of medical care, lost wages, and so 
on. The latter require an impressionistic judgment: how much 
money should be awarded for, say, this much pain and suffer-
32. Douglas C. McGill, “Writer’s Plight: A Libel Suit,” New York Times (19 
July 1981). For a detailed rendition, see Gerry Spence, Trial by Fire: The True 
Story of a Woman’s Ordeal at the Hands of the Law (New York: William Mor-
row, 1986). Compare Yecker v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 358 (1941) (campaign 
flier reproducing the criminal record of a man who happened to have the 
same name as defendant’s opponent in the race).
33. Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 
1982). The lower court opinion, Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 7 
Med. L. Rptr. 1101 (D. Wyo. Jan 7, 1981), ruled that Pring was not a public 
figure and denied Penthouse’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
that the question of whether the story was “of and concerning” her had to go 
to a jury.
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ing? Punitive damages are awarded only if, to put it roughly, 
plaintiff can show that defendant acted maliciously or reck-
lessly. The law does not fuss terribly over the present value of 
money or the tax implications of damages awards; nor, usually, 
over the chunk of plaintiff ’s award that her attorney will take. 
There are tantalizing disputes about how best to understand 
both sorts of damages, but with due melancholy I pass them by 
as irrelevant to my quest here.
 Wrongful publication of a false defamatory statement of 
fact about you: these are the core classic elements of the tort of 
defamation. I should add that not only does the law face end-
less problems about how to draw the boundaries around each 
element, but also it occasionally departs from them. Take the 
case brought by Crawford Burton, a steeplechaser, after two 
photographs of him appeared in an advertisement for Camel 
cigarettes with the accompanying captions, “when you feel 
‘all in’—” and “get a LIFT with a CAMEL!” One photo-
graph caught his saddle and girth at just the right angle to sug-
gest he had a preposterously large penis.34 The inimitable Judge 
Learned Hand ruled that Burton could make out a case for 
libel even though he couldn’t plausibly point to any defama-
tory statement of fact:
We dismiss at once so much of the complaint as 
alleged that the advertisement might be read to say 
that the plaintiff was deformed, or that he had in-
decently exposed himself, or was making obscene 
34. The advertisement is splendidly reproduced at www.deceptology 
.com/2011/11/grotesque-monstrous-and-obscene-well.html (last visited 1 
June 2016).
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jokes by means of the legends. Nobody could be fat-
uous enough to believe any of these things; every-
body would at once see that it was the camera, and 
the camera alone, that had made the unfortunate 
mistake. If the advertisement is a libel, it is such in 
spite of the fact that it asserts nothing whatever about 
the plaintiff, even by the remotest implications.35
Still, Hand argued, Burton’s reputation had been damaged. He’d 
been exposed to ridicule and contempt. Or so a jury could 
reasonably find. On one view, Hand offers a deeper account of 
defamation, one casting the traditional constituent elements 
as only the most obvious way in which one can be defamed. 
On another view, the now canonical elements of the tort I’ve 
presented crystallized as rigid requirements only more re-
cently, so Hand’s view was sensible enough when he offered it. 
On yet another view, Hand rejects the thought that the criteria 
for defamation will take the form of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. He argues instead that it’s a family-resemblance 
concept, that what happened to the steeplechaser is close 
enough to ordinary defamation that it should qualify. The lan-
guage of Hand’s opinion tilts toward the first interpretation, 
but we might still endorse the last—not least because there are 
plenty of ways of subjecting someone to ridicule and contempt 
that don’t begin to qualify as defamation at law. Take saddling 
someone with a ludicrous or degrading nickname.36 Take com-
35. Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936).
36. Consider the court’s treatment of an inaccurate use of the nickname 
“Wicked Wayne” in Tartaglia v. Townsend, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 693 (1985). A 
nickname that itself embeds an allegedly defamatory claim is another mat-
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ically mimicking someone’s eccentric gait.37 Then again, we 
might decide that despite his stature, Hand blew it and the 
ordinary requirements—defendant wrongly published a false 
defamatory statement of fact—should be seen as constitutive 
of the tort.
 One can profitably put pressure on any and every dimen-
sion of this tort. For instance, we might wonder what various 
strands are woven together in the concept of reputation.38 But 
my strategy here is to put pressure on just one feature of the 
tort: the thought that it offers no protection for the reputa-
tional interests of the dead.
Law’s Skepticism and Ours
For indeed, overwhelmingly—I’ll provide detail in chapter 4—
modern American tort law rejects the claim that defaming the 
dead is a legal injury. But there are two crucial features of the 
law’s stance.
 One: you could insist that the dead can’t experience hurt 
ter: thus the treatment of “la vieja,” ordinarily “the old woman,” to intimate 
that a man is gay in Garcia v. MAC Equip., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104502 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2011).
37. Such mimicking is alleged in Jones v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102040 (D.R.I. Aug. 20, 2010), with multiple causes of ac-
tion all dismissed on summary judgment: tellingly the court does not think 
the mimicking is any part of the defamation claim.
38. Indispensable here are Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of 
Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution,” California Law Review 
(May 1986); and Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2007). There are closely connected issues in 
James Q. Whitman, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus 
Liberty,” Yale Law Journal (April 2004).
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feelings, so they can’t be injured by defamation. But hurt feel-
ings, or in legalese pain and suffering, aren’t an element of the 
tort. Yes, plaintiffs who are defamed can recover damages for 
their pain and suffering. And I don’t doubt that it’s excruciat-
ing to know that others believe something defamatory about 
you. Again, one reason the law sometimes doesn’t require any 
proof of pain and suffering might be that one would more or 
less automatically expect it to follow from defamation. But a 
plaintiff who doesn’t allege any pain and suffering can win a 
defamation action. He can testify that he never fretted, that 
he  had dry contempt for others’ believing the defamation—
but he can still adduce ways in which he’s worse off. “The claim 
that I embezzled, diddled, and popped didn’t bother me, but it 
got me fired”: that might reduce his monetary award and the 
jury might find it baffling; but if defendant argues that it means 
plaintiff wasn’t defamed or can’t recover, the judge will reject 
that argument out of hand.
 Two: you could return to the oblivion thesis and insist 
that once you’re dead, you have no interests at all. In this view, 
there’s nothing special about defaming the dead. You’d expect 
to have no posthumous interests that tort law could vindicate 
if you think there are no posthumous interests, period. But the 
law does recognize some posthumous interests.
 Let’s start here: a legally valid will enables you to dispose 
of your property after you die. Well, not quite: you won’t be 
around to do that. More precisely, a legally valid will enables 
you, while you’re still alive, to decide how your property will 
be distributed once you’re dead. Your will may be challenged: 
people you’ve given short shrift can argue that you weren’t 
competent to make a will—you were delusional or drunk or 
coerced or unduly influenced, say—or that your will has been 
forged or that they have a later valid will, which would take 
Tort’s Landscape 59
precedence.39 But if the will is valid, the law will ensure that the 
will’s executor respect your intentions, however extraordinary.
 The straightforward interpretation of this practice relies 
on what we say and think all the time: we owe it to the dead 
to respect their wishes. Shrugging at the will and deciding we 
know better what to do with the property would seem down-
right contemptuous. As usual, a consequentialist can recon-
struct these intuitions. The real parties in interest, he’d argue, 
are the beneficiaries of the will. They’re alive, thank you very 
much, and they have an interest in the will being enforced. But 
why prefer their interests to the interests of those cut out of the 
will? And why insist on their interests when they’re pets? 
Leona Helmsley left her Maltese, Trouble, a cool $12m in a trust: 
because of the sort of trust it was, a court was able to knock it 
down to $2m on the ground that Trouble couldn’t conceivably 
live long enough to need more even to be supported palatial-
ly.40 But no court would rule that because it’s perverse to leave 
a fortune to a pet, Helmsley’s will should be flouted. No court 
would decide to assign those millions to increase social wel-
fare, say by giving them to an inner-city hospital. That maneu-
ver is plain out of bounds.41
39. Kaprelian v. Kerri Barsamian Harstad, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
10065 (Dec. 20, 2010) (delusional); In re Estate of Willer, 225 Iowa 606 (1938) 
(drunk); Matter of Aoki, 99 A.D.3d 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (coercion or 
undue influence); Daroff Estate, 1964 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 317 (Pa. 
C.P., Orphans’ Ct. Div. 1964) (upholding trial verdict rejecting deceased’s 
brother’s accusations that deceased’s girlfriend murdered him and forged his 
will). On missing later wills, compare Sanderson v. Norcross, 242 Mass. 43 
(1922) and In re Williams’ Will, 121 Misc. 243 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1923).
40. Jeffrey Toobin, “Rich Bitch: The Legal Battle over Trust Funds for 
Pets,” New Yorker (29 September 2008).
41. On deference to testator’s intent, see esp. Smithsonian Institution v. 
Meech, 169 U.S. 398 (1898).
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 Trouble (the dog) looks like trouble for a consequential-
ist. How might he counter? Consider three possibilities. First, 
he could adopt a modified error theory: we serve the interests 
of the living by cultivating excessive regard for testamentary in-
tentions, enforcing them even in cases where no living persons 
are served. By being overinclusive in this way, we strengthen 
living people’s security that we will adhere to the terms of their 
wills. Second, he could adopt a rule-consequentialist move: 
it’s efficient, or optimal in whatever sense you like, to enforce 
valid wills across the board, because the error and transaction 
costs of trying to figure out which individual wills aren’t opti-
mal are too high. The error costs would be those of refusing to 
enforce wills that actually do serve efficiency (but not enforc-
ing wills that shouldn’t be enforced, because we’re comparing 
case-by-case appraisal to a blanket policy of enforcing all valid 
wills). The transaction costs would be the judicial and other 
resources consumed in appraising the consequences of par-
ticular wills. This second move must be contrived if optimality 
means anything like maximizing utility. Plenty of wills are 
made by wealthy people passing their wealth on to their chil-
dren. Is there a plausible story about how they serve some op-
timal end? Isn’t it suspicious how diminishing marginal utility 
plays Cheshire Cat in these discussions, appearing and disap-
pearing unpredictably? Third, he might argue that by letting 
people write enforceable wills, the law saves them from having 
to distribute their property while they’re still alive, which could 
corrupt their relationships with friends, loved ones, charitable 
agencies, and so on. Sure: but wills also let people jerk around 
potential beneficiaries by dangling alluring rewards or nasty 
denials. It’s hard to see why the allegedly sophisticated conse-
quentialist stance is more appealing than sticking with the ev-
eryday intuition that we owe it to Helmsley to enforce her will. 
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The consequentialist stance is badly engineered: it has too 
many rickety moving parts. Yes, I’m ruefully aware that a con-
sequentialist can now go meta and argue that our everyday 
intuitions, nonconsequentialist as they seem, are properly kit-
ted out for the mentally feeble beings that we are, and were we 
sufficiently brainy we would embrace his more elaborate re-
constructions without hesitation.
 Still, when we enforce a will we are respecting the inten-
tions once entertained by a living agent. Defaming the dead is 
different: it’s contrived to say that living agents intend not to be 
defamed after their deaths, because you can’t have intentions 
about what independent agents do. However we describe the 
difference, my next examples of the law’s regard for the dead 
can’t be set aside as easily.
 Take the confidentiality of privileged attorney-client com-
munications. (Those communications are privileged when they 
are offered to the lawyer in his capacity as a lawyer, not say as 
a personal aside, and only when offered in private or only in 
the presence of the lawyer’s associates and agents: a secretary, 
say. Note the contrast: demeaning statements of fact qualify as 
defamation if and only if published to third parties; communi-
cations don’t qualify for the privilege if they are published to 
third parties.) A grand jury wanted to know what Vince Foster 
had to say to his lawyer nine days before he committed sui-
cide. But the relevant federal rule of evidence instructs courts 
to “look to the principles of the common law as they may be 
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of 
reason and experience,”42 and the Supreme Court easily found 
that Foster’s communications were still properly confidential. 
Again I think the straightforward interpretation is that we owe 
42. USCS Fed. Rules Evid. R. 501.
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it to Foster to respect confidentiality here, even though he’s 
dead. Again there are consequentialist reconstructions and in-
deed the Court offered some: “Without assurance of the priv-
ilege’s posthumous application, the client may very well not 
have made disclosures to his attorney at all, so the loss of evi-
dence is more apparent than real. In the case at hand, it seems 
quite plausible that Foster, perhaps already contemplating sui-
cide, may not have sought legal advice from Hamilton if he 
had not been assured the conversation was privileged.”43 But 
even the dissenters conceded “that a deceased client may re-
tain a personal, reputational, and economic interest in confi-
dentiality.”44 In some jurisdictions, the living lawyer does not 
merely have the right to maintain the confidentiality of privi-
leged communications. He has a duty to do so. As an Illinois 
court put it, citing state statutes, “It is therefore immaterial 
that the attorney, called as a witness, is willing to disclose them 
and as the privilege applies to the communication it is imma-
terial whether the client is or is not a party to the action in 
which the questions arise. . . . This protection, given by the law 
to communications made during the relationship of attorney 
and client, is perpetual and does not cease by the death of the 
client.”45
 So too for other privileged communications. In a Cali-
fornia case, worries about the validity of a will were not enough 
to override the confidentiality of the deceased’s communica-
tions with his doctor. In a 1962 will, Alice Marie White be-
queathed her son Albert a trust and provided that Stanford 
43. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998).
44. Swidler & Berlin at 412 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
45. In re Estate of Busse, 332 Ill. App. 258, 266 (1947) (citing, at the el-
lipses, 28 R. C. L. 548, § 138 and 28 R. C. L. 570, § 160).
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University would inherit any remaining assets at Albert’s death. 
But then in 1985 the public administrator found Alice’s 1981 
will in her safe-deposit box. This one left everything to Albert 
outright. Seeking to challenge the validity of this later will, 
Stanford wanted to press the theory that it was merely a ges-
ture to persuade the then mentally disabled Albert that he was 
securely provided for. So they tried to subpoena Albert’s med-
ical records. The court refused. California law provided that 
holders of such privileges—from confidential communications 
between attorneys and clients, doctors and patients, penitents 
and clergy members, and more—were free to insist on them 
or waive them. Albert was now dead; his estate’s administra-
tor held the privilege and wished to enforce it. No more had 
to be said.46
 You might well wonder why the legislature would adopt 
such a rule. Once again, there’s a consequentialist reconstruc-
tion. (There always is, isn’t there?) The court put it this way: 
“The possibility of posthumous exposure of sensitive, highly 
personal, and sometimes embarrassing information about one’s 
physical or mental condition, information which often involves 
surviving family members or other individuals with whom the 
patient has had contacts, would hinder the free communica-
tion between patient and professional which the privilege is 
designed to encourage.”47 The merits of that reconstruction 
aside, the administrator has fiduciary obligations to represent 
46. Rittenhouse v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1584 (1991). For the 
substantive guarantee, see Cal. Evid. Code § 912. Compare the treatment of 
attorney/client privilege in In re Layman’s Will, 40 Minn. 371 (1889). For 
more on medical privacy after death, see Daniel Sperling, Posthumous Inter-
ests: Legal and Ethical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), chap. 5.
47. Rittenhouse at 1590.
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the interests of the deceased, not to do whatever he takes to be 
socially optimal or economically efficient, not to think about 
whether he imagines Stanford is a deserving beneficiary, not 
anything remotely like that. Similarly, had Stanford showed 
up in the internecine court proceedings over Leona Helmsley’s 
will and urged that they were more deserving than Trouble, 
the court wouldn’t have given them the time of day.
 Legislation sometimes secures posthumous interests. 
Take Washington state’s statute on the right of publicity, secur-
ing “a property right in the use of his or her name, voice, sig-
nature, photograph, or likeness. . . . The property right does not 
expire upon the death of the individual or personality, regard-
less of whether the law of the domicile, residence, or citizen-
ship of the individual or personality at the time of death or 
otherwise recognizes a similar or identical property right.”48 
Litigation over the exclusive right to commercially exploit Jimi 
Hendrix’s likeness and name produced a flurry of constitu-
tional challenges to this provision. They failed.49 You might 
think the real beneficiaries of the rule are the living inheritors 
of Hendrix’s intellectual property rights, but not all such legis-
lation can be disposed of so readily.
 So consider a quirky complication in U.S. copyright law. 
We tend to think of the “moral rights of the artist” as a Euro-
pean obsession. But visual artists now enjoy a right—the qual-
ifications needn’t concern us—“to prevent any intentional dis-
tortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which 
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any 
intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work 
48. Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 63.60.010.
49. Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd, 762 F.3d 829 
(9th Cir. 2014).
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is a violation of that right . . . and to prevent any destruction of 
a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly 
negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.”50 
The visual artist continues to enjoy these rights even when 
someone else owns the work of art. And visual artists who cre-
ated their art before 1990, when this legislation took effect, and 
still owned it then enjoy that right for decades after they die.51
 Here’s another bit of intellectual property law. Under the 
Lanham Act, as a general matter trademarks shall issue on 
application—but not for “matter which may disparage . . . per-
sons, living or dead . . . or bring them into contempt, or disre-
pute.”52 What’s the point of this restriction? Surely one plausible 
view—I don’t insist that it stands alone—is that it invades the 
rights of the dead to use them for marketing in such deroga-
tory ways. Denial of a trademark is far removed from liability 
in tort. But here the law does seem solicitous of the dead’s rep-
utational interests.
 Sometimes the law protects posthumous rights even when 
the legislature hasn’t explicitly addressed the matter. Take the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), honeycombed with ex-
emptions designed to protect individual privacy. Does the 
provision exempting information that “could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy” extend to protecting the privacy of the dead?53 One 
court ruled it does: “the death of the subject of personal infor-
mation does diminish to some extent the privacy interest in 
50. 17 USCS § 106A(a)(3).
51. 17 USCS § 106A(d)(2), incorporating by reference 17 USCS §§ 302–3. 
Thanks to Jessica Litman for pointing me to Experience Hendrix and for 
guiding me through the complexities of this statute.
52. 15 USCS § 1052(a).
53. 5 USCS § 552(b)(7)(c).
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that information, though it by no means extinguishes that 
 interest; one’s own and one’s relations’ interests in privacy 
 ordinarily extend beyond one’s death.”54 The Supreme Court, 
considering the same provision in a challenge to a denial of a 
FOIA request for the death-scene photos of Vince Foster, re-
lied on the thought that publicizing the photos would invade 
the privacy of Foster’s surviving family members.55 But that 
was precisely the rationale urged by Foster’s family and by the 
solicitor general in their briefs and there was no reason for 
the Court to take up Foster’s own interests sua sponte, or on its 
own accord.56
 These features of law are so deeply entrenched that it’s 
easy to ignore them. On the view that dead people still have 
interests that the law should respect, they are crystal clear and 
make perfect sense. Those denying that view can offer ellipti-
cal reconstructions or argue that the law is wrong. But the law 
is utterly solicitous of your testamentary intentions, however 
eccentric; and the law will enforce the confidentiality of your 
privileged communications after your death; and the law will 
extend some statutory protections to cover the dead, even ab-
sent any pressing evidence that the bare language of the statute 
requires doing so or that the legislature intended that result.
54. Schrecker v. United States DOJ, 254 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
This continues to be binding law in the circuit: see Plunkett v. DOJ, 924 F. 
Supp. 2d 289 (D.D.C. 2013).
55. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). Like-
wise, on a parallel FOIA exemption, see Badhwar v. United States Dep’t of Air 
Force, 829 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Contrast the reliance on Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 652I, in Mineer v. Williams, 82 F. Supp. 2d 702 (E.D. Ky. 
2000) (denying the possibility of tort liability for invading the privacy of a 
dead person).
56. 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 808; 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 816.
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 Recall what I dubbed the oblivion thesis, one powerfully 
seductive attack on worries about defaming the dead. Recall 
the appeal of the dead butcher’s haunting refrain: “When I die, 
my body will be taken to the charnel ground and it will be 
eaten by birds and wild animals. Not a trace will be left. My 
mind will vanish, so at that time who will be left to go to the 
hells. ha! ha!” Our skeptic bravely sides with the butcher and 
taunts us for implicitly relying on belief in the afterlife, just 
the sort of belief the Tibetan Book of the Dead enlists to show 
that the joke’s on the butcher. And again I want to argue that 
the oblivion thesis is false—and I want to deny that doing so 
requires any such reliance on the afterlife.
 For now, I want to emphasize this. Rejecting a privacy 
claim brought on behalf of a dead woman, another New York 
court said bluntly, “Death deprives us of all rights, in the legal 
sense of that term.”57 As a matter of positive law, that was 
wrong when the court said it. It remains wrong today. Because 
the law won’t entertain tort claims for defaming the dead, I 
can’t enlist the law as support for my view. But neither can fans 
of the oblivion thesis.
57. Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 447 (1895).
III
Speak No Evil
This obituary went viral:
 Marianne Theresa Johnson-Reddick born Jan 
4, 1935 and died alone on [August] 30, 2013. She is 
survived by her 6 of 8 children whom she spent her 
lifetime torturing in every way possible. While she 
neglected and abused her small children, she re-
fused to allow anyone else to care or show compas-
sion towards them. When they became adults she 
stalked and tortured anyone they dared to love. Ev-
eryone she met, adult or child was tortured by her 
cruelty and exposure to violence, criminal activity, 
vulgarity, and hatred of the gentle or kind human 
spirit.
 On behalf of her children whom she so abra-
sively exposed to her evil and violent life, we cele-
brate her passing from this earth and hope she lives 
in the after-life reliving each gesture of violence, 
cruelty, and shame that she delivered on her chil-
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dren. Her surviving children will now live the rest 
of their lives with the peace of knowing their night-
mare finally has some form of closure.
 Most of us have found peace in helping those 
who have been exposed to child abuse and hope 
this message of her final passing can revive our mes-
sage that abusing children is unforgiveable, shame-
less, and should not be tolerated in a “humane 
 society.” Our greatest wish now, is to stimulate a 
 national movement that mandates a purposeful and 
dedicated war against child abuse in the United 
States of America.1
Months later, the obituary’s author outed herself online. One of 
Johnson-Reddick’s daughters, she furnished wrenching detail 
of child abuse and responded to the charge that it was outra-
geous to craft such an obituary:
How could anyone write a scathing and public obit-
uary showing such disdain for a parent? For me, it 
was a natural “normal” process for ending and cel-
ebrating the death of someone who camouflaged 
themselves as a mother.
 There are no words or expressions to ade-
quately describe the sense of freedom I felt upon a 
phone call from my brother singing “Ding Dong, 
the witch is dead.”
1. Reno Gazette-Journal (10 September 2013). Reprinted with permis-
sion of Katherine Reddick, Ph.D. Organizational Consultant, specializing in 
reforming America’s foster care system.
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The resoundingly positive online comments included this gem: 
“I applaud you. Congratulations on the loss of your mother.”2
 Whether or not the daughter acted wrongly in publish-
ing this obituary, it isn’t innocuous. It wouldn’t have gone 
viral—globally—if it hadn’t so blatantly transgressed our deep 
sense that you should speak no ill of the dead. That norm is 
so powerful that even Richard Nixon benefited from it. Yes, 
Tricky Dick—I came of political age despising him, way before 
Watergate, so I recycled the name for the ludicrous orange 
vinyl clown my small daughters used as a bath toy; they rel-
ished the vaguely obscene noise it made when they squeezed 
it, and I figured political socialization can’t start too early—
died and suddenly was no longer the guy you wouldn’t buy a 
used car from.3 Instead he was instantly reincarnated as a sage 
statesman. Even the New York Times, not renowned for its de-
votion to Nixon or the GOP, ran an obituary that pivoted from 
acknowledging Watergate to intoning, “Yet Mr. Nixon, surely 
one of the half-dozen pivotal figures of American politics in 
the quarter-century that followed World War II, wrought for-
eign policy accomplishments of historic proportions that had 
proved beyond the reach of his Democratic foes.”4
2. Katherine Reddick, “I Wrote the ‘Scathing Obituary’ about My Mother, 
and Here’s Why I Did It and Have No Regrets,” www.xojane.com/it-happened 
-to-me/scathing-obituary-katherine-reddick (18 February 2014) (last vis-
ited 10 June 2014), footnotes removed. See too Siobhan McAndrew, “Brutal 
Obituary Reveals Lives of Neglect, Abuse: Daughter, Son Didn’t Expect 
Mother’s Obit to Go Viral,” Reno Gazette-Journal (11 September 2013).
3. “The Salesman”—of caskets, not cars—in Herbert Block, The Herblock 
Gallery (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 171–72, reprinted in Block, 
Herblock Special Report (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 68–71, ought to be 
better known.
4. R. W. Apple, Jr., “The 37th President; Richard Nixon, 81, Dies; A Mas-
ter of Politics Undone by Watergate,” New York Times (23 April 1994).
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 So even if it can be overridden, there seems to be some 
serious commitment to the view that we ought not speak ill of 
the dead. Our skeptic might be impatient. “Johnson-Reddick 
is dead,” he’ll say. “She’s in no position to be wronged. Make 
the obituary as flagrantly false as you like. Make the daughter’s 
motivations as wretched as you like. It makes no difference. 
Johnson-Reddick is beyond harm, beyond wrong. I grant,” 
he continues, “that the prohibition on speaking ill of the dead 
goes back a very long way. Indeed an early statement comes 
from Chilon of Sparta, from the sixth century b.c.5 But you’ve 
rightly credited me with commitments to the oblivion thesis 
and the hangover thesis. Recall Fustel’s account and you’ll see 
why people thought they shouldn’t speak ill of the dead. It’s 
prudent to refrain if you imagine their spirits are alert, power-
ful, vengeful. But once you surrender that picture, you ought to 
realize that the dead are well and truly gone. They’re in no po-
sition to suffer distress, let alone to take vengeance on us: who 
will be left to go to the hells? ha! ha! Johnson-Reddick cannot 
reach out from beyond the grave and punish her daughter for 
her audacity. So there is no reason to hesitate at speaking ill of 
the dead. Not that a weighty presumption against doing that 
could in principle be overridden, as many thought was true 
in the case of the daughter’s obituary for her mother. Rather 
that there’s no apparent justification for having any such pre-
sumption in the first place. Or anyway, that presumption would 
have to depend on the claims of the living, because they’re the 
only critters with any claims at all.”
 The skeptic is right about one thing: cultural disapproval 
of speaking ill of the dead, even skittishness about it, is long-
5. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, 
2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 1:70.
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standing. It’s undeniable that we think it’s ordinarily an awful 
thing to do, at least about those who’ve died recently, at least 
by those who knew them, or to people who knew them or in 
settings where those people will learn about it. Talk of cross- 
cultural universals is notoriously tricky, but I also think it un-
deniable that some such sentiment is utterly common across 
centuries and continents. I turn now to canvassing some his-
torical sources: like law, they offer an opportunity to go beyond 
intuition; and like law, they’re worthy of some epistemic defer-
ence. Here I briefly sample some discussions from early mod-
ern England. I don’t imagine that any such snapshots could 
begin to furnish a properly historical account. But I do want 
to invoke some argumentative maneuvers available in the set-
ting shaping the common law. Then I’ll probe one nineteenth- 
century American controversy in depth.
Some Views from Early Modern England
Earnest moralists and churchmen in England loved to recur to 
the Latin maxim de mortuis nil nisi bonum: of the dead, noth-
ing unless good; or, for its actual force, speak no ill of the dead. 
The injunction to speak no ill of the dead even made it into a 
children’s primer with the monarch’s stamp of approval.6 Ad-
dressing Parliament and Queen Elizabeth on the nefarious role 
of the deceased Philip II of Spain in the Anglo-Spanish War, 
the Lord Keeper quoted de mortuis and then underlined it with 
hyperbole: “I would be loth to speak of the dead, much more 
6. The New Universal Primer, or, An Easy Book, Suited to the Tender Ca-
pacities of Children: Authorised by His Majesty King George (Derby, [1790?]), 
50. See too John Tapner, The School-Master’s Repository; or, Youth’s Moral 
Preceptor (London, [1761]), 29.
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to slander the dead.”7 Remember, some urged, that Solon in his 
wisdom had made de mortuis a law for Athens. Plutarch reports 
Solon’s justification: “It is pious to think the deceased sacred, 
and just, not to meddle with those that are gone, and politic, to 
prevent the perpetuity of discord.”8 The discord might be among 
the living, divided by their disputes about the dead. Or it might 
also be visited on us by the resentful dead. This is an ancient 
belief, but it surfaces later than you might expect. One (fic-
tionalized) 1691 source observes, “Plato’s Ring had this Motto 
on it, It is easier to provoke the Dead, than to pacifie them, when 
once provok’d. Intimating thereby, That the Souls of the Departed, 
are sensible of the Injuries that are done them by the Living.”9 
Again I disclaim any reliance on the claim that the dead are 
aware of and interested in what the living say. So again if it 
turns out that’s the only way to make sense of worries about 
defaming the dead, we should—I should—stop worrying.
 One divine likened those bashing a dead prelate to hiss-
ing adders and “Cannibals . . . delight[ing] to feed on dead 
mans flesh, by tearing of their Fame.”10 The parallel to canni-
balism isn’t unique. One 1611 writer sighed, “Mee thinks, that 
Calumny should ende with the carkasse of her subiect, and not 
7. Sir Simonds D’Ewes, The Journals of All the Parliaments during the 
Reign of Queen Elizabeth, Both of the House of Lords and the House of Com-
mons, rev. Paul Bowes (London, 1682), 599–600.
8. Plutarch’s Lives, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, 10 vols. (London: William 
Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914), 1:461.
9. [Mahmut] to Dgnet Oglou, 20th of the 1st moon of the year 1649, in 
[Giovanni Paolo Marana], The Third Volume of Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy, 
Who Lived Five and Forty Years, Undiscover’d, at Paris (London, 1691), 356.
10. Isaac Basire, The Dead Mans Real Speech: A Funeral Sermon Preached 
on Hebr. Xi. 4 (London, 1673), 32–33. See more generally William Davy, A 
System of Divinity, in a Course of Sermons, 26 vols. (Lustleigh, [1798–]1807), 
8:275–76.
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haunt the graue till the last bone be consumed.”11 (Would our 
skeptic say that shrinking from cannibalism is itself indefensi-
ble? “It’s protein, and it’s just a cadaver, not a person. Probably 
it’s an environmental winner to eat corpses: Greenpeace ought 
to get over their irrational disgust and start lobbying. I guess 
you’d want to know about mercury and saturated fat, bacteria 
too; but that’s to serve your welfare, not the dead person’s.” I’ll 
turn to corpse desecration in chapter 5.) It’s worth mentioning 
a cultural setting the early modern English were less fond of: 
according to one hadith, the Prophet reproved two men for 
commenting nastily on a man stoned to death for adultery. As 
they passed a dead donkey, the Prophet invited them to partake 
of its flesh. They were stunned—until the Prophet explained 
that their dishonoring the dead man was worse than eating the 
carcass.12
 Just how is speaking ill of the dead like cannibalism? We 
might say that each practice treats the dead unacceptably, but 
that wouldn’t provide much leverage. That is, it wouldn’t fol-
low that cannibalism is objectionable for the same reasons that 
speaking ill of the dead is. But maybe it’s just that each is an 
invasion of a feature closely associated with persons: bodies in 
one case, reputations in the other. If you think it’s wrong to 
invade such features when persons are alive, you might think 
it remains wrong when they’re dead. It remains open whether 
worrying about such invasions after the person’s death is irra-
tional, even contemptible, or perfectly sensible.
11. [Anthony Stafford], Staffords Niobe: or His Age of Teares (London, 
1611), 137.
12. Imam Abu Dawud As-Sijistani, Sunan Abu Dawud: The Third Correct 
Tradition of the Prophetic Sunna, trans. Mohammad Mahdi al-Sharif, 5 vols. 
(Lebanon: Dar Al-Kotob Al-ilmiyah, 2008), 5:50, an extension of Quran 
49:12.
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 Some indicted the cowardice of defaming the dead: “It is 
not less cowardly to speak ill of the Dead, than it would be to 
kill an Enemy incapable of making his own Defence.”13 Others 
seem to have found a violation of gallantry: “Amongst generous 
Spirits, it is accounted base to be valiant amongst them that 
cannot resist, or to hurt the name and reputation of the dead.”14
 The dead can’t defend themselves. These authors appeal 
to that ineluctable fact to support a principle sounding in fair 
play: one ought to attack only those capable of self-defense; 
criticizing the dead is then like taking candy from a baby. 
(Compare two nearby principles: “Pick on someone your own 
size”; and “If you have something to say about me, say it to my 
face.”) The same ineluctable fact could be spun epistemically: 
we’re less likely to learn what can be said in the dead’s defense. 
After all, the living might well know exculpatory things about 
themselves that others don’t know. And they might well have a 
keener incentive to defend themselves. These reasons offer the 
outlines of a defense of the view that we should speak no ill 
of the dead. But the stricture against speaking ill of the dead 
doesn’t seem to extend to criticizing the comatose or far-off 
people who speak foreign languages. So this justification is 
overinclusive as against the norm we’re trying to understand.
13. [Jean Baptiste Morvan, Abbé de Bellegarde], Reflexions upon Ridi-
cule, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (London, 1717), 1:143. See too [Adam Petrie], Rules of 
Good Deportment, or of Good Breeding, for the Use of Youth (Edinburgh, 
1720), 58; A Collection of Select Aphorisms and Maxims (Dublin, 1722), 8; 
Charles Palmer, A Collection of Select Aphorisms and Maxims (London, 
1748), 14; Chilo the Lacedemonian, in Erasmus, The Apopthegms of the An-
cients, 2 vols. (London, 1753), 1:77; The Instructor: or, The Art of Living Well 
(London, 1754), 146.
14. John Guillim, A Display of Heraldry (London, 1679), 165. See too 
John Spencer, Kaina Kai Palia: Things New and Old (London, 1658), 206.
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 Most early modern English opponents of de mortuis do 
not endorse the oblivion thesis. They do not say that the dead 
have no claims on us. Instead they argue that the norm may be 
properly overridden, just as many thought Johnson-Reddick’s 
daughter was justified in publishing her blistering obituary. Or 
they argue that de mortuis chips away too broadly at frank dis-
cussion of the dead, some of which would be salutary. One 
pamphleteer assaulting the recently executed Charles I spat 
out, “I am not ignorant what senslesse maxims and ridiculous 
principles have gotten credit in the World (as undoubted Ora-
cles indisputably to be obeyed) as that de mortuis nil nisi bona, 
but by no means to tread on the sacred Urne of Princes, though 
living never so vicious and exorbitant, as if death had be-
queathed unto them a supersedeas for the covering over their 
faults and licencious reignes, and to close them up in the Cof-
fin of Oblivion.”15 (A contemporary defined supersedeas: “In our 
common Law it signifieth a commandement sent by writing, 
forbidding an officer from the doing of that, which otherwise 
he might and ought to doe.”)16 Jonathan Swift fumed, “These 
excellent Casuists know just Latin enough, to have heard a 
most foolish Precept, that de mortuis nil nisi bonum, so that 
if Socrates, and Anytus his Accuser, had happened to die to-
gether, the Charity of Survivers must either have obliged them 
15. The Life and Reigne of King Charls, or the Pseudo Martyr Discovered 
(London, 1651), preface, sig. A4 recto. The piece is sometimes attributed to 
John Milton, but that seems wrong. There’s no mention of it in Complete 
Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe et al., 8 vols. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1953–82).
16. I. B., An English Expositor: Teaching the Interpretation of the Hardest 
Words Used in Our Language (London, 1641), s.v. supersedeas. Note Hobbes’s 
characteristic worry about fragmented authority: Tho[mas] Hobbes, De Cor-
pore Politico: or, The Elements of Law, Moral & Politick (London, 1652), 153.
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to hold their Peace, or to fix the same Character on both.”17 
The thought is that we have pressing interests in sharpening 
our moral appraisals, and it would make us less intelligent to 
declare the dead off limits. Given one strand of the compli-
cated gender history of free speech, on which public reason 
invigorates manly citizens and humble deference effeminates 
subjects, Dr. Johnson may have been agreeing when he scoffed 
that de mortuis “appeared to me to favour more of female 
weakness than of manly reason.”18
 These writers rallied to underline the public benefits of 
speaking ill of the dead when the ill is deserved; that is, when 
the charges are truthful; that is, when it would not today qual-
ify at tort law as defamation even were the subjects alive. That 
stance might explain this apparent irony: “I am not fond of li-
belling the dead,” one writer assured his readers before pum-
meling one of English legal history’s most deserving targets, 
Judge Jeffreys of the infamous bloody assizes.19 Nothing libel-
ous about rehearsing the actual record of Jeffries’s scandalous 
abuses. So—I want to emphasize this point—it’s a mistake to 
imagine that de mortuis underwrites the case for making it a 
17. An Answer to a Paper Called a Memorial (Dublin, 1728), in The Prose 
Works of Jonathan Swift, ed. Herbert Davis, 14 vols. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1939–68), 12:24–25. See too Swift’s An Examination of Certain Abuses, Cor-
ruptions, and Enormities in the City of Dublin (Dublin, 1732), in Prose Works, 
12:226–27.
18. “Young,” in Samuel Johnson, The Lives of the Most Eminent English 
Poets, with Critical Observations on Their Works, ed. Roger Lonsdale, 4 vols. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 4:149.
19. [Philip Withers], Alfred’s Appeal: Containing His Address to the Court 
of King’s Bench, on the Subject of the Marriage of Mary Anne Fitzherbert, and 
Her Intrigue with Count Bellois (London, 1789), 52. Compare Reveries of the 
Heart; during a Tour through Part of England and France, 2 vols. (London, 
1781), 2:186–87.
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tort to defame the dead. It’s a mistake to imagine that the crit-
ics I’ve quoted expose that case as silly. To the contrary! So far 
as they’re complaining that de mortuis is overinclusive, their 
views explain why tort law shouldn’t make it actionable to 
offer truthful criticism of the dead. But truth is not defamatory 
anyway, whether the target of the attack is alive or dead. In-
deed, early modern English critics’ emphasis on the social 
value of criticizing dead public figures, especially political 
and legal authorities, anticipates crucial strands of today’s First 
Amendment law, though obviously they couldn’t know that.
 More generally, de mortuis was pernicious nonsense that 
would make it impossible to write history, impossible to in-
spire readers to be moral:
They say, De Mortuis nil nisi Bonum,
Thieves and Murderers never stone ’um.
Do all mischief live or dead,
Expect not to be punished,
Nor so much as mentioned.
Why then should Vertue be rewarded,
If Vice must not be regarded?
These are simple, silly Themes,
The Offspring of idle Dreams.
Burn all Histories to Ashes,
Call Plutarch, Tacitus and Livy, Flashes.
For daring to record the Doom
Of Tyrants, in Greece or Rome.20
20. R[obert] D[ixon], Canidia, or The Witches: A Rhapsody (London, 
1683), 168. See too [John Carrington], The Lancashire Levite Rebuk’d: or, 
A Farther Vindication of the Dissenters from Popery, Superstition, Ignorance, 
and Knavery (London, 1698), preface; [Benjamin] Victor, The History of the 
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Even one churchman, Abraham Markland, agreed that one 
ought to speak evil of those who really deserved it: “As it is no 
Injury to the Dead, it is a Justice we owe to the Living; the 
greatest Kindness and Charity; and may serve to discourage 
and deter them from following such wicked Examples.”21
 Appeals to de mortuis exasperated even whimsical Lau-
rence Sterne. In Tristram Shandy he had taken a nasty swipe at 
the weirdly named—but, as always with Sterne, think about 
puns and lascivious associations, and, um, make it a short u—
Kunastrokius.22 Contemporaries figured out that this clown 
was the late Dr. Richard Mead. One of Sterne’s correspondents 
reproached him by reciting de mortuis. He’d “waited four days 
to cool myself,” responded Sterne, “before I would set pen to 
paper to answer you.” Then he let fly this zinger: “I can find 
nothing in it, or make more sense of it, than a nonsensical 
lullaby of some nurse, put into Latin by some pedant, to be 
chanted by some hypocrite to the end of the world, for the 
consolation of departing lechers.”23
Theatres of London and Dublin, from the Year 1730 to the Present Time, 2 vols. 
(London, 1761), 1:36–37; Richard Saumarez, A New System of Physiology, 
2nd ed., 2 vols. (London, 1799), 1:87 n. Contrast A Modest Vindication of 
Oliver Cromwell from the Unjust Accusations of Lieutenant-General Ludlow 
in His Memoirs (London, 1698), 76.
21. Abraham Markland, Sermons Preach’d at the Cathedral-Church of 
Winchester, 2 vols. (London, 1729), 2:120–21.
22. Tristram Shandy, vol. 1, chap. 7, from the narrator’s ruminations on 
hobby horses, with an unmistakable intimation of oral sex, if not oral-on-
anal bestiality: “Did not Dr. Kunastrokius, that great man, at his leisure 
hours, take the greatest delight imaginable in combing of asses’ tails, and 
plucking the dead hairs out with his teeth, though he had tweezers always in 
his pocket?”
23. Laurence Sterne to Dr. ******, 30 January 1760, in The Florida Edition 
of the Works of Laurence Sterne, ed. Melvyn New et al., 8 vols. (Gainesville: 
University Presses of Florida, 1978–2008), 7:114. For a different rendition of 
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 Notice another motif in these last few sources: prospec-
tive thieves, murderers, tyrants, and lechers can be deterred if 
they believe de mortuis will not protect their reputations once 
they’re dead. Not only will free discussion of the dead’s vices 
sharpen our moral understanding; it also will lead people to 
behave better. The invocation of deterrence means we will be-
have better, not just because of our sharpened understanding, 
but because we ourselves don’t want to be castigated once we’re 
dead. Here again the living’s concern for their postmortem rep-
utations is a prop in the argument that—the paradox is only 
apparent—it’s okay, all things considered, to criticize the dead.
 Is it irrational of the living to care about their postmor-
tem reputations? True, we joke about posterity: “What’s pos-
terity ever done for me?” True, we can imagine the cunning 
rogue whose plans depend on not getting caught only as long 
as he’s alive. He might deride the thought that his schemes 
would count as failures if they were detected only after his 
death. “By then,” he might say, “I’ll have pocketed and enjoyed 
my ill-gotten gains, and never been punished.” But many of us 
do want to be thought well of by posterity, if we’re remem-
bered at all. Or at least we want to be thought of justly. We 
want not to be credited with misdeeds we’re not actually guilty 
of. In short, we want not to be defamed after we’re dead. If 
you’re skeptical, you could shrug this off as a brute psycholog-
ical fact and say we might as well capitalize on it to promote 
the interests of the living. You could then redouble the attack 
on de mortuis: it’s only an obstacle to deterring bad actions.
Mead’s sexual predilections, see Florida Edition, 3:57–58. A critic of Tris-
tram Shandy, for reasons that escape me, presented himself as Kunastrokius’s 
son: Explanatory Remarks upon The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy: 
Wherein, the Morals and Politics of This Piece Are Clearly Laid Open, by Jere-
miah Kunastrokius, M.D. (London, 1760), 5.
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 Writers today may not tip their hats to, or scoff at, de 
mortuis, but it’s not hard to find them flouting its putative wis-
dom. Here’s Terry Eagleton taking deadly aim at two famous 
writers, living son and dead father. He starts with a quotation:
“They’re gaining on us demographically at a huge 
rate. A quarter of humanity now and by 2025 they’ll 
be a third. Italy’s down to 1.1 child per woman. 
We’re just going to be outnumbered. . . . There’s a 
definite urge—don’t you have it?—to say, ‘The Mus-
lim community will have to suffer until it gets its 
house in order.’ What sort of suffering? Not letting 
them travel. Deportation—further down the road. 
Curtailing of freedoms. Strip-searching people who 
look like they’re from the Middle East or from Pa-
kistan . . . Discriminatory stuff, until it hurts the 
whole community and they start getting tough with 
their children.” . . .
 Not the ramblings of a British National Party 
thug, but the reflections of the novelist Martin Amis, 
leading luminary of the English metropolitan liter-
ary world. There might, perhaps, be a genetic ex-
cuse for this squalid mixture of bile and hysteria: 
Amis’s father Kingsley, after all, was a racist, anti- 
Semitic boor, a drink-sodden, self-hating reviler of 
women, gays, and liberals, and Amis fils has clearly 
learnt more from him than how to turn a shapely 
phrase.24
24. “Introduction to the 2007 Edition,” in Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An 
Introduction (London: Verso, 2007), x. For the quotation, see www.ginny 
dougary.co.uk/the-voice-of-experience (last visited 12 December 2015).
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It’s easy to fret that tort liability would deprive us of the 
 pleasures—not all of them ignoble—of reading this sort of 
thing. We could bicker over whether Eagleton’s claims about 
Kingsley Amis are fact or opinion, for instance, or (transplant-
ing the matter from the U.K. to the U.S.) whether an action 
brought on behalf of Kingsley would founder on his being a 
public figure. But rules and remedies are not yet the point. We’re 
still trying to sort out whether it makes any sense to think 
there’s a presumptive injury here, even if we finally decide that 
offsetting considerations suggest that tort liability must be care-
fully refined—or precluded outright. Look how easily Abra-
ham Markland could concede that “it is no Injury to the Dead” 
to assail their reputations. You could interpret him as endors-
ing the global thesis that there’s nothing for the concept of 
wrongful injury to get a grip on. But again the context of his 
remark is crucial: he’s considering truthful reports of the dead’s 
misdeeds. So perhaps he’s saying only that they have no cause 
for complaint if their deeds are reported accurately.
 Still, I grant that Markland might champion the oblivion 
thesis. But recall that that thesis, whatever its merits, is an aw-
fully awkward explanation for tort law’s refusal to recognize 
defaming the dead as a cause of action, because the law read-
ily protects other posthumous interests. So too, de mortuis 
wouldn’t ground a defense of tort liability for defaming the 
dead, because the maxim is crudely wholesale. It covers evil 
spoken of the dead whether it’s true or false. But it’s a constitu-
tive element of the tort of defamation that the charge be false. 
You can recur to earlier strands in the common law, where 
even true defamatory claims could be tortious unless they 
were published for good ends, say to warn innocent third par-
ties against dealing with a scoundrel. But de mortuis is even 
broader than that. It is an apparently absolute proscription. The 
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oblivion thesis and de mortuis pair off nicely as rivals, then. 
But the law is drawing more fine-grained distinctions than 
either rival view suggests.
 You might think that we don’t need an argument for the 
oblivion thesis, that it’s obviously true. So consider this darkly 
hilarious epitaph:
Sacred to the Memory of the wanton and libidinous
E—S—V—G—,
Whose Life as variegated as the pantomimical Garb;
The Colours of which may each of them be considered
emblematic of her numerous destinies.
The Sable, the Gloom of a Prison, which she but too
often inhabited;
The Azure, that Calmness of Fortune, she seldom was
acquainted with,
And the Or, that Honor, Happiness, and Affluence which 
was
no sooner in her Grasp than discarded from Self-vanity,
Profligacy, and Inconsiderateness.
But to mark what she has been, and to ascertain what she 
should
have been, cannot but be affecting and deviating from
that humane, tho’ unwise Injunction,
de mortuis nil nisi bonum.
Of Ability, she was an uncommon Owner:
Of Fortune, ’till she abused the fickle Goddess, she never
knew the want;
And in her Matrimonial Connection, she might have been
peculiarly happy, had she not forfeited the Affections
of a deserving Husband, the Friendship of
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her Relations, and the Esteem of
her Friends, by
Infamy unparalleled;
Prostitution unrestrained,
Extravagance unbounded:
and Perfidy unmerited.
In the 39th Year of her Age, she departed this Life, friendless,
worn out by Debauchery and Want.25
 These charges could help motivate the living to steer 
clear of lurid vices (“I don’t want that on my gravestone!”), just 
as inscriptions touting the virtues of the dead could help mo-
tivate the living to pursue virtue themselves. But suppose that 
E.S.V.G. didn’t deserve a word of this, that it’s malicious fabri-
cation from start to finish. Let’s return to the core puzzle: was 
she injured by it? (Suppose her enemies don’t taunt her with 
the language before she dies.) Suppose someone erects a head-
stone or a monument with a similar tale about you after you 
die. Are you indifferent to that prospect? Or is the only reason 
you care that your family and friends would find it upsetting?
 But now I want to tighten the screws because I’m con-
vinced that that move sidesteps the issue. What would your 
family and friends be upset about? Presumably they think that 
you’ve been wronged. The loving family member who’s actu-
ally thinking, “Oh hell, dear departed’s reputation matters only 
if and insofar as it affects my life,” is self-absorbed. To put it 
mildly. If you think the defamatory epitaph is wrong only in-
sofar as it harms or offends the survivors, and they think the 
25. [Herbert Croft], The Wreck of Westminster Abbey, Being a Selection 
from the Monumental Records of the Most Conspicuous Personages, 6th ed. 
(London, [1788]), 34–35.
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injury is to the deceased, we’re going around in a perverse 
circle. Sure, you could resolve the paradox by insisting that 
it’s irrational for anyone to care about such matters. But what 
makes you so confident about that? I see the appeal of an error 
theory that impeaches our beliefs about our interests after we 
die, even if I’m not inclined to subscribe to it: there are abun-
dant puzzles and anyway it’s hard to be confident in our in-
tuitions. But I balk when it seems that that same error theory 
dictates that the everyday reactions of grieving survivors are 
simply misconceived. Imagine confronting E.S.V.G.’s indignant 
and sobbing daughter. “Not a word of it is true!” she gasps. 
“You have nothing to worry about,” you purr soothingly. “It’s 
no injury to your mother. After all, she’s dead.” Surely the 
daughter will glare at you as if you’re a blithering idiot. Want 
to persist and explain to her that she’s confused? If she’s more 
belligerent and threatens to defame your recently deceased 
mother to dramatize what’s at stake, do you want to shrug and 
say, “Be my guest”? If you shrink from that, do you want to 
defend the view that shrinking is irrational?
 Let’s return briefly to the Johnson-Reddick obituary and 
canvass the interests of the living that might underlie a com-
mitment to de mortuis. Living onlookers might have some in-
terest in knowing the truth about Johnson-Reddick. So they 
would be ill-served if the obituary were false, and it might then 
matter that Johnson-Reddick is in no position to respond to 
it. But if it’s true and they have reason to care, they’re better off 
for its publication. (But maybe they don’t or shouldn’t want only 
to believe what happens to be true. Maybe they do or should 
want their belief to be justified, and so maybe they too will or 
should worry about charging someone who can’t respond. Or 
maybe they are people who don’t want their longstanding 
 affection for Johnson-Reddick exploded by this news: after all, 
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we have interests in emotional well-being and serenity, not just 
in maximizing how many true beliefs we hold. This last sug-
gests that it’s overstated to cast truth as the sole regulative ideal 
of belief formation.) And the obituary makes an explicit ap-
peal to the public interest in understanding that child abuse is 
an outrage and in acting accordingly. That broader public, too, 
might be benefited, not least the children whose abuse would be 
averted by greater efforts, though—the epistemic point again—
it would be bad for the cause if it turned out the ghastly charges 
in the obituary were false, because others would suggest that 
we are suffering a case of moral panic about child abuse and 
we should realize that the phenomenon is overblown. Con-
sider the flap surrounding the revelation that Cambodian ac-
tivist Somaly Mam had invented her tale of being sold into sex 
slavery as an orphan.26
 But does it make sense to say that Johnson-Reddick 
 herself could be wronged by the publication of this obituary? 
Were she alive and were the charges false, surely the publication 
would be wrong. Tort law would recognize this as a straight-
forward case of libel. Trickier: suppose Johnson-Reddick were 
alive but the charges were true: could she be wronged by their 
publication? Or could she have a right that others not publish 
true but damaging information about her? What if they’d vol-
untarily agreed not to? What if their sole purpose in doing so 
was to cause her distress? Would that last go only to assessing 
their motivation but not to whether the publication itself was 
right or wrong? Whatever your inclination about those ques-
26. Thomas Fuller, “Cambodian Activist’s Fall Exposes Broad Deception,” 
New York Times (14 June 2014) (“A government study conducted five years 
ago found that 77 percent of children living in Cambodia’s orphanages had 
at least one [living] parent”).
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tions, we needn’t resolve them to get a clearer grasp of the legal 
issues surrounding defaming the dead, because—the point 
bears repetition—as a matter of law truthful claims cannot 
qualify as the tort of defamation.
Can the Dead Defame the Dead?
I turn now to a more extended example. First I lay out the 
source materials, in a roughly chronological narrative. Then I 
explore some queries about them.
 Margaret Fuller drowned on 19 July 1850, some fifty 
yards offshore, with onlookers making no rescue effort as the 
boat went down. She was returning from Italy with her hus-
band, Count Ossoli (though some scowled that they were only 
lovers), and their child; Ossoli and the child drowned too. 
Today she’s known mostly by feminists with historical inter-
ests, for her Woman in the Nineteenth Century—you might 
know Edgar Allan Poe’s apocryphal gibe, that humanity is di-
vided into “men, women, and Margaret Fuller”—and by those 
interested in American transcendentalism.27 Fuller was prom-
27. For a curious defense, insisting that Fuller was “large-breasted,” that 
“the strand of tawny blond hair that survives negates all claims that it was 
stringy and lusterless,” and that Europeans found her “graceful and charm-
ing,” see Joseph Jay Deiss, “Humanity, Said Edgar Allan Poe, Is Divided into 
Men, Women, and Margaret Fuller,” American Heritage (August 1972). You 
can’t make this stuff up. Deiss’s concession—“True, she was nearsighted and 
squinted disconcertingly”—is more of the same. The wording attributed to 
Poe, deployed endlessly since then, is from Perry Miller, The Transcendental-
ists: An Anthology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 467; 
it’s also in Margaret Fuller: American Romantic; A Selection from Her Writ-
ings and Correspondence, ed. Perry Miller (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 
1963), 192. Miller offers no citation and I’ve found no earlier instance of the 
language, though I blanch at the thought that Miller, a superb scholar, in-
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inent enough in those circles for Emerson to prevail on Tho-
reau to descend on the accident site and recover what he could. 
Thoreau was joined by other transcendentalists.28 Fuller and 
Nathaniel Hawthorne knew one another well: she was a regu-
lar visitor at Brook Farm, site of a utopian experiment where 
Hawthorne lived and worked—and which he put to work in 
writing The Blithedale Romance, whose Zenobia is surely mod-
eled on Fuller. There are notorious difficulties linking biogra-
phy to art, but it’s been plausibly argued that Fuller resurfaces 
elsewhere in Hawthorne’s fiction, too.29
 Nathaniel Hawthorne died on 19 May 1864: he’d had a 
stomachache. He left behind not just classics of American lit-
erature, but hundreds of unpublished journal pages.
 Hawthorne’s wife Sophia published material from his 
journals, but omitted inflammatory passages. Hawthorne’s son 
Julian exhibited no such restraint. Nathaniel Hawthorne and 
His Wife, which Julian published in 1884, ignited a firestorm 
over the inclusion of an excerpt from Nathaniel’s Roman jour-
vented it. Thanks to Eliza Richards for pointing me to Poe’s response to Fuller’s 
Woman in the Nineteenth Century: “Miss Fuller has erred, too, through her 
own excessive objectiveness. She judges woman by the heart and intellect of 
Miss Fuller, but there are not more than one or two dozen Miss Fullers on 
the whole face of the earth.” See “The Literati of New York City—No. IV,” 
Godey’s Lady’s Book (August 1846), reprinted in Edgar Allan Poe, Essays and 
Reviews (New York: Library of America, 1984), 1173.
28. Ralph Waldo Emerson to Marcus Spring, 23 July 1850, in The Letters 
of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Ralph L. Rusk and Eleanor M. Tilton, 8 vols. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1939–91), 8:254; also in The Selected 
Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Joel Myerson (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1997), 358; Henry David Thoreau to Ralph Waldo Emerson, 25 
July 1850, in The Correspondence of Henry David Thoreau, ed. Walter Hardin 
and Carl Bode (New York: New York University Press, 1958), 262–63.
29. Thomas R. Mitchell, Hawthorne’s Fuller Mystery (Amherst: Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
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nal that mused on Fuller and her relationship with Count Os-
soli. It was, declared one contemporary, “the great literary 
sensation of the season.”30 Nathaniel begins by recording the 
judgment of sculptor Joseph Mozier, an apparently knowl-
edgeable friend with whom Fuller had stayed a while in Italy. 
Ossoli’s family was poor and disreputable. Ossoli, thought 
Mozier, worked as a servant or kept someone’s apartment. He 
“was the handsomest man that Mr. Mozier ever saw, but en-
tirely ignorant, even of his own language; scarcely able to read 
at all; destitute of manners,—in short, half an idiot, and with-
out any pretension to be a gentleman.” Margaret had asked 
Mozier to teach Ossoli sculpture, but after four months’ work 
Ossoli crafted a foot with the big toe on the wrong side.
 Then Nathaniel shifts into his own voice. Ossoli, he 
muses,
could not possibly have had the least appreciation 
of Margaret; and the wonder is, what attraction she 
found in this boor, this man without the intellec-
tual spark,—she that had always shown such a cruel 
and bitter scorn of intellectual deficiency. As from 
her towards him, I do not understand what feeling 
there could have been; . . . as from him towards her 
I can understand as little, for she had not the charm 
of womanhood. But she was a person anxious to 
try all things, and fill up her experience in all direc-
tions; she had a strong and coarse nature, which she 
had done her utmost to refine, with infinite pains; 
but of course it could only be superficially changed. 
30. Caroline Healey Dall, “The Hawthorne Book Censured,” Republican 
(15 December 1884).
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The solution of the riddle lies in this direction; nor 
does one’s conscience revolt at the idea of thus solv-
ing it; for (at least, this is my own experience) Mar-
garet has not left in the hearts and minds of those 
who knew her any deep witness of her integrity and 
purity. She was a great humbug,—of course, with 
much talent and much moral reality, or else she 
could never have been so great a humbug. But she 
had stuck herself full of borrowed qualities, which 
she chose to provide herself with, but which had no 
root in her.
Emerson and others had soaring hopes for Fuller’s manuscript 
on the 1848 revolutions in the Italian states, one item Thoreau 
hoped to retrieve. But Hawthorne jeered that there never had 
been such a work. Mozier had assured him that Fuller “had 
quite lost all power of literary production” before leaving Rome, 
and that the alleged manuscript “never had existence.” And 
then this:
Thus there appears to have been a total collapse 
in poor Margaret, morally and intellectually; and, 
tragic as her catastrophe was, Providence was, after 
all, kind in putting her and her clownish husband 
and their child on board that fated ship. There 
never was such a tragedy as her whole story,—the 
sadder and sterner, because so much of the ridicu-
lous was mixed up with it, and because she could 
bear anything better than to be ridiculous. It was 
such an awful joke, that she should have resolved—
in all sincerity, no doubt—to make herself the great-
est, wisest, best woman of the age. And to that end 
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she set to work on her strong, heavy, unpliable, 
and, in many respects, defective and evil nature, 
and adorned it with a mosaic of admirable quali-
ties, such as she chose to possess; putting in here a 
splendid talent and there a moral excellence, and 
polishing each separate piece, and the whole to-
gether, till it seemed to shine afar and dazzle all who 
saw it. She took credit to herself for having been 
her own Redeemer, if not her own Creator;31 and, 
indeed, she was far more a work of art than any of 
Mozier’s statues. But she was not working on an 
inanimate substance, like marble or clay; there was 
something within her that she could not possibly 
come at, to re-create or refine it; and, by and by, this 
rude old potency bestirred itself, and undid all her 
labor in the twinkling of an eye. On the whole, I do 
not know but I like her the better for it; because she 
proved herself a very woman after all, and fell as the 
weakest of her sisters might.32
A Providence that mercifully kills a woman trying to escape 
femininity: I scarcely know what to say. Nasty stuff, though 
the original, even nastier than Julian’s transcription, isn’t vague 
about whom Ossoli might have been a servant or kept an apart-
ment for. It says it was Fuller. And Nathaniel refers to Ossoli 
not as a “man without the intellectual spark,” but as a “hymen” 
31. Fuller did resolve to be “my own priest, pupil, parent, child, husband, 
and wife”: Megan Marshall, Margaret Fuller: A New American Life (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 182–83.
32. Julian Hawthorne, Nathaniel Hawthorne and His Wife: A Biography, 
2 vols. (Boston, 1884), 1:259–62.
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without it.33 So much for whatever claim to masculinity Ossoli’s 
splendid good looks gave him.
 Julian’s publication gave rise to de mortuis sentiments 
we’ve already seen. “We object to this whole business of laying 
bare the unpleasant things that have been said of people, and 
by people, after they are dead and gone,” demurred the Lit-
erary World. Fuller and Nathaniel could no longer speak for 
themselves.34 “A sad depreciation of poor Margaret Fuller, and 
a terrible pulling down of Ossoli,” lamented the Evening Star.35 
But the New York Times saluted Julian’s two volumes: “All Haw-
thorne admirers . . . will read the work with profound satisfac-
tion and uninterrupted pleasure.” The review quoted much of 
the passage on Fuller, admitting it was the sort of thing “likely 
to create discussion.” But the reviewer embraced the passage. 
“Hawthorne, we may be sure, never wrote these lines for pub-
lication. But how worthy of his powers of insight they were!”36
 Others recoiled. Christopher Cranch, another transcen-
dentalist, denounced the passage as “an abominable libel of 
Hawthorne upon Margaret Fuller Ossoli and her husband,” “a 
gross & extreme libel.” This doesn’t make sense as a narrow 
or technical legal judgment, at least by our lights. Recall the 
elements of defamation: wrongful publication of a false and 
defamatory statement of fact. Here we have publication. But 
33. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The French and Italian Notebooks, ed. Thomas 
Woodson, in The Centenary Edition of the Works of Nathaniel Hawthorne, 
ed. William Charvat et al., 23 vols. ([Columbus]: Ohio State University Press, 
1962–97), 14:155 [3 April 1858].
34. “The Hawthorne-Fuller Case,” Literary World (10 January 1885).
35. “Tipping over an Idol,” Evening Star (23 December 1884).
36. “Hawthorne,” New York Times (23 November 1884). For more ap-
proval, see “A New View of Margaret Fuller,” Little Falls Transcript (19 De-
cember 1884).
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do we have any false defamatory statements of fact? That Os-
soli was a stupid boor, Margaret a charmless humbug with a 
defective and evil nature: all of this, as far as tort law goes, is 
simply unactionable as opinion. So no judge would permit a 
jury to bring in a finding of libel on those charges. That Fuller 
never wrote her projected history is a factual claim and might 
well be false, but it’s hard to see how it’s defamatory: hard, that 
is, to see why it would tend to damage her reputation in the 
eyes of any respectable segment of the community. Emerson 
and others would be disappointed if they came to believe the 
charge was true. But it’s hard to see why they would be indig-
nant or contemptuous. (Hard, not impossible. Suppose for in-
stance that Fuller frequently boasted about the manuscript, 
which did indeed exist and was indeed wonderful, but because 
of the publication of this passage others came to believe she 
was a phony who’d never written it.)
 I doubt that Cranch meant to press a strictly legal judg-
ment. Law aside, we find it easy to say that Hawthorne smeared 
Fuller’s reputation. (It is then an interesting question why tort 
law singles out one way of damaging another’s reputation—by 
publishing a false defamatory statement of fact—as actionable.) 
That depends in part on Hawthorne’s magisterial standing. To 
have an authoritative figure prescribe that you think ill of an-
other, even absent any reason at all, can damage that other’s 
reputation. The libel “might defeat itself,” mused Cranch, “but 
many persons might still be influenced by it, coming from a 
writer of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s fame.”37
37. C. P. Cranch to Thomas Wentworth Higginson, 2 December 1884, in 
Margaret Fuller Papers, Folder 7, Ms. Am. 1450 Collection, Rare Books and 
Manuscripts, Boston Public Library. Cranch presses similar formulations in 
“Hawthorne and Margaret Fuller,” Boston Evening Transcript (9 January 1885).
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 Identifying herself as “a friend both of Margaret Fuller 
Ossoli and of Nathaniel and Sophia Hawthorne,” Sarah F. Clarke 
averred, “The mischief done to Mme. Ossoli’s reputation can-
not be very great, since there are many of her intimate friends 
still living who would not recognize her in the coarsely drawn 
and distorted portrait of this private journal.” In a nice swipe, 
she credited Sophia Hawthorne with the delicacy and wisdom 
not to publish journal passages “not characteristic of his ge-
nius or his normal temper. The son, it seems, has not shown 
the qualities that distinguished his mother in performing this 
task.”38 And a contributor to the Woman’s Journal impeached 
Nathaniel’s assessment by reflecting on “Wedded Isolation,” 
suggesting that Nathaniel and Sophia’s absorption in their mar-
riage explained their pinched judgments of others.39
 Julian wasn’t budging. Rebutting Clarke, he managed to 
reproduce the offending passage in full. “I foresaw, of course, 
that [publication] would create a fluttering in the dove cotes of 
Margaret’s surviving friends, and of the later disciples.” But his 
hands were tied: “I did not consider myself justified thereby in 
omitting so sound and searching a bit of analysis. Hawthorne 
knew Margaret thoroughly, and he has told the exact truth 
about her.” (Julian was four years old when Fuller died, but this 
was indeed his view too.)40 The public had an interest in reach-
38. Sarah F. Clarke, “Margaret Fuller Ossoli and Hawthorne,” Boston Eve-
ning Transcript (12 December 1884).
39. T.W.H., “Wedded Isolation,” Woman’s Journal (20 December 1884).
40. Julian Hawthorne and Leonard Lemmon, American Literature: An 
Elementary Text-Book for Use in High Schools and Academies (Boston, 1891), 
150–53; for a riposte blasting the “mean sarcasm and personal spite” of that 
entry, C.W., “A Book Unfit for Schools,” Boston Evening Transcript (13 Au-
gust 1891).
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ing a proper estimation, and any independent interest in emo-
tional serenity wouldn’t be severely threatened: “The majority 
of readers will, I think, not be inconsolable that poor Margaret 
Fuller has at last taken her place with the numberless other 
dismal frauds who fill the limbo of human pretension and fail-
ure.”41 He wasn’t acting, then, solely as someone duty-bound to 
see his father’s papers published; he was doing his bit to deflate 
an overblown reputation. Two weeks later, Julian returned to 
the battleground. Remarking that his father had always been 
credited with deep insight into human nature, he acerbically 
demanded an explanation for the turnabout denunciation of 
Nathaniel’s portrait of Margaret and archly quoted Virgil: “Tan-
taene animis caelestibus irae?” (“Is there so much anger in the 
minds of the gods?”)42
 Cranch pounced on this argument. There were already 
four or five biographies of Fuller, some by friends, all of them 
judicious and disinterested. “And the testimony of her biogra-
phers is borne out in the love and admiration of large numbers 
of the best men and women who knew her, and can never for-
get her. But if all these persons were mistaken in their estimate 
of her—which of course they were if what is called Hawthorne’s 
‘analysis’ of her character has any truth—then either they were 
the most gullible of mortals, or she the most artful.” Did it 
make sense to prefer a private judgment Nathaniel had scrib-
41. Julian Hawthorne, “Hawthorne and Margaret Fuller,” Boston Evening 
Transcript (2 January 1885).
42. “Mr. Julian Hawthorne Rejoins,” Boston Evening Transcript (16 Janu-
ary 1885). Thanks to Bruce Frier for help deciphering the blotchy typogra-
phy and for translating the Latin (Aeneid 1:11). Fitzgerald has “Can 
anger / Black as this prey on the minds of heaven?” Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. 
Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Random House, 1983), 3.
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bled “many years after her death”?43 Perhaps to inoculate him-
self and his readers against such broadsides, Julian had already 
sniffed, “As for Mr. C. P. Cranch, I remember him . . . as an 
amiable and inoffensive gentleman, with an entertaining tal-
ent for ventriloquism.”44
 Likewise, Sophia Hawthorne’s sister blamed Julian for 
publishing “jotted down impressions” that didn’t reflect Na-
thaniel’s considered views. “Yes, I know that paragraph about 
Margaret Fuller in Julian Hawthorne’s ‘Life.’ Of course Haw-
thorne wrote it, but he never meant it in the world.” Nathaniel, 
she recalled, had urged her, “ ‘Never print anything you have 
written until you have read it over in many moods of mind.’ ”45 
The Evening News thought it ridiculous to imagine that Julian 
wanted to assist the public in coming to sound judgments. 
They charged that he wanted only “to keep himself before the 
people. . . . He continues the Margaret Fuller controversy, and 
it’s nuts and raisins to him, because it keeps him ‘up.’ ” Abruptly 
addressing Julian, the paper sneered, “Margaret, why, boy, she’d 
more sense in her little finger than you’ll ever acquire, and d’ye 
mind, sonny, she could write English, and that’s more than 
you’ve been able to do yet.”46
 Yet another commentator invoked legal language: in pub-
lishing the journal excerpt, Julian Hawthorne had adminis-
43. Christopher P. Cranch, in “Hawthorne and Pharisaism,” Boston Eve-
ning Transcript (10 February 1885). Compare “The Hawthornes,” American 
(16 May 1885).
44. “Mr. Julian Hawthorne Rejoins.”
45. Minna Caroline Smith, “Elizabeth Peabody: Reminiscences and In-
terests of Her Active Life,” Boston Daily Advertiser (25 August 1887), re-
printed with incidental variations in London American Register (15 October 
1887).
46. Evening News (28 January 1885), 2.
Speak No Evil 97
tered “bitter, uncalled-for blows, resurrected from the dead 
to slander the dead, by the bad judgment of the living.”47 We 
might then begin a more sustained appraisal by asking: Did 
Julian injure members of the public, in particular fans of Fuller? 
Did he injure himself? Did he injure Nathaniel? Did he injure 
Fuller?
 “Biographers have not often the will, even if the power, 
to inflict such wounds as the friends and relatives of Margaret 
Fuller Ossoli have received” at Julian’s hands, began one sus-
tained essay.48 So what are those wounds? Not the pain of being 
reminded that treasured Margaret is dead: I suppose that af-
fectionate and respectful references to Margaret wouldn’t trig-
ger any such pain. Is it the pain of knowing that someone else, 
even a celebrated someone else, at least sometimes thought 
poorly of Margaret? Surely one could love Margaret without 
insisting that others love her. (I love my wife and children, but 
I don’t mind that you don’t. I wouldn’t mind even if you knew 
them. Likewise with literary figures: I adore Donald Barthelme’s 
work, but it’s fine with me if you don’t.) Is it the pain in think-
ing that Nathaniel and those rallying to his view think that the 
affection of friends and relatives is misplaced? Is it wondering 
if it is in fact misplaced? But what kind of friend and relative is 
even tempted by epistemic deference to such a journal entry? 
Or, as I suspect, does the wound depend on the thought that 
Margaret has been injured? If that thought is confused or false, 
if the wound is an unreasonable or indefensible brute fact about 
people, we might still have reason to embrace some version of 
de mortuis. Like it or not, we’d say, speaking ill of the dead 
47. W. C. Burrage, in “Hawthorne and Pharisaism.”
48. Frederick T. Fuller, “Hawthorne and Margaret Fuller Ossoli,” Literary 
World (10 January 1885); small capitals removed.
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seems to upset their friends and relatives: go figure. If, how-
ever, we can vindicate the claim that Margaret was injured, 
this injury to her friends and family will in turn seem perfectly 
straightforward.
 What about other kinds of injuries—or benefits—to a 
broader public? The same essayist closed by declaring that Na-
thaniel’s “words, I am confident, cannot really harm her.” Like 
Markland’s “no injury to the dead,” this might seem to evoke the 
oblivion thesis, but again I think it doesn’t. The publication of 
Nathaniel’s journal entry could direct public attention to Fuller’s 
work and life. Some might “study and know her better, learning 
to hate and shun her faults as she did, and catching, as so many 
of her own generation have already done, the inspiration of her 
noble purpose.” (Suppose a living person were defamed and 
the public interest in sorting out the claim ended up benefiting 
her. Would that mean that the defamation was not an injury? 
No: a wrong that also benefits you is still a wrong. The surgeon 
who removes a dangerous tumor without your consent is still 
liable, though you probably wouldn’t sue him.) Another writer 
agreed that Fuller’s reputation would be unharmed. “In so far 
as the mental status of Margaret Fuller is concerned, no harm 
has, of course, been done.” Yet again, that might sound like the 
oblivion thesis, partly because “mental status” is cryptic at best. 
But the author went on to explain that only “shallow, super-
ficial and impulsive” individuals would let their allegiance to 
Fuller crumble. The same author fretted about “the unignor-
able emphasis it places upon a certain tendency in the popular 
mind,” a passion for “post-mortem mutilation,” for seizing on 
some “single detail” and trashing a fine reputation.49 This re-
49. C. A. Ralph, “With Regard to Margaret Fuller,” Boston Evening Tran-
script (15 January 1885).
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sentment, or, better, this Nietzschean ressentiment, was de-
plorable. Julian himself adduced another kind of benefit to the 
public. Fuller, he insisted, was exemplary of a “large and still 
surviving class, the existence of which is deleterious to civili-
zation and discreditable to human nature”: namely, holier- 
than-thou pharisees.50 Puncturing her vices could lead to moral 
reform: this is just an instance of the broader thesis that de 
mortuis makes us morally stupid.
 Did Julian injure himself? That he’d exhibited “injudicious 
frankness” and “bad taste” were some of the milder formula-
tions on offer.51 The Atlantic credited Julian with “the most 
utter and heroic disregard of the sensibilities of any living per-
son.”52 Here too we have a brute fact: that some thought worse 
of Julian. That’s enough to make him worse off, assuming he 
has any reason to care about his own reputation. But—I don’t 
mean to be finicky—it doesn’t follow that he has wronged him-
self. Just as one might not act wrongly and still make others 
worse off (your car hits a child who darts out so quickly that 
no one could have stopped in time), so too you might not 
wrong yourself and still be worse off. Suppose the concept of 
injury here tracks wrong, not harm. If you think Julian acted 
rightly in publishing, you might think he didn’t injure himself. 
But even then you might think that it can be wrong to act when 
you know or should know others will think worse of you. It 
would depend on such considerations as what the stakes were 
to you and how reasonable, even if finally unfounded, others’ 
50. Julian Hawthorne, “Mr. Hawthorne and His Critics,” Boston Evening 
Transcript (5 February 1885).
51. T.W.H., “Wedded Isolation”; Appletons’ Annual Cyclopaedia and Reg-
ister of Important Events of the Year 1884, n.s. (New York, 1885), 9:439.
52. Atlantic Monthly (February 1885), 262.
100 Speak No Evil
disapproval was. Then again, there is an apparently powerful 
objection to the claim that he wronged himself: he acted vol-
untarily, so he consented: volenti non fit injuria. However we 
sort out such difficulties, the question of Julian injuring him-
self too is parasitic, at least largely, on the question of whether 
others were injured.
 Did Julian injure Nathaniel? Not by design: but you can 
injure others unintentionally, even with the best of intentions. 
Suppose Nathaniel’s reputation suffered: readers had thought 
of him as a sage and good man, but he turned out, in the pri-
vacy of his study, to be mean-spirited. (You can injure some-
one by publicizing an embarrassing or discreditable true fact 
about him, even if it wouldn’t qualify as the tort of defamation.) 
We’re back to the core puzzle: is that an injury to Nathaniel, or 
once dead is he beyond injury?
 So too for the question whether Julian injured Margaret 
Fuller. Let’s suppose he made at least some think significantly 
worse of her. Does that make her worse off? If so, is it a wrong 
or illegitimate way of making her worse off? The language we’ve 
seen—Julian’s publication “cannot really harm her” and “no 
harm . . . has been done” to her “mental status”—goes only to 
her reputation. We still talk idiomatically about harming or 
benefiting someone’s reputation, not just harming or benefit-
ing persons. And it would be captious to deny that your repu-
tation survives you. But the skeptic can drive a wedge right 
there: Yes, he can concede, Julian may have harmed Nathan-
iel’s reputation, and likely he did harm Margaret’s reputation. 
But that doesn’t entail that he harmed Nathaniel or Margaret, 
because neither one is around to be harmed any more. The 
dead person has no interest in his or her ongoing reputation. 
—Maybe.
 I’ll add one question: did Nathaniel injure Margaret? It 
Speak No Evil 101
might in the first place be wrong to inscribe, even in a private 
notebook, such a harsh portrait of someone you’ve at least 
sometimes had warm dealings with. But it’s hard to see how it 
harms her. If you believe nothing is wrong unless it harms 
others or unreasonably risks harming them, this will of course 
undo the claim that it might be wrong. Compare: you delight 
in pricking a voodoo doll of your best friend or your romantic 
partner. You know that voodoo dolls have no causal efficacy 
whatever. Does that make it okay? Suppose you say, “Well, it 
has one effect: it relieves my aggression. In fact this way I can 
treat that person better in the real world.” Does that make the 
voodoo routine choiceworthy? Or try something discomfit-
ing: Someone you know well fantasizes raping you. His actual 
behavior is always exquisitely correct. Surely it would be creepy 
to learn about the fantasy. Only because you’d worry he might 
act on it?53
 Suppose Nathaniel somehow knows the journal entry 
will be published when he’s dead but when Fuller is still alive. 
Or suppose he believes it likely will. True, he never instructed 
Julian or anyone else to start publishing his papers, but he is 
after all a celebrated author whose posthumous publications 
the public will devour. It’s enough that he has set in motion a 
train of events that he knows or should know would injure 
Fuller, even if the injury occurs after his death. (Compare: you 
secretly lace your neighbor’s Tylenol with potassium cyanide. 
You die before he takes a couple of pills, collapses, and dies. It 
would be nuts to deny that you’re responsible on the ground 
that you don’t exist anymore.)
 So Nathaniel can’t be off the hook just because he was 
53. See generally Adela Pinch, Thinking about Other People in Nineteenth- 
Century British Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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dead at the time Julian published the offending excerpt. But he 
could be lucky because Margaret was dead, too. (Your neigh-
bor happens to die before ever opening that bottle of Tylenol. 
His daughter throws it out.) Unless Margaret is harmed by 
this publication, much talk of wrong and injury threaten to 
unravel. It might seem Nathaniel didn’t act wrongly in writing 
the journal entry, because it never harmed her; that Julian 
didn’t act wrongly, for the same reason; and that even her 
friends and families have only rationally indefensible distress 
to adduce. Not all the apparent problems in play depend on 
the claim Margaret was harmed: recall the fears about norms 
of public discussion, or more generally how de mortuis would 
prevent our sharpening our moral judgments, deprive us of 
some incentive to act well, and get in the way of writing his-
tory and the like. Still, I think the dominant intuition moti-
vating the claim that Julian acted wrongly in publishing this 
excerpt is the thought that he harmed Margaret. Even though 
she was dead: indeed, partly because she was dead and couldn’t 
even defend herself.
 Our skeptic, then, has to believe that the brouhaha sur-
rounding Julian’s publication of Nathaniel’s journal excerpt was 
largely irrational. More important, our skeptic has to believe 
that the very consideration motivating much of the anguish—
that Nathaniel and Margaret were dead—is precisely the con-
sideration explaining why the anguish was misplaced. Again, 
that doesn’t mean the skeptical position is wrong. But it under-
lines how boldly revisionist it is—not only against our intu-
itions, but also against our considered actions.
IV
Legal Dilemmas
Back to where we started: you’ve just died. At your fu- neral, someone fumes, “Embezzled money at work.  Diddled children in the park. Popped kittens in the microwave for fun.” The story takes off—but this 
time I’ll imagine that you’re concerned. You know that even 
though you’re dead, a lawyer can make sure your will is en-
forced; even though you’re dead, a lawyer can protect your 
privacy. The law manifestly doesn’t adopt the oblivion thesis, 
whatever skeptics may think. You know too that we generally 
shrink from speaking ill of the dead. Surely, you think, a law-
yer can vindicate your reputation by filing a lawsuit. After all, 
defamation is a tort.
 But in fact the law doesn’t think there’s a viable cause of 
action here—or at least modern American law doesn’t. You’re 
dead, and that makes all the difference. Here I offer a sketch of 
how the law adopted this position, or, put differently, of the 
intractable dilemmas faced by a litigant who wants to sue over 
defaming the dead. Remember that I think the considered 
judgments of the law are entitled to some epistemic deference: 
many thoughtful people have wrestled with these issues for 
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centuries. Judges, in particular, have had to consider careful 
arguments presented by parties wishing to vindicate such rep-
utational interests and parties wishing to deny them. But re-
member too that I reject the stronger claims sometimes made 
here: that the law outstrips our puny intelligence or that it 
magically selects for efficient or otherwise optimal outcomes. 
As it happens, I’ll need the space between those two kinds of 
views, because again, I think it’s illuminating to puzzle over 
the law, but the law has got this one dead wrong.
 Right or wrong, the law is adamant. A Virginia court in 
1987 was loftily dismissive: “The tort of defamation protects 
a person’s interest in his good name, reputation, and standing 
in the community. An individual, it is said, has a basic right to 
personal security that includes his uninterrupted entitlement 
to enjoyment of his reputation. . . . The right is especially per-
sonal to the person defamed. It has never been designed to 
safeguard the memory of a deceased person against remarks 
made subsequent to his death which might conflict with the 
manner in which the decedent’s family and friends wish him 
to be remembered.”1 A Massachusetts court in 1974 was more 
concise: “One who defames the memory of the dead is not lia-
ble civilly to the estate of the decedent or his relatives.”2 That 
echoes the firm language of the Second Restatement: “One who 
publishes defamatory matter concerning a deceased person is 
not liable either to the estate of the person or to his descen-
dants or relatives.”3 Or take this blunt announcement from a 
Louisiana court in 1992: “Once a person is dead, there is no 
1. Smith v. Dameron, 12 Va. Cir. 105, 107 (1987).
2. Casamasina v. Worcester Tel. & Gazette, Inc., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 801, 802 
(1974).
3. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 560.
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extant reputation to injure or for the law to protect.”4 That’s 
silly. Quick: can you remember a single dead person? And 
no, there is no implicit syntax in the concept of reputation that 
makes it unidiomatic to apply to dead people. Hitler still has a 
dreadful reputation. But the peremptory dismissal underlines 
the antipathy of modern American law to the thought that de-
faming the dead might be legally actionable.
 Was it always so? Not quite. Let’s reach back to Elizabe-
than England.
The Case of the Mischievous Squib,  
Crime, and Tort
Archbishop John Whitgift, infamously remembered by Ma-
caulay as “a narrow-minded, mean, and tyrannical priest, who 
gained power by servility and adulation, and employed it in 
persecuting both those who agreed with Calvin about church- 
government, and those who differed from Calvin touching the 
doctrine of Reprobation,”5 earned the enmity of Puritans even 
in his death. The early modern English had the quaint habit of 
attaching elegies to hearses. But when Whitgift was buried in 
1605, some rogue slapped onto his hearse “The Lamentation of 
Dickie for the Death of His Brother Jockie.” Dickie was Richard 
Bancroft, Whitgift’s successor; Jockie was Whitgift. The lines 
are crummy poetry, but as you’ll know if you have any sense 
4. Gugliuzza v. KCMC, 606 So.2d 790, 791 (La. 1992); see too Perez v. 
McCormick & Co., 693 So.2d 294 (La. 1997).
5. “Francis Bacon,” Edinburgh Review (July 1837): 12, reprinted with in-
cidental variations in Thomas Babington Macaulay, Critical and Historical 
Essays, Contributed to the Edinburgh Review, 5th ed., 3 vols. (London, 1848), 
2:296.
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for the venomous combat between Puritans and the Church 
of England, they’re explosive anyway. Here are some:
Popishe Ambition[,] vaine superstition,
coulured conformity[,] canckared envye,
Cunninge hipocrisie[,] feigned simplicity,
masked ympiety, servile flatterye,
Goe all daunce about his hearse,
& for his dirge chant this verse
Our great patron is dead and gone,
& Jhockey hath left dumb dickey alone.6
It took the government a while to sort out what was going on, 
but almost a year later Privy Council pounced on a copy of the 
lines in the possession of one Puritan, who promptly fingered 
another: Lewis Pickering, a teenaged student at Cambridge Uni-
versity who presumably was not delighted to find himself hauled 
before Star Chamber by as formidable a prosecutor as Coke.7
 So what was Pickering’s offense? Recall today’s elements 
of defamation: wrongful publication of a false defamatory 
statement of fact. By our lights, it’s hard to find an actionable 
statement of fact either made in or implied by the verse. But 
Coke’s report of Star Chamber’s opinion—much of which I 
suppose is Coke’s own opinion—included the brisk passing 
comment, “It is not material whether the Libel be true.” Per-
haps then the constitutive elements of libel have changed; in-
6. BL Add. MS 38139, fol. 58r. I’ve followed the meticulous account in 
Alastair Bellany, “A Poem on the Archbishop’s Hearse: Puritanism, Libel, and 
Sedition after the Hampton Court Conference,” Journal of British Studies 
(April 1995).
7. Charles Henry Cooper and Thompson Cooper, Athenae Cantabri-
gienses, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1858–1913), 2:446.
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deed, some of the opinion’s passing comments or dicta look 
like a sketch of a general theory of libel, whether “against a 
private man, or against a Magistrate or publick person.”8 But I 
think the underlying offense here is scandalum magnatum, not 
only because Coke’s report opens with the claim that the verse 
“scandalized and traduced” both churchmen. Longstanding 
statutes singled out “great men” and peers for special legal pro-
tection.9 The legal offense of scandalum magnatum included 
libel and more: so for instance in 1672 one Staniel was found 
8. De Libellis Famosis (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber). For help-
ful context, see Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 86–89.
9. For the statutory background, see 3 Edward I c. 34 (1275) (providing 
in part, “None shall report slanderous News, whereby Discord may arise”); 
for penalty provisions for “telling slanderous Lyes of the Great Men of the 
Realm,” see 2 Richard II Stat 1, c. 5 (1378) and 12 Richard II c. 11 (1388). For 
a dictionary gloss the year after these Star Chamber proceedings, see John 
Cowell, The Interpreter: or Book Containing the Signification of Words: Wherein 
Is Set Forth the True Meaning of All, or the Most Part of Such Words and 
 Termes, as Are Mentioned in the Law VVriters, or Statutes of This Victorious 
and Renowned Kingdom, Requiring Any Exposition or Interpretation (Lon-
don, 1607), s.v. scandalum magnatum: “Scandalum Magnatum, is the espe-
ciall name of a wrong done to any high personage of the land, as Prelates, 
Dukes, Earles, Barons, and other Nobles: and also of the Chanceler, trea-
surer, clerk of the priuy seale, steward of the kings house, Iustice, of the one 
bench or of the other, & other great officers of the realm, by false news: or 
horrible & false messages, whereby debates and discords betwixt them and 
the commons, or any scandall to their persons might arise.” For overviews, 
see W[illiam] Sheppard, Action upon the Case for Slander (London, 1662), 
chap. 4 (suggesting that to qualify the charges must be “false” or “false and 
horrible”); Thomas Starkie, A Treatise on the Law of Slander, Libel, Scandalum 
Mag natum, and False Rumours; Including the Rules Which Regulate Intellec-
tual Communications Affecting the Characters of Individual and the Interests 
of the Public (London, 1813), chap. 6; John C. Lassiter, “Defamation of Peers: 
The Rise and Decline of the Action for Scandalum Magnatum, 1497–1773,” 
American Journal of Legal History (1978).
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liable for saying, “The Earl of Pembroke is of so little esteem 
in the country, that no man of reputation hath any esteem for 
him; he is a pitiful fellow, and no man will take his word for 
two-pence; and no man of reputation values him more than I 
value the dirt under my feet.”10 No false statement of fact here, 
either; only opinion; but still an offense. So a treatise on Star 
Chamber principally written in 1621 devoted a chapter to “Li-
belling, and Scandalous Words against Nobles” and glossed 
libel as including, among other offenses, “scoffing at the person 
of another in rhyme or prose, or . . . personating him, thereby 
to make him ridiculous; or . . . setting up horns at his gate . . . 
or publish[ing] disgraceful or false speeches against any emi-
nent man or public officer.” (The horns would mean he was a 
cuckold.) The author doubted that the dead archbishop could 
have made out a common law tort action against Pickering, 
but said Pickering still had offered a “scornful libel” and added 
that because it was written, questions of its truth were irrele-
vant.11 And a 1647 commentator on the law of slander under-
lined the inequality: a man of “quality and reputation” could 
win £100 in damages with no evidence of any actual injury, 
but “an Action doth not lie for words betwixt common persons, 
but in case where they are touched in life or Member, or much 
in reputation.”12 No wonder that the same year the audacious 
10. Earl of Pembroke v. Staniel (1672) 89 Eng. Rep. 38 (Common Bench). 
I owe the reference to Lassiter, “Defamation,” 225.
11. William Hudson, A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber, in Collecta-
nea Juridica: Consisting of Tracts Relative to the Law and Constitution of En-
gland, 2 vols. (London, 1791–92), 2:100–104. For the dating of the treatise, 
DNB s.v. Hudson, William (c. 1577–1635).
12. Jo[hn] March, Actions for Slaunder, or, A Methodicall Collection under 
Certain Grounds and Heads, of What Words Are Actionable in the Law, and 
What Not? (London, 1647), 5–6, 136.
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Puritan Pickering was hauled before Star Chamber, the king’s 
chaplain intoned, “it is not now the fashion to set out sin in his 
colours, nor strike at impietie in the highest: thats Scandalum 
Magnatum, rude and barbarous, fitter for the forge; then the 
Princes pallace.”13 (One wonders at intimating to the royal 
family that they might be sinful, but it would be rude to point 
it out.)
 One of Pickering’s defenses was that his verses, however 
construed, couldn’t qualify as libel: “beinge of a deade man he 
tooke it no offence.”14 To say that Whitgift took no offense is 
not yet to say he wasn’t injured.15 Again, in the garden-variety 
13. W[illiam] S[mith], The Black-Smith: A Sermon Preached at White-Hall 
(London, 1606), 32. The sermon is a commentary on 1 Samuel 13:19.
14. Les Reportes del Cases in Camera Stellata 1593 to 1609: from the Orig-
inal Ms. of John Hawarde, ed. William Paley Baildon (privately printed, 
1894), 223. There too is a variant of the offending verse. A sharply different 
version is recorded in Sir Peter Manwood of Kent’s papers, BL MS Harley 
6383, fol. 71r:
The lamentation of Dicky for ye death of Jocky.
The Prelates Pope: the Canonists hope:
the Papists broker: ye Atheists cloker:
dumm dogs pastor: non residents champion:
a slanderer of reformers: a punnisher of new pastors:
cankered envy: masked impiety:
cullored conformity: cunning hippocrisy:
papisticall ambition: vaine superstition:
a Lattin Doctor: a commons Proctor.
The ould virgins spectacles.
Our ould pastor is dead and gone
and Jocky hath lefte dumb Dicky alone.
The variations suggest folk circulation of the libel.
15. Though early modern offense can bear the sense of injury as well as 
dismay or annoyance: see OED s.v. offence sb., 4a.
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defamation case, plaintiff need not produce any evidence that 
he was offended, in the sense of bothered or dismayed, by the 
publication, even if one should expect such testimony as a per-
suasive appeal for damages. Regardless, Coke’s report of the 
proceedings shows that Star Chamber was unmoved by this 
gambit. Death shall not bar actions, they held, whether the os-
tensible victims are private figures or officeholders: “Although 
the private man or Magistrate be dead at the time of the mak-
ing of the Libel, yet it is punishable for in the one Case it stir-
reth up others of the same family, blood, or society to revenge, 
and to breach the peace and in the other the Libeller doth tra-
duce and slander the State and government, which dieth not.”16 
So Pickering was convicted and sentenced: a whopping fine of 
£1,000; a year in jail; and stints in the pillory in London, Croy-
don, and Northampton, with his ears to be nailed to the pillory 
if he didn’t confess. Ah, the ingenuities littering the history of 
punishment: ear mutilation was a persistent tactic against Pu-
ritans and other offenders. William Prynne lost his ears to the 
pillory in 1634. When the authorities sent him back to the pil-
lory in 1637, they ordered that the remaining stumps of his 
ears be cut off.17 Earlier English law dictated cutting out the 
tongue of one who addressed insulting words to another.18
16. De Libellis Famosis.
17. I’d love to regale you further, but it would take me too far afield: see A 
Briefe Relation of Certaine Speciall and Most Materiall Passages, and Speeches 
in the Starre-Chamber Occasioned and Delivered the 14th Day of Iune, 1637: 
at the Censure of Those Three Famous and Worthy Gentlemen, Dr. Bastwicke, 
Mr. Burton, and Mr. Prynne ([Leiden], 1638), 3–17.
18. 3 Edgar, 4 (c. 946-c. 961); 2 Canute, 16 (c. 1027-c. 1034). Compare 
Grágás Ib 183, in Laws of Early Iceland: Grágás. The Codex Regius of Grágás 
with Material from other Manuscripts, trans. Andrew Dennis, Peter Foote, and 
Richard Perkins, 2 vols. (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1980–
2000), 2:198: “The penalty is full outlawry if a man composes [verses] on 
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 No wonder Coke’s report appeals to the interests of the 
living community: this is a criminal prosecution. The law has 
long conceived of crime as an injury to the public. But we 
needn’t wring our hands over whether there are or should 
be victimless crimes to see the force of Star Chamber’s shrug-
ging off Whitgift’s being dead. The squib was a potent swipe at 
the Church of England. In a society where many believed, as 
Hobbes put it, that “in the well governing of opinions con-
sisteth the well governing of men’s actions in order to their 
peace and concord,”19 with a state all too aware of its limited 
capacity and a church extensively caught up in governing, the 
mischievous squib menaced public order. So the criminal law 
acted. True, an eighteenth-century commentator recalling Pick-
ering’s libel was unruffled, even amused: “A primate in mod-
ern times,” he suggested, “would probably have only laughed 
at it, or invited the author to dinner”; he added that there was 
“something very quaint” in the thought that a libel on a dead 
magistrate is a reflection on the government, which never dies.20 
But there was nothing even vaguely irrational or paranoid about 
the Star Chamber proceedings against Pickering.
 Recalling the affair some years later, Coke said, “the Slan-
der of a dead Man is punishable in this Court, as Lewis Picker-
ing is able to tell you, whom I caused here to be censured for a 
Slander against an Archbishop that is dead; for Justice lives, 
though the Party be dead; and such Slanders do wrong the 
someone who was Christian and is dead, or if he recites any poetry that was 
composed to blemish or mock someone who is dead. Procedure in such a 
case is the same as in a killing case.” Thanks to Bill Miller for the reference.
19. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 18.
20. Daines Barrington, Observations on the More Ancient Statutes from 
Magna Charta to the Twenty-First of James I. Cap XXVII., 3rd ed. (London, 
1769), 82–83.
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living Posterity and Alliance of the Man deceased.”21 In the 
dock this time was a Mr. Wraynham, for denouncing Francis 
Bacon’s flagrantly unjust role, as he saw it, in complicated pro-
ceedings about damages owed Wraynham by one Fisher. This 
was some years before Bacon’s spectacular fall from political 
grace on charges of corruption, with possible charges of sod-
omy lurking in the background. Contemporary English law 
did think truth an affirmative defense to the claim of tort.22 
Even if criminal law recognized no such defense then, the en-
comium to Bacon underlines the wrongfulness of Wraynham’s 
charge to a legal order horrified by pointed criticism of the 
authorities. Coke’s appeal to the wrong done to the dead man’s 
living descendants might offer a picture of a tort action they 
could bring in their own name. But it might only return us to 
the specter of breach of the peace and private revenge, con-
siderations offered to explain the public interest in criminal 
prosecution. Coke also remarks of defamation, “I will not omit 
a dead Man; for, tho’ spoken of him, it is a living Fault.”23 This 
statement too is suggestive but ambiguous, because Coke might 
21. A Vindication of the Lord Chancellor Bacon, from the Aspersion of In-
justice, Cast upon Him by Mr. Wraynham (London, 1725), 34.
22. William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 2nd ed., 12 vols. (Lon-
don: Methuen, 1937), 5:207. This remains true, with the burden on the de-
fense to show the truth of their charges: see 15 and 16 Geo. 6 and 1 Eliz. 2, 
c. 66 (1952). For a drily amusing variant wrestling with what a jury must 
have thought about the substantial truth of some charges, see Grobbelaar v. 
News Group Newspapers Ltd, [2002] UKHL 40 (24 October 2002), reinstat-
ing judgment against the newspaper for alleging that a soccer star took 
money to fix games, but knocking down the jury’s initial award of £85,000 to 
£1. The law lords later ordered Grobbelaar to pay two thirds—more than 
£1m—of the newspaper’s attorney’s fees: Clare Dyer and Vivek Chaudhary, 
“Ex-Soccer Star Faces Ruin after £1m Libel Case Bill,” Guardian (27 Novem-
ber 2002).
23. Vindication, 33.
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still be thinking of the scandal—and political damage—to the 
living community. But he might be affirming that one wrongs 
a man, here and now, by defaming him: that his being dead is 
irrelevant.
 So the case of the mischievous squib might look like a 
successful tort action for defaming the dead. But it’s a criminal 
action. No wonder a dispute surfaces on whether Whitgift was 
harmed, because that’s the sort of thing that straightforwardly 
makes for a criminal offense. But no wonder either that it fi-
nally doesn’t matter. I’m reluctant to lean hard on any of the 
passing language here: I don’t know if these players had a con-
sidered view on whether libeling the dead harms them. Then 
again, Whitgift’s 1699 biographer declares that Pickering and 
others “sought by an infamous Libel to stain the glory of his 
ever honourable Name” and rejoices in the “honourable Sen-
tence” meted out by Star Chamber.24 The biographer, at least, 
doesn’t seem to be thinking of any public stakes.
 There’s no reason to imagine that our own ready distinc-
tion between tort and crime was always in place. Apparently—
the sources are perilously thin and I’m not competent to assess 
them—if we reach back as far as twelfth-century England, we 
find that private actors could routinely bring criminal prosecu-
tions, not because of occasional qui tam proceedings enabled 
by statute. Or, better, we find that tort and crime were, from 
our anachronistic point of view, blurred into a picture of “un-
differentiated wrong.”25 Victims could themselves carry out 
24. George Paule, The Life of John Whitgift (London, 1699), 122.
25. For this picture, see Paul R. Hyams, Rancor & Reconciliation in Medi-
eval England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), chaps. 3–4; see also 
John Hudson, The Formation of the English Common Law: Law and Society 
in England from the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta (London: Longman, 
1996), chap. 3; Patrick Wormald, The Making of English Law: King Alfred to 
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punishment for crime.26 Convictions for wrongs could lead 
to both punishment and orders of compensation. As Plucknett 
puts it, “The modern distinction between crime and tort is 
therefore one of those classifications which it is futile to press 
upon mediaeval law.”27 We may well hear lingering echoes of 
this earlier approach in the Star Chamber proceedings against 
Pickering. We will hear further distant echoes resounding cen-
turies after the law has differentiated between tort and crime 
not only in theory but also in practice: in the rules of standing, 
in procedure, in the burden of proof, and more.
 Criminal libel proceedings didn’t die with Star Chamber. 
In 1716, legal commentator William Hawkins offered a gloss 
on libel which would frequently be echoed and, as we’ll see, 
make its way into American law: “a Libel in a strict Sense is 
taken for a malicious Defamation, expressed either in Printing 
or Writing, and tending either to blacken the Memory of one 
who is dead, or the Reputation of one who is alive, and to ex-
pose him to publick Hatred, Contempt or Ridicule.” Libels, he 
continued, are actionable because they disturb the peace “by 
provoking the Parties injured, and their Friends and Families 
to Acts of Revenge, which it would be impossible to restrain by 
the severest Laws, were there no Redress from Publick Justice 
for Injuries of this kind.”28 There’s no equivocation here in urg-
ing that the dead, too, can be libeled.
the Twelfth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 143–61. Consider the rough 
parallel of when the king is entitled to wergild in the law of Æthelred: 
Wormald, Making, 324–25.
26. Hudson, Formation, 159–60.
27. Theodore F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th 
ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), 422.
28. William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 2 vols. (Lon-
don, 1716–21), 1:193 (chap. 73). An 1884 Queen’s Bench opinion, R. v. 
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 The year 1790 saw criminal charges that The World had 
defamed the Earl of Cowper just a couple of months after he’d 
died in Florence.29 The offending publication scornfully indicted 
the earl’s dissipated life abroad. It revealed, for instance, that 
decades before, the earl was unmoved by news of his father’s 
death—or, better, moved in being happy to inherit money: 
“He had debased his mind out of all emotions that can honour 
human nature, to the enervating depravities of Italy! . . . he put 
on mourning—he changed the Coronet on his coach, and he 
went, as usual, to Mad. Corci and the Opera.”30 The earl’s fam-
ily already had prosecuted author and printer alike. (We find 
Labouchere [1884] All E. R. 959 (QB), skeptical about even criminal libel 
actions when the alleged victim is dead, cites Hawkins as an authority for its 
skepticism. The language it quotes—“the court will not grant this extraordi-
nary remedy . . . ”—appears in the 1795 edition: William Hawkins, A Trea-
tise of the Pleas of the Crown, rev. Thomas Leach, 7th ed., 4 vols. (London, 
1795), 2:128–29 (chap. 73), reproduced in Thomas Edlyne Tomlins, The Law- 
Dictionary, Explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the British Law, 
4th ed. with additions by Thomas Colpitts Granger, 2 vols. (London, 1835), 
s.v. Libel, III. For transcript material from the case, with discussion of a 
planned duel, see “The Lawson-Labouchere Libel Case,” Glasgow Herald (19, 
22, 23, 24, 25 March 1881); see too Reports of Cases in Criminal Law Argued 
and Determined in All the Courts of England, ed. Edward Cox et al., 31 vols. 
(London, 1846–1941), 15:415–30.
29. DNB s.v. Topham, Edward.
30. The World (17 February 1790), also in The English Chronicle, and Uni-
versal Evening Post (16–18 February 1790). This must be the action that 
Charles Pigott is referring to in his infamous The Jockey Club: or A Sketch of 
the Manners of the Age, pt. 1, 11th ed. (London, 1792), 165: “An action was 
brought by a Mr. Cowper, for something written (for nobody could under-
stand what it was perfectly) about Lord Cowper who was dead.” I don’t 
know why Pigott thought the substance of the alleged libel was doubtful. For 
some of the Cowper family tree, see “Genealogical and Historical Memoir of 
the Right Hon. Leopold-Louis-Francis Cowper,” in The European Magazine 
and London Review (October 1812), 340–44.
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private prosecutions not just in the remote mists of twelfth- 
century England, but straight through 1879.31 In fact, they’re 
still possible today.) This time, they were going after the pub-
lisher. Formidable advocate Thomas Erskine insisted on the 
wrongfulness of defaming a man “incapable of protecting his 
own reputation”:32 though it might seem finicky, we should 
distinguish the nastiness of beating up on someone helpless 
from the question of whether Cowper was in fact injured by 
any such beating. Meanwhile the defense attorney argued that 
the publisher couldn’t be liable unless it could be “proved that 
he knew of the insertion.” It’s unclear whether scienter here 
attaches to the content of the story or the further knowledge 
the story is defamatory, but let that go. The defense also argued 
“that the charge could not be a libel, as it defamed no person 
living.”33 Yet the jury found the publisher guilty.34
 On appeal, the court of King’s Bench discarded the in-
dictment, but not on the ground that the dead have no repu-
tational interests. Instead, the court pressed a point we’ve seen 
from critics of de mortuis: “to say, in general, that the conduct 
of a dead person can at no time be canvassed; to hold that, 
even after ages are passed, the conduct of bad men cannot be 
contrasted with the good, would be to exclude the must [sic] 
31. The Prosecution of Offences Act, 42 & 43 Vict. c. 22 (1879), estab-
lished the office of Director of Public Prosecutions.
32. I assume this is Thomas, who did sometimes appear as prosecutor. 
See his own reflections on prosecuting Thomas Williams, the bookseller of 
Paine’s Age of Reason, in Mr. Erskine’s Speech on the Trial of Thomas Williams 
([London? 1797]), 3.
33. The Annual Register, or A View of the History, Politics, and Literature, 
for the Year 1790, 2nd ed. (London, 1802), 211–12.
34. London Chronicle (1 July 1790).
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useful part of history.” So authors would have a privilege if 
they pressed their claims against the dead “fairly and honestly.” 
But publication, “whether soon or late after the death of the 
party, if it be done with a malevolent purpose, to vilify the 
memory of the deceased, and with a view to injure his poster-
ity . . . then it is done with a design to break the peace, and 
then it becomes illegal.” Since the indictment here made no 
such allegation, it was defective.35 When Star Chamber con-
victed Pickering in the case of the mischievous squib, they 
were willing to assume that his publication would stir up so-
cial disorder. But almost two centuries later King’s Bench avers 
that that determination has to go to a jury. And this is also 
a year before Fox’s Libel Act, a great victory for Whigs and 
radicals, mandates that in libel actions the judge may not con-
sign the jury to finding only the fact of publication. He must 
also assign to them the question of whether the publication is 
defamatory.36
 Apparently it runs in the family. On 4 February 1799, the 
Times ran the following paragraph:
A Noble Earl, not many months come into the pos-
session of his inheritance, and who was lately in 
treaty for a considerable estate in Hertfordshire, 
has within a very few days lost upwards of Seventy 
Thousand Pounds to a Noble Duke, well known 
on the turf. His despair of mind in having been so 
much the dupe had nigh led to the most fatal con-
sequences. We leave it to the feelings of the Noble 
35. R. v. Topham (1791) 100 Eng. Rep. 931 (KB).
36. 32 Geo. III c. 60 (1792).
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Winner to justify this desperate gambling. We un-
derstand the whole sum was paid at the instant, 
having been the accumulations of his minority.37
The paragraph referred to the new Earl of Cowper, son of the 
man smeared with charges of his dissipated life in Italy. The 
new earl was thirteen years old when his father died. He re-
cently had reached the age of majority and taken control of 
the family’s considerable assets. On 14 February, the Times 
solemnly reported that the earl had died two days earlier—
not, apparently, in consternation over their libel, but from a 
ruptured blood vessel in his lungs. The doctors blamed his 
refusal to be bled in response to an earlier accident horseback 
riding: he’d never recovered his health.38
 Once again another Cowper pursued criminal charges 
against the publisher of the newspaper. A family member who 
managed the earl’s estate testified that the earl “certainly was 
not addicted to the vice of gambling. From what knowledge he 
had of him, remarkably the contrary. He believed his Lordship 
disliked play very much, and he had often heard him express 
his disapprobation of it.” Had the earl lost and paid £70,000, he 
added, he surely would have known about it. Why have any 
confidence that such a blatantly false libel was “of and con-
cerning” the earl in the first place? Because of the bit about his 
negotiating for an estate in Hertfordshire: it had belonged to 
one Paul Benfield, and Cowper had indeed been trying to get 
it. Then too, Cowper had come into possession of his inheri-
37. Times (4 February 1799).
38. Times (14 February 1799). The story got the fourth earl’s name wrong: 
this was George Augustus Clavering Cowper, not George Nassau Clavering 
Cowper, who was the third earl.
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tance the previous August. Those facts were enough to fix the 
reference. But “the offensive part was absolutely false.”
 This time, Erskine appeared in his more usual role, de-
fending the press. John Walter, publisher of the Times, “was 
living in the country, and knew nothing about the publication 
of this paragraph till afterwards, when he was extremely sorry 
for it.” Erskine was willing to concede that Walter could be 
civilly liable, that is liable in tort, simply for owning a paper 
that published such a paragraph. (This would depend on the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, on which the master is liable 
for the deeds of his servant, unless the servant is, as the law 
puts it, on a frolic, that is, far outside the scope of what he’s 
entrusted to do.) But, he argued, Walter couldn’t be criminally 
responsible, because “no man ought to be convicted of a crime 
without a wicked intention”: this is the doctrine of mens rea. 
The rumor was circulating widely before the paper published 
it. A family friend promptly protested and demanded a retrac-
tion. After expressing concern about his proposed language 
backfiring, the paper had retracted the defamatory charge just 
two days after publishing it: “We are extremely sorry, through 
the medium of our Paper, to have given currency to a report 
which has for some days prevailed, respecting a Noble Earl 
who was stated to have been reduced to a state of despair, in 
consequence of having lost a large sum of money at play, as we 
have the most unquestionable authority for stating that it is 
totally without foundation.”39 Summing up, Lord Kenyon in-
structed the jury that Erskine’s appeal to mens rea didn’t cor-
rectly state the law: as if “a book may be sold by a man’s wife, 
by his children, or by his servants, and however libelous it may 
be, he is not answerable, if he keeps out of the way and does not 
39. Times (6 February 1799).
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know it.” The consequences would be dire. “If this were to be 
considered as law, the lowest and meanest of the people might 
be found ready to engage in such business. . . . Is this to be the 
situation of the public?” The jury found Walter guilty.40
 The situation of the public: it sounds like an unvarnished 
consequentialist appeal. On this reading, the court is thinking, 
sure, it’s unfair to John Walter to punish him for the publica-
tion of this paragraph when he had nothing to do with it. 
(Poor Walter already had served time for criminal libel—for 
inserting paragraphs the government was paying him to pub-
lish.)41 But if the law fails to extend criminal liability here, 
scoundrels will publish and wriggle free. (Not until 1843, by 
statute, did English law hold that mere ownership wasn’t enough 
to make a publisher criminally liable.)42 In the face of that dis-
couraging prospect, fairness be damned. But the situation of 
the public also sounds in concern about a social world in which 
reverence or at least due respect for nobility will be corroded 
by caustic accounts of what outrageous gamblers and spend-
thrifts they are. In an aristocratic society, that could well seem 
a harm to the community. The perpetrators, however broadly 
conceived, should then be criminally liable, at least when the 
story is false, as it was here.
 Consider one last English criminal case from 1887, R. v. 
Ensar and Carr, “an alleged libel on the memory of Mr. John 
Batchelor, to whom a statue had been erected by the Liberals 
of Cardiff.”43 Scorning Batchelor as “a political agitator and an 
40. Ironically perhaps, this relatively detailed account of the trial is from 
Times (3 July 1799). For the brief formal opinion, see R. v. Walter (1799) 170 
Eng. Rep. 524 (KB).
41. DNB s.v. Walter, John (1739?–1812).
42. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7 (1843).
43. Birmingham Daily Post (11 February 1887). For Batchelor’s role in the 
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associate of, and sympathizer with, the Chartists,” that working- 
class movement finally crushed in 1848, Carr had suggested 
that Batchelor had “left his country for his country’s good.”44 
The prosecution was based on the theory that this amounted 
to an accusation that Batchelor had been transported: that is, 
sent to Australia for his crimes. The court directed an acquittal 
“on the ground that an action for libeling a dead man would 
not lie unless it was published with the intention of vilifying 
his posterity. The dead had no rights and suffered no wrongs.”45 
That last is overstated: again, the law does not adopt the obliv-
ion thesis. That aside, it sounds much like the rationale that 
King’s Bench adopted in deciding the indictment for libeling 
the third Earl of Cowper was defective.
 On this side of the Atlantic, in 1808 a Massachusetts 
judge adopted Hawkins’s gloss—“A libel is a malicious publi-
cation, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and 
pictures, tending either to blacken the memory of one dead, 
or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to pub-
lic hatred, contempt, or ridicule”—without attribution.46 The 
bit about the dead was pure dictum, but other Massachusetts 
courts applauded it: “To the correctness of this definition no 
objection can now be urged.”47 Other dicta emphasized the 
link between defaming the dead and public violence: “A libel 
Chartist movement, see R. P. Hastings, Chartism in the North Riding of York-
shire and South Durham, 1838–1848 (Heslington: University of York, Borth-
wick Institute of Historical Research, 2004), 7–12. The case seems to be re-
ported only in the newspapers.
44. Western Mail (14 February 1887).
45. Birmingham Daily Post (11 February 1887).
46. Commonwealth v. William Clap, 4 Mass. 163 (1808).
47. Clark v. Binney, 19 Mass. 113, 115 (1824). See too Commonwealth v. 
Origen Batchelder, Thach. Crim. Cas. 191 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1829).
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even of a deceased person is an offence against the public, be-
cause it may stir up the passions of the living and produce acts 
of revenge.”48
 One New Jersey defendant tried to quash an indictment 
for libeling the dead by urging that there was no evidence that 
he sought to bring the family into disrepute “and induce them 
to break the peace.” Citing R. v. Topham and other cases, he 
insisted that absent such evidence, a criminal libel action was 
a nonstarter: “The authorities are all one way and cannot be 
disregarded.” “If the doctrine contended for is true,” protested 
the state, “then a dead man who leaves no descendants or rel-
atives can be libeled with impunity.” If you shrink at its being 
open hunting season on such dead people—and if you’re 
thinking tortishly, not criminally, let’s leave aside for now who 
might have standing to assert their interests or fob it off on the 
estate—perhaps you do think the injury is indeed to the dead 
person. (But you might demur that it’s unseemly without fix-
ing on that picture of injury.) The court ruled “that the ten-
dency to induce violence must exist equally, whether the libel 
be upon the dead or upon the living; subject to one proviso, 
however, and that is, that the person deceased shall have lived 
so recently that his cotemporaries and intimate associates shall 
be the persons exposed to the temptation to do violence.” So 
the indictment had to state, and the prosecution had to show, 
only that the defamed wasn’t long dead and that he’d left such 
“cotemporaries.”49 This move probably keeps us firmly on the 
terrain of worrying that libeling the dead is a crime, not a tort. 
If one’s reputational interests linger only as long and precisely 
48. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 277 (Pa. 1811).
49. State v. Herrick (Passaic Cty. N.J. Quarter Sessions 1881), 3 Crim. L. 
Mag. 174 (1882).
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insofar as one has contemporaries willing to avenge one, all 
the heavy lifting seems to be done by the threat of violence. 
But perhaps the New Jersey court would have admitted that it’s 
possible a contemporary, young at the defamed’s death, would 
still be willing to take vengeance because of a defamation de-
cades later, but not recognize any legal action, on the grounds 
that a necessary condition of the action is that the dead still have 
reputational interests and that those interests erode over time.
 Hawkins’s gloss on libel also made it into a Washington 
state statute. The state high court considered an appeal of a 
conviction for libeling George Washington in a newspaper—
in 1916. Once again the defendant appealed to R. v. Topham, 
insisting that the court take judicial notice of the fact that 
George Washington and all his contemporaries were dead and 
so as a matter of law his story couldn’t be libelous. He added 
that his speech was anyway protected by the First Amendment. 
The court was unmoved: “We are quite unable to appreciate 
an argument which suggests that any one has a constitutional 
right to maliciously defame the memory of a deceased person, 
though such person’s memory lives only in history, any more 
than to maliciously defame a living person.” The Supreme 
Court hadn’t yet incorporated the First Amendment against 
the states. (A passing riddle about the theory of incorporation: 
if the work was done by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, why didn’t the Supreme Court notice until 
the 1920s?) Nor was there any reason to construe the statute as 
having any such time limit. So the court didn’t flinch in affirm-
ing the conviction.50 Suppose the defamed hadn’t been the fa-
50. State v. Haffer, 94 Wash. 136 (1916). Barnum v. State, 92 Wis. 586 
(1896) upholds a criminal libel conviction against a procedural challenge; the 
case is misreported in “Can Libel the Dead,” Penny Press (10 March 1896). 
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ther of our country. Would a prosecutor have taken any inter-
est? Would a jury have cared? Would the state high court have 
applied the same rule? Doesn’t this look just like scandalum 
magnatum?
 It’s droll to find such horror at criticism of political au-
thorities in republican America. This case is not alone: an Ohio 
newspaper waxed apoplectic over a proposed nasty epitaph for 
James Buchanan,51 and a New York City newspaper seethed in 
fury at an attack on the late James Garfield.52 But First Amend-
ment law has flipped scandalum magnatum on its head. Today it 
is harder, not easier, for public figures to win libel suits.53 So too 
For a 1940 criminal libel conviction against the editor of the Daily Worker, 
see “Hathaway, Editor of Daily Worker, Guilty with Publishing Company in 
Liggett Libel,” New York Times (4 May 1940). The widow also won a civil 
action: for brief procedural notations, see Liggett v. Daily Worker, 255 A.D. 
793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) and Liggett v. Comprodaily Pub. Co., 256 A.D. 
1005 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939).
51. “Defaming the Dead: A Base and Heartless Attack on Mr. Buchanan,” 
Newark Advocate (5 June 1868).
52. “Slandering the Dead,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper (15 April 
1882). Compare Defaming the Dead: Work of Cooper’s Smut Machine; An 
Attack on the Memory of a Beloved Divine That Will Be Vigorously Resented 
(n.p., [1882]), assailing an attack on Democratic candidate for governor of 
Pennsylvania Robert E. Pattison’s dead father.
53. This is the central thrust of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). Justice Brennan tried to persuade the Court to extend the standard 
to any discussion of public interest, regardless of the status of the parties 
involved. Compare Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (majority embrac-
ing that view) with Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality 
of three for that view) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (ma-
jority of five against that view). Contrast Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
(overturning an intentional infliction of emotional distress award against 
Westboro Baptist Church where “Westboro addressed matters of public im-
port on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the 
guidance of local officials,” 1220, even though neither Albert Snyder nor his 
dead son, target of the church’s protest, was a public figure). Hustler Magazine 
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Justice Jackson’s comment, the deepest claim in all First Amend-
ment law—“Authority here is to be controlled by public opin-
ion, not public opinion by authority”54—inverts Hobbes’s claim.
 The cases I’ve canvassed so far are criminal prosecutions. 
So again the law’s interests in these matters are public, not pri-
vate: the injuries that count are to society, not to the defamed 
parties. No wonder that from the case of the mischievous squib 
on, courts returned to the worry that loyal family members 
will avenge themselves or that expressions of contempt for the 
constituted authorities are an acid bath corroding social order. 
No wonder courts were brusque with defendants who urged 
that their ostensible victims weren’t injured because they’re 
dead. No need for them to figure out how or whether it’s sen-
sible to say a defamed dead man has been injured. They weren’t 
worried about that. They were worried about the interests of 
the living.
 Such criminal prosecutions are brought today even in 
the West. German law states, “Whoever defames the memory 
of a deceased person shall be liable to imprisonment of not 
more than two years or a fine.”55 Swiss law too makes defaming 
the dead a crime—but not if the target has been dead for more 
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) had extended the New York Times standard to 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. There Falwell was a public figure. 
Snyder treats the First Amendment as an absolute bar, Hustler as ratcheting 
up in various ways what a plaintiff would have to show to prevail.
54. West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
55. Straftgesetzbuch [STBG] [Penal Code], § 189 (Ger.), translation at 
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#StGBengl 
_000P189 (last visited 23 November 2014). Holocaust denier Gerald Fred-
rick Töben is sometimes described as having been convicted for defaming 
the dead, but apparently he was prosecuted under § 130: see Emma Alberici, 
“Alleged Australian Holocaust Denier Arrested,” ABC Transcripts (Australia) 
(2 October 2008).
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than thirty years.56 There’s evidence that contrary to mythol-
ogy, criminal libel actions survive in these United States, even 
if they don’t produce published opinions. One author found 
sixty-one actions in Wisconsin between 1991 and 2007. One, 
for instance, was brought after a University of Wisconsin at 
Eau Claire teaching assistant broke up with her boyfriend. He 
circulated a letter to the faculty of her department falsely ac-
cusing her of sleeping with one of her students. He pleaded 
guilty and got two years probation.57 Then again a series of state 
courts have ruled the relevant statutes unconstitutional.58 But 
56. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [STGB], Code Penal Suisse [CP], 
Codice Pénale Svizzero [CP] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311.0, Art. 
175 (Switz.), translation at www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/ 
19370083/index.html (last visited 12 December 2015).
57. David Pritchard, “Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study,” 
Communication Law and Policy (Summer 2009).
58. Compare Commonwealth v. Armao, 286 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1972); Weston 
v. State, 258 Ark. 707 (1975); Eberle v. Municipal Court, 55 Cal. App. 3d 423 
(1976); Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1978) (striking down crim-
inal defamation statute as “unconstitutionally vague, and therefore over-
broad,” at 290: this is a sadly common mistake about the relationship be-
tween vagueness and overbreadth in First Amendment law); People v. Ryan, 
806 P.2d 935, 941 (Colo. 1991) (“The statute remains valid to the extent that 
it penalizes libelous attacks under the facts of this case, where one private 
person has disparaged the reputation of another private individual”); State v. 
Powell, 114 N.M. 395 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (where trial court struck down 
statute on its face, repeating the essentials of such an analysis but ruling only 
that the law failed here on an as-applied basis); State v. Helfrich, 277 Mont. 
452 (1996) (considering criminal prohibition of stalking brought to bear 
against posting of perhaps truthful fliers); Ivey v. State, 821 So.2d 937 (Ala. 
2001); I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110 (2002) (accepting overbreadth challenge 
brought by student prosecuted for posting online defamatory claims about 
other students, teachers, and the principal); Parmelee v. O’Neel, 145 Wn. App. 
223 (2008), rev’d on other grounds and remanded, 168 Wn.2d 515 (2010).
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as far as I can tell, we no longer criminally prosecute defaming 
the dead.
Tort’s Doctrinal Dilemma: The First Prong
So there’s an ample history of criminal prosecutions for de-
faming the dead. Some of those actions at least flirt with the 
thought that the dead themselves suffer an injury: but again 
there’s no reason for the criminal law to work out a considered 
view on that. And again, modern American courts are ada-
mant that a tort action for defaming the dead is simply a non-
starter. Why? I’ll show that tort law has left would-be litigants 
with an apparently insoluble dilemma—or, if you like, facing 
a pincer attack. On one side, the law denies that the action can 
be brought in the name of the dead person. On the other, if 
living relatives bring the action, the law denies that they been 
injured, so they don’t have standing to pursue the matter.
 I begin with the first prong of the dilemma, which goes 
back far enough in the common law to have an imposing Latin 
name: actio personalis moritur cum persona, or a personal ac-
tion dies with the person. (The standard contrast category to 
personal is real, referring to one kind of property claim.) To 
realize its force, notice that the law has to take a stand not only 
on whether it’s a tort to defame an already dead person, but on 
what we now call the right of survival. Suppose you’re defamed 
while alive and you file a lawsuit, but you die before there’s a 
final judgment. May your estate continue to press the claim 
and collect damages if you win? Or should the action be dis-
missed when you die? Actio personalis is the longstanding rule 
of the common law, set down in Latin by Coke in 1612, and it 
means that there is no right of survival: the action dies when 
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you do.59 It will follow a fortiori that “embezzled, diddled, and 
popped” won’t give rise to a legal action, because you’re dead 
when that outrageous charge is “published” or circulated.
 Learned commentators have been stern, even relentless, 
in denouncing the maxim. Holdsworth suggested that Coke 
just plain made it up, and added, “the maxim when it first ap-
peared in its modern shape was both untrue and misleading.”60 
My wonderful colleague Brian Simpson found the Latin tag in 
1479, 1496, and 1521, so he discarded the claim that Coke, 
that “old rogue,” was to blame; but Simpson thought it note-
worthy that the Latin tag then disappeared until 1612, and he 
drily described its murky contrast between real and personal 
actions as “peculiarly unfortunate”: “most of the maxims of the 
common law,” he added, “are not distinguished by their pro-
fundity.”61 Pollock described it as a “barbarous rule.”62 Pluck-
59. Pinchon’s Case (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 859 (KB).
60. William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 5th ed., 16 vols. (Lon-
don: Methuen, 1942), 3:576. Note too H. Goudy, “Two Ancient Brocards,” in 
Essays in Legal History: Read before the International Congress of Historical 
Studies Held in London in 1913, ed. Paul Vinogradoff (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1913), 226: “Perhaps Coke himself invented it.”
61. A. W. Brian Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The 
Rise of the Action of Assumpsit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
562–65. Percy H. Winfield, “Death as Affecting Liability in Tort,” Columbia 
Law Review (March 1929): 344, beat Simpson to the punch in refuting Holds-
worth; I should note that Winfield is skeptical that actio personalis ever 
made much difference. For a typically unhelpful attempt to gloss the sense of 
personal at issue here, see Edward Leigh, A Philologicall Commentary: or, An 
Illustration of the Most Obvious and Useful Words in the Law, 2nd ed. (Lon-
don, 1658), 5–6.
62. Frederick Pollock, The Law of Tort (New York, 1895), 40–41. For apt 
arguments for why defamation actions should survive, see Note [Luke De-
Grand], “Challenging the Exclusion of Libel and Slander from Survival Stat-
utes,” University of Illinois Law Review (January 1984); Note [Florence Frances 
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nett denied that it ever correctly stated the law.63 No reason to 
think that just because it’s stated in Latin and has an imposing 
history, it makes any sense.
 But I think that modern academic skepticism is best un-
derstood, because most plausible, if directed at the hazy ques-
tion of what makes a legal action personal, not at the thought 
that in the early common law, personal legal claims, however 
conceived, extinguished when the parties did. So a 1658 com-
mentator remarks that actio personalis applies not generally 
but only in “cases where the wrong did principally and imme-
diately rest upon a mans person, as if one scandalize or beat 
another.”64 The language implicitly acknowledges that there’s 
uncertainty or confusion about what makes a legal action 
personal, but it also takes scandalizing—the word is common 
enough in contemporary English, but in this context I think 
it again summons up not just scandalum magnatum but defa-
mation more generally65—as a paradigm case of a personal 
legal claim.
 I’m skipping over the jurisdictional history that for cen-
turies assigned defamation actions to England’s ecclesiastical 
courts, also over what those courts made of the conceptual 
contours of the offense and the remedies on offer.66 But a 1678 
Cameron], “Defamation Survivability and the Demise of the Antiquated 
‘Actio Personalis’ Doctrine,” Columbia Law Review (December 1985).
63. Theodore F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th 
ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), 376.
64. Leigh, Philologicall Commentary, 6.
65. OED s.v. scandalize, v. 1, s. 3: “To utter false or malicious reports of 
(a person’s) conduct; to slander, to charge slanderously.”
66. See esp. R. H. Helmholz, The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdic-
tion from 597 to the 1640s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), chap. 11. 
For a 1645 presentment in ecclesiastical court for slandering a man’s dead 
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commentator on that body of law, John Godolphin, considers 
a question posed “rather by the Casuists than Canonists,” that 
is, by theorists and not church lawyers: “Whether satisfaction 
for the dammage done by Defamation, be to be made to the 
Heirs of the Defamed, in case he died before such dammages 
were recovered by him?” The casuists “agree the rule of law” 
(that actio personalis is a correct statement of positive law? that 
it is the desirable rule?), but deny it applies in the defamation 
action, because they deny that reputational interests are per-
sonal in the relevant sense. If you set another’s house on fire, 
they point out, and die before the victim can recover, your 
heirs will be held liable. The property interest isn’t personal. 
Surely, the casuists urge, “A mans Good Name and Reputation 
is far more precious than his habitation: he that consumes that 
Good Name and Credit without cause, shall refund the dam-
mage out of his Estate, and death it self (before satisfaction 
made) shall not excuse his Heirs.” Godolphin is unmoved: “But 
when all is said (for some will superabound in their own Judg-
ments) the said Rule of Law must stand void of all Exceptions, 
and hold good and applicable to the Premises, That Actio Per-
sonalis moritur cum persona.”67 The point about exceptions isn’t 
quite right, because the issue is whether defamation properly 
falls in the domain controlled by actio personalis. The sugges-
tion that it’s not is compatible with believing that in its do-
main, actio personalis is absolute. But Godolphin’s discussion 
makes clear that at least here the worry is about what legal 
mother by calling him “sonn of a whore,” see www.isle-of-man.com/manx 
notebook/famhist/wills/1645_mc.htm (last visited 24 November 2014).
67. John Godolphin, Repertorium Canonicum: or, An Abridgment of the 
Ecclesiastical Laws of This Realm, Consistent with the Temporal (London, 
1678), 63–64.
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actions are personal, not about whether personal actions die 
with the death of the parties.68
 However we construe modern historians’ hesitation 
about how accurately actio personalis stated the common law, 
I’ve been unable to find a single tort case brought by an estate 
in reaction to the defamation of a dead person. As far as our 
core problem goes, then, actio personalis seems to have cor-
rectly stated the law. What sense does—or did—it make? No-
tice, as you may already have, that it meant that a legal action 
would die upon the death of plaintiff—or defendant.69 (With-
out mentioning the Latin tag, a King’s Bench opinion from 
the late sixteenth century notes that defendant’s death is or-
dinarily a reason not to award plaintiff what the jury had 
 decided on.)70 What might justify such a curious rule? Why 
should a living plaintiff be told, “You’re no longer entitled to 
68. For further discussion of the scope of actio personalis putting pres-
sure on what personal means, see esp. William Leonard, The Fourth Part of 
the Reports of Several Cases of Law (London, 1687), 44–46. See too [Thomas 
Wentworth], The Office and Dutie of Execvtors (London, 1641), 156; William 
Sheppard, The Tovch-Stone of Common Assurances (London, 1648), 481.
69. So W[illiam] N[oy], A Treatise of the Principall Grounds and Maxi-
mes of the Laws of This Kingdom (London, 1641), 6, glossing actio personalis: 
“As if batterie be done to a man, if he that did the batterie, or the other die, 
the Action is gone.” Winfield, “Death,” led me to Noy. See too John Godol-
phin, The Orphans Legacy: or, A Testamentary Abridgment (London, 1674), 
129; William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1765–69), 3:302; Edward Vaughan Williams et al., A 
Treatise on the Law of Executors and Administrators, 10th ed., 2 vols. (Lon-
don, 1905), 1:606; William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 2nd ed. 
(St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1955), 706. Those fond of the dubious glo-
ries of law-French should also consult John Latch, Plusieurs Tres-Bons Cases, 
Come ils etoyent adjugees es trois premiers ans du Raign du feu Roy Charles le 
Premier en La Court de Bank le Roy (London, 1661), 167.
70. Select Cases on Defamation to 1600, ed. R. H. Helmholz (London: 
Selden Society, 1985), 83.
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relief, because the party who injured you is now dead”? Con-
sider three possibilities.
 One: it’s unfair, one might think, for defendant’s heirs to 
have to cough up assets to remedy a wrong they never com-
mitted. Likewise, it might seem unfair for plaintiff ’s heirs to 
profit from an injury to plaintiff. The law would no longer be 
rectifying a wrong between two parties, in this view. It would 
just be grabbing assets from heirs who never committed a 
wrong, awarding them to heirs who never suffered one. But 
this justification is an optical illusion. When defendant’s heir 
complains, “hey, I never committed this wrong,” he’s implicitly 
imagining that the assets in question are his property. But if 
defendant did commit a tort against plaintiff, defendant him-
self no longer had full rights to the assets in question. He had 
possessor rights. The plaintiff suing him could not seize the 
property before winning a final judgment. Nor would the plain-
tiff have the right to decide which assets the defendant should 
liquidate or deliver in order to satisfy the judgment. But the 
defendant had no right to bequeath the full value of his assets 
to the heir. So the heir is in no position to complain that his 
property is being taken: some of it wasn’t rightfully his in the 
first place. Likewise, in reverse, for the thought that plaintiff ’s 
heirs are enjoying some undeserved windfall.
 Two: a partly anachronistic way to grasp the period of 
“undifferentiated wrong” is to see tort actions as piggybacking 
on criminal prosecutions. A criminal suspect’s death meant the 
end of the crown’s interest in prosecuting, so there was noth-
ing left for a tort action to piggyback on. Whatever one makes 
of this conjecture, notice that it won’t explain the further curi-
ous feature that the victim’s death also eliminates the tort ac-
tion. So it’s at best a partial account of actio personalis. And 
whatever justificatory force it may have had is now long dead. 
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Today, of course, just as tort has properly declared indepen-
dence from contract,71 so too it is independent from crimi- 
nal law.
 Three: I think there’s a much more plausible theory to ex-
plain why actio personalis extended to the death of defendant: 
it depends on a conception of tort as a substitute for private 
violence, coupled with doubts about the likelihood of family 
feuds. The worry—that in the absence of a legal remedy, private 
actors will take matters into their own hands—has surfaced 
repeatedly in this chapter. It shows up later than you might 
imagine: an 1872 court upholding a punitive damages award 
for spitting in someone else’s face wrote, “The act in question 
was one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retalia-
tion by force, and the law, as far as it may, should afford sub-
stantial protection against such outrages, in the way of liberal 
damages, that the public tranquillity may be preserved by 
saving the necessity of resort to personal violence as the only 
means of redress.”72 I’ll cheerfully concede that worries about 
private violence once justified the extension of tort liability. 
But it can’t, for us, count as a justification of tort law: not 
wholesale, as to why we should have such a practice; and not 
retail, as to why actio personalis or any other particular doc-
trine ought to be the rule. To be cheekily polemical about it: 
wanna defend the thesis that quadriplegics ought to be dis-
qualified from tort actions?
 Three purported justifications, none of them any good. 
It’s hard to see any other justification for actio personalis. As 
one modern court put it, “It would be anomalous to breathe 
71. Once again I’m thinking of Cardozo’s overthrowing the rule of privity 
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
72. Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 554 (1872).
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life into this maxim, since all agree it had no foundation in 
principle.”73 As recently as 1983, a federal district court firmly 
brushed it aside.74 Time and Life magazines linked Kenneth 
MacDonald to the FBI’s Abscam investigation. He sued for 
defamation but died before the matter was resolved. All par-
ties first agreed to let his estate continue the action, but then 
defendants demanded summary judgment on the ground that 
his cause of action died when he did. The court declared,
if the plaintiff had a valid cause of action here, there 
is no just reason why it should not survive his death. 
To say that a man’s defamed reputation dies with 
him is to ignore the realities of life and the bleak 
legacy which he leaves behind.
 There is no valid reason which should deny 
the family of Kenneth MacDonald the right to clear 
his name and seek compensation for its destruction. 
Why should a claim for a damaged leg survive one’s 
death, where a claim for a damaged name does not. 
After death, the leg cannot be healed, but the repu-
tation can.
Or more pointedly: “The cases which have held that a defama-
tion claim does not survive death rest on some contrived fic-
tion or technical label.” The contrived fiction or technical label 
must be actio personalis. The court also enlisted New Jersey 
law, governing this diversity action, and Prosser’s Torts, pre-
73. Canino v. New York News, Inc., 96 N.J. 189, 191 (1984) (affirming the 
survival of a libel action after death of the defamed plaintiff).
74. MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1983).
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dicting the extension of survival in tort actions.75 But the cen-
tral thrust of its rationale is normative. Once you wrest free 
of the hypnotic effect of actio personalis’s Latin and historical 
pedigree, you can see that it’s as peremptory as de mortuis. 
Whatever its merits, though, actio personalis explains why leg-
islatures had to intervene to create, say, a tort action for wrong-
ful death—and, perhaps, why the law has conceptualized the 
injury as one to survivors, not to the dead party.76 And it ex-
plains the crafting of statutes about the right of survival. Even 
today, some states’ survival statutes lop off defamation and 
insist that your estate cannot continue to pursue an action if 
you die after the alleged injury and after suing, but before a 
trial comes to completion.77 So too modern British law pro-
75. Prosser, Handbook, 709.
76. Sean Hannon Williams, “Lost Life and Lost Projects,” Indiana Law 
Journal (Fall 2012).
77. See for instance Illinois 755 ILCS 5/27–6; Indiana IC 34–9-3–1; 
Kansas K.S.A. § 60–1802; Kentucky KRS chap. 411.140; Missouri R.S. Mo. 
§ 537.030; Ohio ORC Ann. § 2311.21. Some states allow defamation actions 
to survive the plaintiff ’s death: see for instance Michigan MCL § 600.2921; 
New Jersey N.J. Stat. § 2A:15–3; Pennsylvania 42 Pa.C.S. § 8302; Texas Tex. 
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.021. Pennsylvania used to refuse to recognize a 
right of survival in defamation cases, but the state high court rejected that 
restriction on an equal protection challenge: see Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 
395 (1975). Contrast Innes v. Howell Corp., 76 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 1996), re-
jecting an equal protection challenge to the Kansas statute on the hyperdef-
erential view that the legislature could have been worried about free speech, 
even if there’s no evidence that they were. Even in toothless gummy slobber-
ing rational-basis review, the kind (in)famously deployed in Williamson v. 
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), how could a quite general objection to libel 
law serve as a rationale for distinguishing survival actions? Why are they any 
more problematic for free speech than other defamation actions?
Hatchard v. Mège (1887) 18 L. R. Q. B. 771 (Eng.), doesn’t allow a libel 
action to go forward after death of plaintiff, but allows on the same back-
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vides that all tort claims shall survive the death of plaintiff 
or defendant—except defamation actions.78 Fans of incentive 
 effects will notice that given the arthritic pace at which the 
typical civil suit lumbers through our courts, it’s open hunting 
season on the reputations of the sick and elderly in such juris-
dictions. It would make a nice radio spot. “Feeling malicious? 
Check the yellow pages and find an assisted living facility near 
you. Act now!”
 For centuries, then, actio personalis meant that a defama-
tion action would die the moment either party did. The law’s 
adamant stance against survival meant, a fortiori, that it was 
a simple nonstarter to sue on behalf of parties defamed after 
their deaths. No wonder I’ve found no such actions from the 
heyday of actio personalis. That’s the first prong of the dilemma 
facing would-be litigants.
Tort’s Doctrinal Dilemma: The Second Prong
Recall a thought we’ve seen repeatedly, from imagining your 
funeral to Star Chamber’s judgment and more. Set aside our 
central question, whether it’s bad for you to be defamed after 
you die. Isn’t it bad for your loved ones? They’re still alive, so 
actio personalis won’t bar them from suing. Here’s the second 
ground facts slander on title—the estate’s property interests in the alcohol 
dealership are at issue. In the name of free speech, Re X (a minor) (wardship: 
restriction on publication) [1974] 2 W.L.R. 335 (Eng.), rejects a plea from a 
mother and stepfather to block the impending publication of a book retail-
ing their teenaged daughter’s father’s disgusting sexual predilections. The 
dead father was Peter Duval Smith and the book appeared as Richard West, 
Victory in Vietnam (London: Private Eye, 1974).
78. 24 & 25 Geo. 5 c. 41 (1934).
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prong of the dilemma. Right, actio personalis won’t stop them—
but the Palsgraf principle will.79 The principle is very deep in 
tort law and reminds us how much that law really is private law. 
We can put the principle this way: a wrong to one party that 
causes a harm to a second is not a tort against the second.
 The Palsgraf principle is named after Palsgraf v. Long Is-
land Railroad Co., probably the single most exemplary mod-
ern torts case. Waiting for a train to Rockaway Beach, Helen 
Palsgraf stood on the platform. Some distance away, the “guards” 
(conductors, I suppose) fumbled a bit in helping a passenger 
board another train. The passenger held an unmarked parcel. 
The conductors’ jostling made the parcel drop. It contained 
fireworks; the impact set them off; the blast made a scale loom-
ing over Palsgraf fall; the scale injured her. So Palsgraf sued the 
railroad.
 This is a negligence action, so canonically it has four ele-
ments. Palsgraf had to show that the railroad (1) owed her a 
duty of care, that it (2) breached that duty, and that that breach 
(3) caused her (4) injury. The usual duty for common carriers 
such as the railroad was one of utmost care. But New York did 
not extend that heightened duty to maintaining “platforms, 
halls, stairways and the like,”80 or even to the employees’ con-
duct. 81 The duty extended only to the condition of the equip-
ment and the road bed. Still, Palsgraf could argue that the 
conductors were careless, that they didn’t conduct themselves 
79. I adopt the coinage “Palsgraf principle” from John C. P. Goldberg and 
Robert H. Sitkoff, “Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with 
Inheritance,” Stanford Law Review (February 2013): 380–82.
80. Kelly v. Manhattan Railway Co., 112 N.Y. 443, 450 (1889).
81. Stierle v. Union R. Co., 156 N.Y. 70 (1898).
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with reasonable care, and that their jostling the package caused 
her injury.82 So check off the four elements: there was a duty 
of care, it was breached, and that did cause her injury. No sur-
prise that she won at trial. No surprise that the first court to 
hear the railroad’s appeal upheld that verdict.
 But New York’s highest court overturned the judgment. 
The majority opinion is unfortunately written in the curious 
idiolect I sometimes call Cardozo-speak. But here’s the crux. 
Judge Cardozo insists that plaintiff “sues in her own right for 
a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary 
of a breach of duty to another.”83 The crucial fact for Cardozo 
is that the parcel of explosives was unmarked. So reasonably 
careful conductors worry only that if they make it fall, it will 
break. (Or perhaps that it will bruise or break someone’s foot.) 
They have no reason to worry about the welfare of Mrs. Pals-
graf. And—more Cardozo-speak—“the risk reasonably to be 
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.”84 Perhaps then the 
railroad owes Palsgraf no duty of care in dealing with the pas-
senger with the parcel. Better, perhaps, to say that nothing the 
conductors are doing implicates that duty; or, better yet, that 
as a matter of law they didn’t breach it. (“As a matter of law” 
82. Apparently her lawyer’s initial complaint identified the railroad’s 
breach as permitting passengers to bring fireworks and other flammable 
materials onto the platform. That invites: well, how could the railroad stop 
them? By announcing a policy? Suppose passengers ignore the policy. It 
would still be possible to argue that it was the railroad’s fault. It seems the 
trial judge agreed that the railroad had no duty to search every passenger or 
examine all parcels, but his instructions to the jury are what transformed the 
breach question into the conductors’ jostling the package. See William H. 
Manz, The Palsgraf Case: Courts, Law, and Society in 1920s New York (New-
ark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2005), 30, 49.
83. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 342 (1928).
84. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 344.
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means the judge should so rule, because no reasonable jury 
could find otherwise, given these facts.) So Cardozo also says, 
“The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its rela-
tion to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation 
to the plaintiff, standing far away.”85 So here’s the Palsgraf prin-
ciple: if anyone was wronged here, it was the man with the par-
cel. The guards’ wronging him happened to harm Mrs. Pals-
graf. But that doesn’t mean they wronged Mrs. Palsgraf. And 
if they didn’t wrong her, she can’t conceivably prevail in a tort 
action. Cardozo is not thinking that if he were on the jury, he 
wouldn’t find the railroad liable. He is saying it was a legal 
error to let the jury finding stand.
 The Palsgraf principle suggests there’s something invidi-
ously loose or sloppy in thinking that negligence law incentiv-
izes the optimal level of care. The law could easily hold the 
railroad responsible for Palsgraf ’s injuries. It could say more 
generally that when your carelessness harms others, you’re or-
dinarily liable, whether you’ve wronged them or not. I suppose 
that in principle that legal rule would incentivize marginally 
more care—assuming that people somehow know what the law 
says (another familiar hand-waving gesture from these discus-
sions). I can’t imagine why that extra quota of care would be 
too much or inefficient or anything like that. If I had to take a 
stab at the relevant empirical considerations, I’d guess that the 
Palsgraf principle means tort law is incentivizing not quite 
enough care. Stab and guess underline another objection. Nei-
ther judges nor juries are in an epistemic position to have a 
clue as to what rule would incentivize optimal care. Indeed the 
rules of evidence make many of the relevant considerations 
85. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 341.
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inadmissible.86 Actual tort law is ill designed to serve public 
values.
 Regardless, when the defamed dead’s survivors bring tort 
actions in their own names, they run headlong into the Pals-
graf principle. These plaintiffs seem to be arguing that a wrong 
to the deceased has harmed them. So they don’t prevail. A Mr. 
86. Consider competing interpretations of the “Hand rule,” laid down in 
Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 
173 (2d Cir. 1947): “If the probability [of injury] be called P; the injury, L; 
and the burden [of taking precautions], B; liability depends upon whether B 
is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is] less than PL.” Changing the 
variable names and oddly recasting the inequality as an equation, Hand cau-
tioned against taking the formula literally in Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 
149 (2d Cir. 1949):
It is indeed possible to state an equation for negligence in the 
form, C equals P times D, in which the C is the care required to 
avoid risk, D, the possible injuries, and P, the probability that 
the injuries will occur, if the requisite care is not taken. But of 
these factors care is the only one ever susceptible of quantita-
tive estimate, and often that is not. The injuries are always a 
variable within limits, which do not admit of even approxi-
mate ascertainment; and, although probability might theoreti-
cally be estimated, if any statistics were available, they never 
are; and, besides, probability varies with the severity of the in-
juries. It follows that all such attempts are illusory; and, if ser-
viceable at all, are so only to center attention upon which one 
of the factors may be determinative in any given situation.
I’d add the obvious worries about incommensurability: it isn’t brave, it’s fool-
hardy, to insist that everything can be collapsed into dollars, let alone utils. 
Throwing caution to the winds is Judge Richard Posner in McCarty v. Pheas-
ant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987): “For many years to come 
juries may be forced to make rough judgments of reasonableness, intuiting 
rather than measuring the factors in the Hand Formula.” One wonders what 
will change.
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Wellman sued the New York Evening Sun for an 1890 story 
alleging that his wife had been unfaithful and had died getting 
an abortion. Wellman complained that his practice as a lawyer 
had suffered, as had his reputation. The court dismissed the 
complaint. “No cause of action is stated in favor of the plain-
tiff. The injurious publication solely affects the deceased lady, 
and is a personal wrong which died with her.”87 The dismissal 
mixes actio personalis and the Palsgraf principle: she’s no lon-
ger in any position to complain of an injury and he can’t com-
plain that an injury to her that causes harm to him is a tort 
against him. It’s actually the a fortiori extension of actio per-
sonalis: the wrong didn’t die with her; it postdated her decease. 
But the court clearly thinks that Wellman wasn’t wronged, even 
if he’s worse off as the result of some wrong to his wife.
 So too for the woman who sued a doctor after her daugh-
ter, Clara Nelson, died. She alleged not just malpractice, but 
also that the doctor repeated “a false, untrue, and malicious 
charge that the said Clara had been pregnant, and had had a 
miscarriage.” And she won $5,000. On appeal the court fretted 
about that second cause of action. “The action is for damages 
suffered by a living person from maligning the memory of a 
deceased relative. No authority for the maintenance of such an 
action is to be found.” That didn’t imply that the action couldn’t 
be sustained, the court conceded, but it surely counted against 
it. “It would seem plain that the imputation on the character of 
the daughter did not necessarily or naturally affect the reputa-
tion or character of the plaintiff. And, as it is only injury to 
reputation which gives a right of action, it is apparent that the 
87. Wellman v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n, 66 Hun. 331 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1892).
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present action in this respect cannot be maintained.”88 Like-
wise for the widow who claimed that she’d been defamed by a 
newspaper story alleging that her husband committed suicide 
in accordance with a deal with his business associates (!).89 The 
court balked. “The general rule is that a libel upon the mem-
ory of a deceased person that does not directly cast any per-
sonal reflection upon his relatives does not give them any right 
of action, although they may have thereby suffered mental an-
guish or sustained an impairment of their social standing 
among a considerable class of respectable people of the com-
munity in which they live by the disclosure that they were re-
lated to the deceased.”90
 Hawkins’s bit on blackening the reputation of the dead 
also pops up in a Missouri statute still on the books in 1967: 
Libel defined.—A libel is the malicious defamation 
of a person made public by any printing, writing, 
sign, picture, representation or effigy tending to 
provoke him to wrath or expose him to public ha-
tred, contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the 
benefits of public confidence and social intercourse, 
or any malicious defamation made public as afore-
said, designed to blacken and vilify the memory of 
one who is dead, and tending to scandalize or pro-
voke his surviving relatives and friends.91
88. Sorenson v. Balaban, 4 N.Y. Ann. Cas. 7 (1896). See too Bradt v. New 
Nonpareil Co., 108 Iowa 449 (1899).
89. The story, from the Boston Advertiser (23 February 1941), is repro-
duced in full (twice, no less) in Plaintiff ’s Declaration at 1–5, 6–10, Hughes 
v. New England Newspaper Publ’g Co., 312 Mass. 178 (1942) (No. 372059).
90. Hughes, 312 Mass. at 179.
91. § 559.410, R.S. Mo. 1959, V.A.M.S.
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Could that statutory language help a plaintiff trying to over-
come the Palsgraf principle? Violette Bello sued Random House 
for publishing Harlow: An Intimate Biography. She was the 
widow of Marino Bello, Jean Harlow’s stepfather, who plays no 
savory role in that book. (In one juicy vignette, Bello has Har-
low stage a phony suicide attempt after he sneers at her, “You 
want to be crucified for a little Jew?”)92 “The petition charged 
that defendants maliciously published false, defamatory and 
libelous printed matter concerning Marino Bello which blacken 
and vilify the memory of the deceased Marino Bello and scan-
dalize or provoke his surviving relatives and friends . . . and 
that plaintiff as his widow is scandalized, provoked and libeled 
by reason of the publication of the book.” The parties disputed 
whether connected abatement statutes applied and whether 
California law governed. Talk of provocation once again sum-
mons up the concerns of the criminal law. But the state high 
court found another reason to endorse the lower court’s dis-
missing the action. Violette herself hadn’t been defamed. She 
wasn’t even mentioned in the book.
 But what of the plain language of the statute? Why 
couldn’t Violette sue, as she did, in part on behalf of her de-
ceased husband? The court insisted that the statute “was not 
intended to modify the common law by creating an entirely 
new cause of action for the recovery by surviving relatives and 
friends of damages for the defamation of a dead person.” Had 
the legislature intended any such departure, they would have 
specified who had the right to bring such actions and how any 
damages should be distributed.93 So Violette couldn’t assert 
92. Irving Shulman, Harlow: An Intimate Biography (New York: Bernard 
Geis Associates, 1964), 156.
93. So too Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 442 (1942).
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Marino’s interests. Nor could she assert her own: “No action 
lies by a third person for a libel directed at another.” The stat-
ute’s definition of libel applied to both civil and criminal ac-
tions. The court didn’t even pause to explain that perhaps the 
bit about provoking survivors might apply only to criminal 
prosecutions. They just ignored it.94
 An Oklahoma court found another way to sidestep the 
same statutory borrowing from Hawkins. The state first de-
fined civil libel in 1890, they explained, and that definition 
said nothing about the dead. Yes, in 1890 they also codified the 
now familiar language—“blacken or vilify the memory of one 
who is dead, and tending to scandalize or provoke his surviv-
ing relatives or friends”—but that was explicitly about criminal 
libel. In 1895, the legislature “slightly altered” the definition of 
criminal libel. In 1910, a Code Commission doing some Ben-
thamite cleanup adopted the 1895 definition for both criminal 
and civil libel: “The definitions formerly carried in ‘Crimes and 
Punishments,’ having been amended in 1895, are used, as being 
the latest expression of the legislature on the subject, those 
contained in the old chapter on ‘Persons’ having been adopted 
in 1890.” So yes, as a matter of black-letter law plaintiff ’s claim 
in 1984 looked plausible. But brushing aside the language as 
mere drafting confusion, the court didn’t hesitate to appeal to 
the authority of the First and Second Restatements to rule out 
tort actions for defaming the dead.95
 A Texas court took an equally dim view of a defamation 
action brought by Clyde Barrow’s living siblings. “Appellants 
allege that the movie, ‘Bonnie and Clyde,’ depicted Clyde Bar-
94. Bello v. Random House, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1967).
95. Drake v. Park Newspapers of Northeastern Oklahoma, Inc., 683 P.2d 
1347 (Okla. 1984), bracketed insertion deleted.
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row as a sodomist and homosexual engaging in criminal acts 
of armed bank robbery, murder and resisting arrest.” They too 
could point to a state statute with the same language from 
Hawkins about blackening the memory of the dead.96 They too 
asserted both Clyde’s interests and their own: “Plaintiffs . . . are 
persons who are so intimately connected with the memory 
of  their brother and his reputation, that the defamation of 
CLYDE BARROW is at the [same] time a defamation of him 
and in particular of the Plaintiffs who so closely identified 
with their brother.” This court also denied that Hawkins’s gloss 
offered any basis to assert Clyde’s interests. And it easily ap-
pealed to the Palsgraf principle to toss out the siblings’ asser-
tion of their own interests: “It is now a settled law that in order 
for one to maintain an action for defamation, he must be the 
particular person with reference to whom the defamatory state-
ments were made. . . . Appellants admit that they were never 
named, referred to or identified, either directly or indirectly, in 
the movie, ‘Bonnie and Clyde.’ ”97
 Jack Rose’s widow and children sued after a newspaper 
wrongly identified the dead man as “Baldy Jack Rose,” a con-
fessed murderer fretting about gang vengeance. A New York 
court swatted away the claim. The surviving family members 
had asserted only their own interests. “Defendant does not deny 
that the publication complained of was a libel on the memory 
96. Still the law in the state, now codified as Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 
§ 73.001. See too O.C.G.A. § 16–11–40; Idaho Code § 18–4801; Nev. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 200.510; N.D. Cent. Code, § 12.1–15–01; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 45–2-2. Colorado recently repealed a criminal libel statute with Hawkins’s 
gloss: 2012 Colo. SB 102.
97. Keys v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 468 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). 
See too Skrocki v. Stahl, 14 Cal. App. 1 (1910); Saucer v. Giroux, 54 Cal. App. 
732 (1921); Flynn v. Higham, 149 Cal. App. 3d 677 (1983).
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of the deceased Jack Rose. Plaintiffs make no claim of any right 
to recover for that wrong. They stand upon the position that 
the publication—while it did not affect their reputations in re-
spect of any matter of morals—tended to subject them in their 
own persons to contumely and indignity and was, therefore, a 
libel upon them.” The court acknowledged precedent showing 
that you could be libeled if someone asserted a living family 
member was a criminal. “In this State, however, it has long 
been accepted law that a libel or slander upon the memory of 
a deceased person which makes no direct reflection upon his 
relatives gives them no cause of action for defamation.” This 
time a dissent urged that the story should be actionable for 
exposing widow and children to “ridicule and contempt.”98 
(Recall Burton, where Learned Hand thought it defamatory to 
publish a picture suggesting a man had an implausibly large 
penis.) But it was a dissent.
 Back to Palsgraf—the case, not the principle. It wouldn’t 
be an exemplary case were the dissent simply stupid. Judge 
Andrews’s dissent is best known for shrugging aside Cardozo’s 
central question—to whom did the railroad owe a duty as they 
assisted the man with the parcel?—by insisting we owe a duty 
of reasonable care to the world at large, and arguing instead 
that the case is about proximate cause: that when you act care-
lessly, you set in motion an indefinitely long stream of events, 
some of which may be injuries, and at some point the law 
draws an arbitrary line and says you are no longer responsible. 
This bit is simply stupid: it is hard to know why anyone, let 
alone a judge on an appeals court, who must offer reasoned 
justifications for his opinions, would be cheerful at the thought 
98. Rose v. Daily Mirror, 284 N.Y. 335 (1940). See too Kelly v. Johnson 
Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718 (1958).
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that a central feature of tort law is arbitrary. I’m not making 
this up. “Because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough 
sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of 
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical 
politics.” “It is all a question of expediency. There are no fixed 
rules to govern our judgment.” “This is rather rhetoric than 
law. There is in truth little to guide us other than common 
sense.” “We draw an uncertain and wavering line, but draw it 
we must as best we can.”99
 Andrews is on firmer ground when he suggests that the 
law has manipulated the question of to whom duties of care 
are owed. “We now permit children to recover for the negli-
gent killing of the father. It was never prevented on the theory 
that no duty was owing to them. A husband may be compen-
sated for the loss of his wife’s services. To say that the wrong-
doer was negligent as to the husband as well as to the wife is 
merely an attempt to fit facts to theory.”100 The latter refers to 
loss of consortium. The early cases are caught up in coverture, 
the legal theory holding that when she marries, a woman’s legal 
personality disappears into that of her husband.101 Consortium 
claims were routinely added to lawsuits over criminal conver-
sation (adultery) or alienation of affection, causes of action 
eliminated by legislatures in the early twentieth century.
 But consortium, suitably revamped, is alive and well in 
tort law. Earlier than you might imagine, the law makes the 
99. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 352 et seq.
100. Palsgraf at 349–50.
101. See for instance Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123 (1883) (male 
employee may pursue loss of consortium against his boss on the allegation 
that his boss raped the employee’s pregnant wife, and indeed it makes no 
difference whether it was rape or consensual sex).
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rights of husband and wife fully equal.102 It’s enough to show 
loss or impairment of the enjoyment of one’s spouse’s society 
or companionship. The loss of further “services,” whether sex-
ual or housecleaning or whatever else, can lead to an award of 
greater damages, but isn’t any essential part of the tort. Not 
any injury to one’s spouse will generate a plausible consor-
tium claim.103 In that way the Palsgraf principle still has gravi-
tational force.
 More generally, it’s worse than facile to suggest that the 
duty prong of a negligence action collapses into foreseeability. 
That third parties are harmed by torts is just business as usual. 
It’s foreseeable that if a car hits you and breaks your hip, your 
family will be worse off, your fellow employees will be worse 
off, and so on. That doesn’t begin to give them a tort action. So 
too it’s worse than facile to adopt Prosser’s easy cynicism, on 
which duty is “the sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled 
to protection.”104 The appeal here is to replace an allegedly mys-
terious enquiry into private interests with some kind of conse-
quentialist judgment. At the very least, we should instantly 
agree that much that sensibly qualifies as policy must be off 
limits. In the typical tort case, no one cares whether a ruling 
for plaintiff would advance the interests of the Republican 
Party or increase GDP or anything like that. When Paula Jones 
102. See for instance Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584 (1889), surveying 
decisions from various jurisdictions and affirming the right of women to 
bring such actions: “The actual injury to the wife from the loss of consor-
tium, which is the basis of the action, is the same as the actual injury to the 
husband from that cause. His right to the conjugal society of his wife is no 
greater than her right to the conjugal society of her husband” (590).
103. See for instance Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938).
104. Prosser, Handbook, 326.
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sues President Bill Clinton for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, no one tiptoes toward the thought that the mer-
its of his political agenda are even vaguely relevant to the legal 
merits.105 And it is an odd kind of sophistication to insist that 
those political considerations really drive the outcome. “But 
isn’t the fate of Clinton’s agenda far more important?” I guess. 
But that public interest doesn’t register in tort. Gestures toward 
public values in this domain are mind-numbing, not incisive.
 So too the vocabulary of preference and utility is too 
flaccid to carve the terrain. Conservatives and feminists alike 
might be delighted for Clinton to lose: so what? Nor does the 
law weigh Clinton’s psychic payoff in exposing himself and 
propositioning Jones, maybe adding a Bayesian forecast of 
his pleasure at any ensuing sex, against the dismay she feels.106 
Even harm or setback of interests won’t do the trick. The cen-
tral organizing category of the terrain is wrong. As a classic 
case remarks, a child who kicks another in the classroom is 
liable for battery. The same kick administered on the play-
ground wouldn’t be tortious, because the “implied license” of 
the playground means that that conduct wouldn’t be wrongful 
there.107
 Now consider a consortium action flowing out of an al-
leged underlying libel, though with no dead parties to be found. 
In the early twentieth century, newspapers across the country 
assiduously reported on the doings of Mrs. Everett Garrison of 
Newark, New Jersey. “One of the most attractive and promi-
nent social leaders in Newark and north Jersey society,” she 
105. Jones v. Clinton, 974 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Ark. 1997).
106. Contrast Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1992), 386–87.
107. Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 527 (1891).
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disappeared sometime around 1903—just a few days after one 
Elliot A. Archer, a family and business friend of the Garrisons, 
abandoned his wife and two young children and fled: he must 
have known a local bank was about to discover some tens of 
thousands of dollars in forged receipts. Everett moved to Man-
hattan, wouldn’t talk about his wife, and tried to make a new 
life for himself. In 1908 Mrs. Garrison turned up in Seattle, a 
leading socialite there too, ostensibly married to Archer, now 
going by the name Archie Carter. A New Jersey detective, sent 
to arrest Archer for those forgeries, identified her. (Washing-
ton’s governor refused to extradite Archer to New Jersey. Mrs. 
Garrison-cum-Carter had led his inaugural ball with him.) In 
“another amazing tangle,” she sued Archer for divorce while her 
original and therefore real husband, Garrison, was suing her 
for divorce and, apparently, Archer’s original and real wife was 
suing him for divorce. Friends of Mrs. Garrison-cum- Carter 
hoped that when the dust settled, she would happily marry 
Archer for real.108
108. “Held for Theft in East,” Oregonian (20 November 1908); “Seattle 
Man Is Charged with Forgery,” Seattle Star (21 November 1908); “Alleged 
Forger Held,” New-York Daily Tribune (22 November 1908); “$70,000 Forger 
Arrested after Six-Year Chase,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch (22 November 1908); 
“Caught after Four Years,” Washington Post (22 November 1908); “Held for 
Big Forgeries” and “Jersey Fugitive Found,” Washington Times (22 Novem-
ber 1908); “Fugitive Archer Caught,” New York Times (22 November 1908); 
“The Northwest,” Pullman Herald (27 November 1908); “News of a Week in 
Itemized Form,” Cleveland Gazette (28 November 1908); “Will Fight Extra-
dition,” Salt Lake Tribune (4 December 1908); “Governor Protects Reformed 
Fugitive,” New York Times (5 December 1908); “Governor Mead Refuses to 
Honor Requisition,” San Jose Mercury News (5 December 1908); “Fort Pro-
tests Requisition Refusal,” New-York Tribune (6 December 1908); “Refused 
Requisition,” Bennington Evening Banner (8 December 1908); “Mead’s Hot 
Retort,” Daily Picayune (27 December 1908); “Gov. Mead Caustic to Gov. 
Fort,” New-York Daily Tribune (27 December 1908); “Didn’t Get Gov. Mead’s 
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 Now peruse this paragraph from a detailed story in New 
York’s Sun: “At the time of Archer’s disappearance Mrs. George E. 
Garrison of 426 Summer Avenue also disappeared. Later she 
wrote to her husband from Denver that she had been deserted 
and begged forgiveness. Garrison sent her money and she re-
turned to the East. She disappeared a second time and later 
was heard from as being with Archer on the Pacific coast.”109 
George E. Garrison sued the publisher.110 Now he claimed that 
he had been libeled and that had suffered loss of consortium: 
his wife, living with him, was distraught as a result of this 
publication. Had the wandering Mrs. Garrison once again re-
united with her husband in Manhattan? Was the story “of and 
concerning” Everett Garrison? Did he prefer the name of his 
middle initial to the dread George? (But then why not G. Ever-
ett Garrison?) Well, no. The published story was substantially 
true about Mrs. Everett Garrison, who lived in Newark on 436 
Summer Avenue. It was just false as to Mrs. George E. Garri-
son, who lived in Newark on 426 Summer Avenue. (I don’t 
know if the Garrisons were related.)
 Garrison’s first attempt to sue misfired on the proce-
dural ground that he had run together claims that he should 
have kept separate: that he was libeled and that his wife was 
Letter,” Sun (28 December 1908); “Eloping Newark Wife Led Ball with Gov-
ernor Mead,” Philadelphia Inquirer (29 December 1908); “Jersey Eloper 
Queen in West,” Trenton Evening Times (29 December 1908); “Divorce to 
Save Jersey Elopers,” Trenton Evening Times (15 January 1909); “Still after 
Archer,” Salt Lake Tribune (22 January 1909); “Another Try for Forger,” Spo-
kane Press (22 January 1909).
109. “Archer Caught in Seattle,” Sun (22 November 1908); see too “Fugi-
tive Archer Caught,” New York Times (22 November 1908).
110. For the identification of this publisher with the Sun, see Sun Printing 
& Publishing Ass’n v. Charles William Edwards, 194 U.S. 377 (1904).
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libeled.111 So he amended his complaint. The publisher filed a 
demurrer to both claims: that meant they argued that even if 
Garrison could show that all his factual allegations were true, 
he wasn’t entitled to relief. The court sustained the demurrer 
on the claim that George had been libeled. “The husband’s for-
giveness of an unfaithful wife and extending to her his aid and 
protection are acts of courage and manliness which will not be 
considered by right thinking men and women as holding him 
up to public scorn, contempt or infamy.” No doubt, though, 
that the wife could win a libel per se action on these facts. And 
the “inability of the wife to perform her household duties and 
the loss of her society” counted as a wrong to her husband: the 
wrong of loss of consortium.112
 So the law permits George Garrison to argue that by li-
beling his wife, the Sun wronged him. It does not rule out the 
claim as a violation of the Palsgraf principle: it does not object 
that Garrison is trying to marry a wrong to his wife with a re-
sulting harm to himself. The law’s willingness to indulge this 
consortium action means that Andrews is onto something in 
his quarrel with Cardozo in Palsgraf. Nor did Cardozo have 
any worries about consortium: he joined an opinion affirming 
that wives had the same rights as husbands under this cause of 
action.113
 The Garrison case emphatically does not entail that de-
111. Garrison v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n, 144 A.D. 428 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1911).
112. Garrison v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n, 74 Misc. 622 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1911), aff ’d by Garrison v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n, 150 A.D. 689 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1911) (the husband may recover for his wife’s physical illness 
if that illness followed on mental anguish from being libeled); aff ’d by Garri-
son v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n, 207 N.Y. 1 (1912).
113. Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156 (1923).
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scendants can win actions for libeling the dead. As we’ve seen, 
they lose them. It mattered to the New York courts wrestling 
with this claim that Mrs. Garrison was still alive and could win 
a libel suit in her own name—as indeed she did.114 But the law 
could make a further move. It could say that libeling the dead 
wrongs, say, survivors in the immediate family—wrongs them, 
and not just harms them or makes them worse off.
 It’s tempting to think that any such possibility is shut off 
by the doctrine’s “of and concerning” requirement: that to 
qualify as defamation, the statement must refer to plaintiff.115 
But it’s possible that by publishing a defamation “of and con-
cerning” one party, a defamer wrongs another. Compare a grue-
some example: by tying a mother to her chair and making her 
watch him rape her daughter, the rapist simultaneously batters 
the daughter and commits intentional infliction of emotional 
distress against the mother. In that case it’s merely contingent 
that the sort of harm suffered by the mother isn’t the same as 
that suffered by the daughter. So survivors of a defamed dead 
loved one could even claim that they have suffered reputational 
harm. (If someone says your deceased spouse was a crook, 
people might well think you must have known what was going 
on.) And then the law could say that it’s neither here nor there 
whether defaming a dead person wrongs that person. It could 
114. Mrs. Garrison’s $100 award survived a procedural snafu: Garrison v. 
Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n, 164 A.D. 737 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914); Garri-
son v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n, 222 N.Y. 691 (1918).
115. Here I depart from a passing suggestion in an important article: 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, “Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts,” 
Vanderbilt Law Review (January 1990). Zipursky suggests (17–18) that the 
“of and concerning” requirement fixes the question of who’s wronged by def-
amation. And he wants to enlist that as further evidence of tort law’s deep 
commitment to the Palsgraf principle.
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even cling to the commitment that dead people cannot be 
wronged. But it could still say that a defamation of and con-
cerning a dead person wrongs the survivors. Yes, they’d have 
to show that it really was a libel: that it was wrongful publica-
tion of a false defamatory factual claim. And they could hap-
pily agree that it referred to, that it was “of and concerning,” the 
dead person. But they wouldn’t argue that it wronged the dead. 
They’d argue that it wronged them. Then the Palsgraf principle 
wouldn’t block their lawsuits. Nor would they have to worry 
about any lingering remnants of actio personalis: they’d still 
be alive.116
 Too contrived or perilous a way to navigate the prongs of 
tort’s dilemma? Consider one last case where a state legislature 
adopting Hawkins’s gloss apparently had made it actionable 
“to expose the memory of one deceased to hatred, contempt or 
ridicule.”117 After Sammie Gugliuzza was murdered, his widow 
116. William Gladstone’s sons adopted another strategy to respond to the 
published claim that the dead prime minister’s habit was “in public to speak 
the language of the highest and strictest principle, and in private to pursue 
and possess every sort of woman” (Peter Wright, Portraits and Criticisms 
[London: Eveleigh Nash & Grayson, 1925], 152). They sent Wright a letter 
saying, “Your garbage about Mr. Gladstone in ‘Portraits and Criticisms’ has 
come to our knowledge. You are a liar. Because you slander a dead man you 
are a coward. And because you think the public will accept inventions from 
such as you, you are a fool” (The Argus [12 September 1925]). And they got 
London’s prestigious Bath Club to expel Wright. Wright sued for libel and 
lost; the jury noted, “We are unanimously of the opinion that the evidence 
which has been placed before us has completely vindicated the high moral 
character of the late Mr. William Ewart Gladstone.” See “Lily Langtry Named 
in Gladstone Case,” New York Times (28 January 1927); “Gladstone Cleared: 
Son Wins Libel Suit,” New York Times (4 February 1927).
117. For yet more evidence of the legal circulation and variation of Haw-
kins’s account, see Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases, 
8 vols. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1904–5), s.v. Libel, 6:4116–20.
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and son watched a television announcer intone, “There is an-
other possible motive for the death of Sammie Gugliuzza which 
officers are not talking about. It is rumored on the streets that 
Gugliuzza had gambling debts and ties to organized crime 
and that his murder is some sort of a pay-back.” So they sued 
for defamation. The trial court dismissed the action. But the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal argued that as a civilian court— 
remember here the unique influence of the Code Napoléon—it 
wasn’t nearly as bound by common-law precedent as other 
states. The court accepted a version of actio personalis: “The 
deceased person simply suffers no damage and is unable to 
exercise any right of action for defamation of his memory. This 
concept is consistent with what actions are ‘personal’ and 
abate on death.” But the broadcaster owed a duty of care to the 
dead man’s widow and son “not to defame the memory they 
hold of the decedent.” Yes, “defame the memory” is contrived. 
One defames a person, not a memory. But I suppose the court 
wanted an account of why Gugliuzza’s immediate family could 
sue, but not, say, an old friend or a concerned citizen. Still, the 
widow and son could sue in their own names: they could argue 
the broadcast wronged them.118 They’d still have to show that 
the broadcast claim was a false, defamatory statement of fact, 
but their action wouldn’t be parasitic on an actual or imagined 
tort claim brought by Sammie’s estate.
 Let’s call this the Gugliuzza solution. It makes defaming 
the dead actionable in tort by conceiving of it as a wrong to 
survivors in the immediate family.119 It respects both actio per-
118. Gugliuzza v. KCMC, Inc., 593 So.2d 845 (La. App. 1992).
119. Compare Case of Putistin v. Ukraine, Application No. 16882/03 
(ECHR 21 Feb. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-128204 (last vis-
ited 10 November 2015), affirming a cause of action under Article 8 of the 
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sonalis (these plaintiffs are alive) and the Palsgraf principle 
(they claim a wrong to themselves). So it neatly navigates what 
other litigants found an insoluble dilemma.
 But this ruling didn’t stand on appeal. Like the other 
state courts I’ve canvassed, Louisiana’s Supreme Court denied 
Hawkins’s gloss created a cause of action in tort. After all, they 
noted, it was in the criminal code.120 I’m no expert in Louisi-
ana law, but that sounds right. Still the 1992 appeals court 
opinion demonstrates that tort’s dilemma isn’t insoluble. Yet 
it’s not the solution I’m looking for and it’s worth underlining 
why not.
 An action along the lines of Gugliuzza, before the state 
supreme court pulled the plug on it, would incentivize poten-
tial defamers to shut up. It would compensate family members 
for their distress and other injuries. And it would require show-
ing that the deceased had been defamed. But it wouldn’t vindi-
cate the intuition that the dead target of the libel was wronged: 
that would be neither here nor there. It would count only as a 
clumsy way to come close.
 That might seem arid, pettifogging, even risible. But the 
stakes are real: should the survivors’ injuries qualify for dam-
ages? It’s one thing to grant them standing to pursue the injury 
against Sammie—more on that later. It’s another to say they 
may pursue their own injuries, not any ostensible injuries suf-
fered by Sammie. It’s cavalier to shrug off the difference be-
tween these two legal actions as of mere distributive interest 
Convention, safeguarding privacy, when the son of a football player com-
plained about a newspaper story claiming his dead father had collaborated 
with the Gestapo.
120. Gugliuzza v. KCMC, Inc., 606 So.2d 790 (La. 1992). See La. R.S. 
14:47.
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and insist that what finally matters is promoting social welfare 
or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
Coda
Let’s review: here’s the chapter by buzzword. Scandalum mag-
natum: the law once took an interest in defaming the dead, 
when they were great men, anyway. But that was criminal law, 
not tort law. So the injury that counted was that to the public. 
Archbishop Whitgift might die, but the Church of England and 
the realm lived forever. I don’t want to resurrect scandalum 
magnatum—American First Amendment law rightly rejects 
it—but I’m not interested in making it a crime to defame the 
dead. I’m defending a remedy in tort.
 Actio personalis cum moritur: a personal action dies with 
the death of the person. In the common law, a defamation law-
suit would terminate when either plaintiff or defendant died. 
So a fortiori, it wasn’t a tort to defame the dead. Palsgraf prin-
ciple: a wrong to one party that harms but does not wrong 
a  second isn’t a tort against the second. No wonder actions 
brought by aggrieved descendants of dead ones who’ve been 
libeled founder. We could treat the survivors as the wronged 
parties: then the Palsgraf principle would pose no obstacle. 
Doing so would in some sense hold defamers accountable and 
in some sense offer compensation. Close enough, perhaps, if 
you think tort law is all about deterrence and compensation. But 
not close enough, if like me you think it matters enormously 
that a tort plaintiff says, and must say, to a defendant, “you 
wronged me”: and if in turn you want to redeem the intuition 
that it wrongs the dead to defame them. Or even if you’re pay-
ing attention to just which injuries should be compensated.
 These two obstacles have explanatory, not justificatory, 
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force. They provide an account of why libeling the dead is a 
nonstarter in modern tort law. But they don’t give us good rea-
son to embrace that fact. Actio personalis depends most plau-
sibly on the thought that tort prevents private violence. But we 
may rightly seek to hold people accountable for their wrongs 
without beginning to believe that if we don’t, feuds will erupt. 
And the Palsgraf principle is compatible too with thinking that 
defaming the dead wrongs them. It is far-fetched, remember, 
to muster the oblivion thesis and urge that there are no post-
humous legal interests, period. That position is far more revi-
sionist, far more radical, against current law than any cause of 
action I’m recommending here would be.
V
Corpse Desecration
I’m now ready to argue that defaming the dead ought to  be a tort and to offer a more direct rebuttal of the skeptic’s  case. But first I want to take a detour—I hope it’s illumi-nating—and try out an abbreviated version of the analy-
sis so far, this time on corpse desecration. Forget the afterlife: 
does it injure you if your corpse is badly treated after your death?
A Skeptical Dialogue
You can decide if you want to play skeptic or interlocutor, but 
here’s the script I’d supply.
 So you still think that nothing that happens after you die 
makes any difference to you?
 —Yes, that’s right. I’m dead. It’s over. Ha ha and all that.
 Traditional funerals are pricey. The federal government 
offers a helpful checklist1 of stuff your family will have to shell 
out for—casket, burial vault, visitation services, funeral ser-
1. See www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0301-funeral-costs-and-pricing 
-checklist (last visited 29 September 2014).
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vices, graveside ceremonies, hearse, gravestone, and so on. 
Add flowers, food for the grieving, and the like. We’re talking 
thousands of dollars. Suppose your family balks. Someone of-
fers his pickup truck to drive your corpse eight miles outside 
city limits and dump it some yards off the road. Probably a 
crime, but unlikely to be detected. To make sure your corpse 
can’t be identified, the driver will first hack it up and pour acid 
on your face. None of this is bad for you?
 —No. How could it be?
 You’re not appalled to learn that your family would do 
that to you?
 —It’s not me, you know. It’s the body I used to occupy. 
When I was alive. I’m dead; I am no more. So they’re not treat-
ing me any way at all. The only point to a traditional funeral is 
that it’s good for the grieving. If they prefer dumping my body, 
more power to them: whatever gets them through the day. They 
still have interests; I don’t. This isn’t a novel thought. Here’s an 
English surgeon applauding cremation in 1873: “I assume that 
there is no point of view to be regarded as specially belonging 
to the deceased person, and that no one believes that the dead 
has any interest in the matter.”2
 Well, it’s one thing to deny that a dead man has a point of 
view, another to deny he has interests. But all in good time. For 
now: you’re not appalled to learn that your family would do 
that to your corpse?
 —Slow to catch on, eh? Why should I be appalled? Would 
you be appalled if your family used a color poster of you as a 
target for darts?
2. Sir Henry Thompson, Cremation: The Treatment of the Body after 
Death, 3rd ed. (London, 1884), 5. For the dating of the initial publication, 
Cremation, 14.
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 Probably, depending on what else you tell me, but I’ll ask 
the questions here, thank you very much. Once again, let’s set 
your family and loved ones aside: in the kinship and social 
circles you cherish, you’re the last to die. Some public author-
ity would ordinarily bury your body, cheaply but with dignity. 
But tax-cutting savagery has set in and instead the govern-
ment wants to heave your corpse onto the municipal dump. 
Vultures will eat some of it, feral dogs some more; some will 
rot; and so on. Not a problem?
 —I don’t see what you hope to gain by varying the exam-
ple. I’ll just keep saying, “I’m dead, it’s over, I have no interests, 
I have no welfare, nothing that happens can matter to me.” I 
can play your dubious parlor game too. I don’t care if they run 
my corpse through the mulcher and use the chunks to fertilize 
the garden. I don’t care if they do it while guffawing about my 
allergies or hatred of worms. I don’t care if they mock my reli-
gious commitments by sticking a ham and cheese sandwich in 
my mouth.
 Your mouth?
 —My corpse’s mouth. Whatever.
 I thought you don’t exist. How can you have a mouth or 
a corpse?
 —Oh, don’t seize on the curiosities of syntax.
 You know that if you committed suicide in ancien régime 
France, the government could have your corpse dragged 
through the streets and then unceremoniously dumped in the 
trash, right?3
3. Ordonnance criminelle du mois d’août 1670, titre xxii. For a general 
survey and analysis of older European practices, see Lieven Vandekerck-
hove, On Punishment: The Confrontation of Suicide in Old-Europe (Leuven: 
Universitaire Pers Leuven, 2000).
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 —No, I didn’t, but so what?
 You agree that people care about what happens to their 
corpses.
 —Some people do. I don’t.
 You think the people who care are confused?
 —Yup.
 What makes you so confident?
 —I still subscribe to the oblivion thesis: nothing that 
happens after you die can have any impact on your interests, 
your welfare, the quality of your life, or any such notion. Noth-
ing. If nothing can, then nothing that happens to your corpse 
can: that’s a trivial lemma.
 —And I still subscribe to the hangover thesis. I think 
people care because they inherit or illicitly rely on beliefs about 
the afterlife. You officially renounce any such beliefs, but I don’t 
see what else you can adduce. In many cultures, people believe 
they have to bury your body, or do whatever the locals count 
as suitable, for your soul to come to rest. Achilles ties Hector’s 
corpse to his cart and then drags it face down in the dust. The 
brutality doesn’t only upset Hector’s parents; it’s also a problem 
for Hector: remember that in a dream Patroklos tells Achilles 
that until he’s buried properly, he won’t be able to cross into 
Hades.4 In 447, Valentinian III promulgated a decree against 
violating tombs and profaning cadavers: “the souls love the 
abode of the bodies which they have left, and for some kind of 
mysterious reason, they rejoice in the honor of their tomb.”5 I 
4. Iliad, bks. 22–24.
5. Éric Rebillard, The Care of the Dead in Late Antiquity, trans. Elizabeth 
Trapnell Rawlings and Jeanine Routier-Pucci (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 2009), 66. Consider the “Edict of an Emperor on the Violation of 
Sepulchres,” probably from Augustus, imposing capital punishment for re-
moving bodies: “It is my pleasure that graves and tombs which anyone has 
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find that bit about “some kind of mysterious reason” ironically 
amusing: if it’s hard to figure out why even souls should care 
about their corpses, isn’t it going to be downright impossible 
to figure out why anyone who doesn’t believe in souls would?
 —Then there’s the darkly hilarious belief that God won’t 
be able to resurrect you unless your corpse’s physical integrity 
is maintained. (One wonders about those pesky earthworms.) 
Take this Lombardy epitaph, likely some fifteen hundred years 
old: “I beg you, Christians all and my guardian, most favored 
Julian, [to make sure that] no one ever violate this tomb, so that 
it be preserved until the end of the world so that I may come 
back to life without impediment when He comes who will 
judge the living and the dead.”6 In the early nineteenth cen-
tury, England’s anatomists needed more cadavers for medical 
education. The demand produced not just grave robberies but 
murders.7 Jeremy Bentham got his parliamentary acolytes to 
pass a measure flipping the default rule against dissection, so 
that the state could hand over your cadaver to the anatomists 
unless it could be shown that you had objected (with two wit-
nesses) or that surviving relatives did.8 The authorities proved 
suitably aggressive in applying this rule against those who died 
prepared as a pious service for forebears, children, or members of his house-
hold are to remain forever unmolested” (Allan Chester Johnson et al., An-
cient Roman Statutes, ed. Clyde Pharr [Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1961], 133). For discussion, Rebillard, Care, 59–61.
6. Rebillard, Care, 74–75; Rebillard’s brackets. Philippe Ariès, The Hour 
of Our Death, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 32, 
notices the same epitaph.
7. Lisa Rosner, The Anatomy Murders: Being the True and Spectacular 
History of Edinburgh’s Burke and Hare and of the Man of Science Who Abetted 
Them in the Commission of Their Most Heinous Crimes (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
8. 2 & 3 Will. IV c. 75, s. 7 (1832).
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in workhouses,9 now thrust into the ignoble position formerly 
occupied by murderers.10 Horror at being on the dole may well 
have something to do with this fate—and, though it’s hard to 
be sure, with the accompanying worry that being hacked up 
might deprive you of an afterlife. At least one writer in the Lon-
don Medical Gazette felt compelled to deny that last.11
 —Now I don’t believe any of this, so I don’t think it mat-
9. See generally Ruth Richardson’s wonderful Death, Dissection, and the 
Destitute, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
10. 25 Geo. II c. 37, s. 2 (1752), reiterated by 9 Geo. IV c. 31, s. 4 (1828), 
repealed by 2 & 3 Will. IV c. 75, s. 16 (1832). For denunciation of the new 
rule before its formal adoption, see for instance John Bull (24 May 1829). 
And see the wonderfully snotty suggestion in the Age (13 April 1828): “We 
propose that ‘every member of the House of Commons should, after death, 
be given to the surgeons for dissection.’ This would ensure an ample supply, 
and as the great majority of these gentlemen are of no manner of use to the 
public during their lives, it would be only fair that they should be turned to 
good account after death.” For concern about the transition from criminals 
to the poor, see for instance The Journal of Sir Walter Scott, ed. W. E. K. An-
derson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 505–6 (16 January 1829); Walter 
Scott to Maria Edgeworth, 4 February 1829, in The Letters of Sir Walter Scott, 
ed. H. J. C. Grierson, 12 vols. (London: Constable, 1932–37), 11:125–26.
11. “Dissection Viewed with Reference to the Resurrection,” London 
Medical Gazette (25 February 1832). I owe the reference to Richardson, 
Death, 273. For a scattering of early modern English writers trying to figure 
out how resurrection worked, see R[ichard] O[verton], Mans Mortallitie 
(Amsterdam, 1643); The Prerogative of Man (London, 1645); Humphrey 
Hody, The Resurrection of the (Same) Body Asserted (London, 1694); Winch 
Holdsworth, A Defence of the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Same Body 
(London, 1727); A[nthony] Fleury, A Short Essay on the General Resurrec-
tion: Wherein It Is Proved, that We Shall Rise with the Same Bodies We Now 
Have (Dublin, 1752); The Author of Simple Truth, The Spiritual Body: Being 
an Humble Attempt to Remove the Absurdity from the Doctrine of the Resur-
rection (London, 1789); Rev. Edward Barry, M.D., Theological, Philosophical, 
and Moral Essays, 2nd ed. (London, [1797?]), 262–65; and, for professed 
ignorance awaiting ecstasy, see the inimitable John Dunton, Upon This Mo-
ment Depends Eternity (London, 1723), 48. Much of the later debate spins 
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ters what happens to my corpse. You say that you don’t believe 
in the afterlife either, or at least that you’re not relying on any 
such belief. So why do you care what happens to your corpse? 
Again, I think you’re suffering from a hangover of these quaint 
beliefs. Time to get with the program! In 1830, denouncing 
“the filthy, disgusting, and unnatural traffic in dead bodies,” the 
Lancet acknowledged the poor’s “abhorrence of dissection.”12 
By 1906, the journal was pushing back against that abhorrence: 
“probably many of the waverers could be easily persuaded to 
give their consent if a little pressure were brought to bear upon 
them.”13 And in 2003, the Journal of Medical Ethics ran an edi-
torial insisting that “it is immoral to require consent for ca-
daver organ donation”: “The body should be regarded as on 
loan to the individual from the biomass.”14
 In the United States, grave robberies for anatomists fell 
disproportionately on the poor and on blacks.15 That doesn’t 
bother you?
off from the discussion in John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, bk. 2, chap. 27.
12. Lancet (10 April 1830). I owe the reference to Richardson, Death, 75.
13. Lancet (13 January 1906).
14. H. E. Emson, “It Is Immoral to Require Consent for Cadaver Organ 
Donation,” Journal of Medical Ethics (June 2003). The same author offers a 
priceless bit of empiricism: “At death the soul departs from the body—I have 
watched this occur.”
15. Edward C. Halperin, “The Poor, the Black, and the Marginalized as 
the Source of Cadavers in United States Anatomical Education,” Clinical 
Anatomy (July 2007). For American disputes on the practice, see Michael 
Sappol, A Traffic of Dead Bodies: Anatomy and Embodied Social Identity in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2002), chap. 4. More generally see John Harley Warner and James M. Ed-
monson, Dissection: Photographs of a Rite of Passage in American Medicine, 
1880–1930 (New York: Blast Books, 2009).
166 Corpse Desecration
 —Why should it? Genuinely bad things happen to poor 
people and black people. That isn’t one of them.
 “Soylent Green is people!” Not horrifying?
 —Well, I can think that it doesn’t matter what becomes 
of corpses without wanting to eat them. But I’ll bite: it seems 
like a great way to save money wasted on funerals, a sensible use 
of protein. The government could ensure public health stan-
dards. With a suitable nudge or three, a little pressure brought 
to bear, survivors could learn to bask in the socially valuable 
work their deceased loved ones were doing. You want afford-
able housing? Raze those cemeteries, excavate the bodies—or 
not—and start building.
 Insert deep sigh here. Well, one last example. You’re six 
months pregnant when you’re murdered. At the county coro-
ner’s office, an employee high on alcohol and cocaine has sex 
with your cadav—
 —That’s sick. That’s really disgusting. You sit around and 
make up stuff like that?
Some Snippets of Culture
Corpses matter. In every culture I know of, the treatment of a 
corpse is important. The shrinking from corpse desecration, 
indeed the alacrity with which we summon up the category 
desecration, underline the point. (Our skeptic may object that 
desecration reveals that we still imagine the corpse as sacred, 
strictly speaking. But surely desecration can mean treating 
something of great value as if it weren’t valuable, or had much 
lesser value. People who worry about flag desecration needn’t 
be idolaters.) Sure, there’s plenty of variation on what counts 
as an appropriate way to dispose of a corpse: some approve 
of cremation, some don’t. We Americans assume that burial is 
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forever. But today in China, you can rent a burial plot for a 
renewable term of fifty to seventy years;16 in Germany, you or-
dinarily rent a plot for some twenty or thirty years, and states 
vary on whether the lease is renewable;17 in Greece, you get a 
plot for just three years.18 So what counts as appropriate or 
respectful is a matter of social convention, and no doubt those 
conventions are shaped at least in part by economic consider-
ations: consider the trend toward cremation where land is 
scarce.19 But that too is consistent with the baldly, boldly univer-
salist claim that every culture thinks the treatment of a corpse 
is important. No culture seems to adopt the skeptic’s view.
 That doesn’t mean the skeptic is wrong. I have the same 
stance about widespread cultural convictions that I have about 
the common law: they’re worth some epistemic deference, in 
the sense of taking them seriously and wondering what rea-
sons might be—and have been—adduced on their behalf. But 
again I’d reject any claim of the form that they must be right or 
are automatically more credible than any critical insights we 
can bring to bear once we have taken them seriously.
 Humphrey Gilbert subdued a 1569 rebellion in Munster, 
Ireland. Here’s one of his tactics, as described by a contempo-
rary defender:
16. “Leased Graveyards Last 50–70 Years,” Shenzhen Daily (6 April 2011).
17. See http://berlin.angloinfo.com/information/healthcare/death-dying 
(last visited 15 October 2014).
18. Alex Mar, “Rent-a-Grave,” www.slate.com/articles/life/faithbased/ 
2011/02/rentagrave.html (last visited 15 October 2014). For the emergence 
of burial in perpetuity in France, see Ariès, Hour, 517–18. On the transition 
from churchyards to cemeteries, see esp. Thomas Laqueur, The Work of the 
Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal Remains (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2015), chaps. 4–5.
19. For instance, see Nicholas Iovino, “Ashes to Ashes: Cremation Is on 
the Rise,” Malden Observer (13 September 2013).
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His maner was that the heddes of all those (of what 
sort soeuer thei were) whiche were killed in the daie, 
should bee cutte of from their bodies, and brought 
to the place where he incamped at night: and should 
there bee laied on the ground, by eche side of the 
waie leadyng into his owne Tente: so that none 
could come into his Tente for any cause, but com-
monly he muste passe through a lane of heddes, 
whiche he vsed ad terrorem, the dedde feelyng 
nothyng the more paines thereby: and yet did it 
bryng greate terrour to the people, when thei sawe 
the heddes of their dedde fathers, brothers, chil-
dren, kinsfolke, and freendes, lye on the grounde 
before their faces, as thei came to speake with the 
saied Collonell. Whiche course of gouernemente 
maie by some bee thought to cruell, in excuse 
whereof it is to bee aunswered. That he did but then 
beginne that order with theim, whiche thei had in 
effecte euer tofore vsed toward the Englishe. And 
further he was out of doubte, that the dedde felte 
no paines by cuttyng of their heddes.20
20. [Thomas Churchyard], A General Rehearsall of Warres, Called Church-
yardes Choise (London, 1579), n.p. (the nearest preceding subheading is 
“The order and course of his gouernement”). I owe the reference to Kenneth 
R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the 
Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), 184–85.
Compare Peter Oliver’s Origin & Progress of the American Revolution: A 
Tory View, ed. Douglass Adair and John A. Schutz (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1967), 132, repelling revolutionary complaints about Indian 
“savages”: “As to taking the Scalp off a dead Man, it will not give any great 
Pain; & this is the Trophy of their Victory, which they return Home with as 
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The applause here is tempered: they started it, and anyway 
corpses feel no pain, a point worth edgily repeating. The au-
thor knows that at least some contemporary readers will shrink 
in revulsion—and indignation.
 Now consider a Goya engraving from the early nine-
teenth century, part of his astonishing Disasters of War series. 
The immediate context is the Peninsular Wars, with France’s 
brutal assertion of control over Spain. The engraving’s title, 
Grande hazaña! con muertos! most easily translates as “Great 
Deeds! with [the] Dead!” (see fig. 1), though usually con is 
rendered as “against” instead of “with,” which reshapes the 
caption’s meaning. The tone of searing irony resounds through 
the series of engravings: “This Is What You Were Born for,” 
announces one engraving of a man vomiting over a bunch of 
corpses strewn on the ground; “This Is Bad” is the laconic 
comment on French soldiers stabbing a monk in the back; 
“This Is Worse,” reports an engraving of a naked armless corpse 
stuck in a tree, a corpse far more vividly detailed than the 
French soldiers behind it. 
 These dead soldiers weren’t left sprawling on the ground. 
Some French soldier had to work to truss and display them on 
the tree—and not just to strip their corpses but also to hack 
them apart and slash off their genitals. No dignified or respect-
ful burial here: but not I think disinterested cruelty, some ata-
vism, as some would have it, an eruption of thoughtless sav-
agery as the thin veneer of civilization peels away in the heat of 
battle; rather a calculated strategic gesture to sap Spanish mo-
rale. (That it’s calculated is wholly compatible with the possibil-
their Voucher; & as to any Damage it may do to a dead Person, it is of no 
more Consequence than taking off the Shirt of his Garment.”
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ity that the French soldiers were furious as they hacked away, 
also with the possibility that some military superior did the 
calculating and they were merely following orders.)
 The engraving is cringeworthy. You can’t see the face of 
the corpse with his head bent forward, but you sure can see the 
others, rendered carefully enough to make them specific indi-
viduals. There’s a shrewd comment on what Goya is up to, or at 
least how we react, from British artists Dinos and Jake Chap-
man: “Goya’s Great Deeds Against The Dead represent, as we 
see it, a Humanist crucifixion. ‘Humanist’ because the body is 
elaborated as flesh, as matter. No longer the religious body, no 
longer redeemed by God. Goya introduces finality—the abso-
Fig. 1. Francisco Goya, Grande hazaña! con muertos! from Los 
desastres de la guerra (1810–15). Museo Nacional del Prado, 
Madrid. Photo: akg-images.
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lute terror of material termination.”21 If that’s right, the skeptic 
is wrong to imagine that the horror of treating corpses this way 
depends, however furtively or illicitly, on religious conviction. 
Instead it underlines a horror for which we can find no solace. 
The Chapman brothers offered their own rendition of this 
Goya engraving, a rendition whose three-dimensional realism 
makes it downright pornographic. The genital areas are daubed 
in bright red paint as though the nauseating knife work were 
done just before the viewer enters the scene. The Chapmans 
have what I’d call an antihumanist agenda of their own, mer-
rily shocking the audience with renditions of children with 
penises for noses, splayed vaginas, extra body parts, and the 
like: “We would like to rub salt into your inferiority complex, 
smash your ego in the face, gouge your swollen eyes from their 
sullen peep-holes and piss in the empty orifices, but we’ll settle 
for a few aesthetic shlock tactics.”22 Antihumanism, if that’s what 
it is, might supply its own dubious consolation for the fragility 
of our bodies and the horror of carving up corpses and stash-
ing them in trees. But at that point, we’re far from Goya.
 Not far at all is a 1901 cartoon by Jean Veber called Le 
verger du Roi Éduoard (King Edward’s Orchard), as unsettling 
as the Goya, as propaganda if not as art (see fig. 2). The context 
is the Second Boer War, honorably installed in the pantheon of 
military conflict for Britain’s use of concentration camps, where 
21. “Revelations: A Conversation between Robert Rosenblum and Dinos 
& Jake Chapman,” in Unholy Libel: Six Feet Under, ed. Jake Chapman and 
Mollie Dent-Brocklehurst (New York: Gagosian Gallery, 1997), 150.
22. Jake Chapman, “Unholy Libel (Six Feet Under): Pleasurable Disgust 
in the Theatre of Abhorrence; Spastic Thought, Terminal Tics and Hyper-
bolic Ambivalence,” in Unholy Libel, 6–7. The color plates in the back of this 
volume include their version of the Goya and a sampling of these other im-
ages; or you can cruise http://jakeanddinoschapman.com.
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tens of thousands died.23 Veber’s caption points to the contem-
porary allegation that Lord Kitchener had issued an order to 
take no prisoners, but to hang everyone captured. Irish MP 
John Dillon demanded a parliamentary investigation. He ac-
knowledged that the evidence was hazy and that Kitchener 
had denied the claim. But he also quoted Kitchener: “He de-
sired to give them every chance to surrender voluntarily and 
finish the war by the most humane means possible. If the con-
ciliatory method he was now adopting failed, he had other 
23. Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, The Boer War (London: John Murray, 
2002), 194–96; for a more defensive account, Philip Magnus, Kitchener: Por-
trait of an Imperialist (London: John Murray, 1958), 178–81.
Fig. 2. Jean Veber, Le verger du Roi Éduoard, from the satirical 
magazine L’assiette au beurre (28 September 1901). Courtesy of 
University of Michigan Library (Special Collections Library).
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means which he would be obliged to exercise.”24 The British 
government took the matter seriously enough to prosecute—
no, not Kitchener: rather a South African newspaper editor for 
criminal and seditious libel for pressing the same charge against 
Kitchener. The prosecutor contacted Kitchener, who again de-
nied it: “We treat enemies who have surrendered with every 
consideration.”25 (But did British troops let them surrender?)
 Veber, though, presents the allegation as hard fact, in-
deed as a quotation from an official report that Kitchener sent 
to the war office. The caption invites the viewer to see the car-
toon in the first instance as an indictment of killing people 
who should have been taken prisoner. One man has struggled 
enough to untie his hands: that unobtrusive reminder of a death 
struggle is perhaps a protest that he should be dead at all.
 But there’s more. Six men strung up on the same scaffold: 
these faces too are well defined enough to be those of real indi-
viduals, but the sheer efficiency of their execution is dehuman-
izing. Who builds a gallows big enough to hold so many bodies 
at once? So what’s the builder thinking? The corpses bear more 
than a passing resemblance to carcasses for sale at a butcher’s. 
And why are they barefoot? Maybe because the British forces 
want their boots or maybe to prevent their spastic kicks from 
injuring anyone. But I don’t think it’s contrived to detect some-
thing prehensile or maybe pawlike about their toes and feet, 
another way of registering the horror of treating individuals 
with such contempt, as if they were mere animals being slaugh-
24. Parliamentary Debates, 4th ser., vol. 89, col. 1249. See too for instance 
Rebecca Harding Davis, “Lord Kitchener’s Methods,” Independent (7 Febru-
ary 1901).
25. “For Libel on Kitchener: Cape Town Editor Put under Arrest on a 
Charge of Sedition,” Washington Post (8 February 1901).
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tered. We are tiptoeing, maybe sprinting, toward the repulsion 
at mass graves, about which I’ll say more in a bit. The shadowy 
soldiers are generic, abstract, a clump. There’s a trick with per-
spective: the soldiers manage to be less distinct than the corpses 
they’re in front of. Smaller, too, as if their diminutive size re-
vealed their moral inferiority. Only a fuzzy corporate blob, sug-
gests the cartoon, could perform such an atrocity. These dead 
men, vividly individual, deserve better than twisting in the 
wind. So Veber is protesting the treatment of their corpses, too.
 Must our skeptic insist that we are confused in shrinking 
from these images? No. Consider Ronald Dworkin’s distinc-
tion between derivative and detached conceptions of the value 
of human life.26 Quickly, so roughly: The derivative conception 
says that life is valuable as a condition of someone’s pursuing 
his interests. The detached conception says that life is intrinsi-
cally valuable, not as an enabling condition to the pursuit of 
some further end. Now these are conceptions of what makes life 
valuable, and we’re wondering about the treatment of corpses. 
But it’s easy to extend Dworkin’s distinction. A corpse has de-
rivative value only if or insofar as its dignified treatment, say, 
is a condition of realizing—its interests? No: more plausibly, the 
interests of the person whose corpse it is. A corpse has de-
tached value insofar as it is intrinsically wrong to mistreat it, 
because, say, doing so expresses contempt for human life.
 Our skeptic will put pressure on the derivative concep-
tion, because he believes that once you’re dead, you have no 
interests at all. And I suppose he will deny that a corpse is the 
kind of thing that can have interests: it has no plans or projects 
26. Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Eu-
thanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 11–14.
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to advance, so no particular interests; no general conditions it 
needs to secure to be in a position to adopt and pursue plans 
and projects, so no general interests. (On this much, I agree 
with the skeptic.) But there’s no reason our skeptic has to deny 
or even doubt that mangling a corpse or displaying it limbless 
on a tree with its genitals hacked away expresses contempt for 
human life as such. And that means that the skeptic can scold 
me for pretending to exploit a mismatch between his skepti-
cism and the universality of cultural regard for corpses.
 At least at first pass, the distinction between derivative 
and detached conceptions maps neatly onto the distinction 
between tort law and criminal law. Recall that tort law is pri-
vate law: it allows injured parties to sue their putative wrong-
doers. But criminal law is public law: crimes ordinarily have 
victims, but we conceive of crime as an offense against the 
people or the state, so prosecutions ordinarily are mounted by 
a public official and brought in the name of the people or the 
state. No surprise that state after state makes it a felony to mis-
treat a corpse. Here for instance is Arkansas’s statute:
(a)  A person commits abuse of a corpse if, except as 
authorized by law, he or she knowingly:
(1)  Disinters, removes, dissects, or mutilates a 
corpse; or
(2)
(A)  Physically mistreats or conceals a corpse 
in a manner offensive to a person of rea-
sonable sensibilities. . . .
(C)
 (i) As used in this section, “in a manner 
offensive to a person of reasonable sensibili-
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ties” means in a manner that is outside the 
normal practices of handling or disposing 
of a corpse.
 (ii) “In a manner offensive to a person 
of reasonable sensibilities” includes without 
limitation the dismembering, submerging, 
or burning of a corpse.27
In 1994, a bleeding Kimberly Ann Dougan drove not to the 
hospital, but to a highway outside town, where she deposited 
her stillborn baby’s body in a dumpster. This earned her six 
years in prison and a $10,000 fine.28 The whole sorry debacle 
can be understood without venturing any tendentious sugges-
tions about a stillborn infant’s interests in its proper burial. In 
2011, the legislature amended the statute, raising the offense 
from a class D to a class C felony: this increases the potential 
punishment. So this is no dead-letter law, but a matter of on-
27. A.C.A. § 5-60-101 (2014). See Model Penal Code § 250.10.
28. Dougan v. State, 322 Ark. 384 (1995). Compare people pitching in to 
provide a respectful burial for a murdered baby: Casey Sumner, “Burial Rite 
Slated for Baby Left in Freezer,” Blade (3 July 2012). Michael Rosen, Dignity: 
Its History and Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 
131–42, agrees that corpse desecration is wrong, but not as a gesture of con-
tempt to the person whose corpse it was. After all, he rightly notes, we worry 
about desecrating the corpses even of early fetuses. Those who deny those 
fetuses are persons worry too. But we needn’t have a unified explanation for 
our sentiments about corpse desecration. Riddles about Rosen’s appeal to 
duty aside, it seems fine to urge that corpse desecration is always an affront 
to humanity and also ordinarily an affront to the person whose corpse it is. 
Compare Pepys’s lament over the cruelty of not promptly burying those 
struck down by the plague: The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete 
Transcription, ed. Robert Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols. (London: 
Bell, 1970–83), 6:201 (22 August 1665), 6:212 (4 September 1665).
Corpse Desecration 177
going legislative concern. Mutilating a corpse also can qualify 
as an aggravated circumstance in homicide and so justify en-
hancing the punishment.29
 Our skeptic might diagnose our shrinking from the Goya 
and Veber illustrations as arising from the same detached 
considerations that motor these strands of criminal law. The 
worry, he could say, is the affront to the value of human life. 
The butchery defiles or desecrates humanity, as if we were noth-
ing but lower animals. (Even most patrons of animal rights, 
alert to “speciesism,” can agree that humans are valuable in 
ways lower animals aren’t.) To underline the point, he can em-
phasize we don’t need any actual human beings in the back-
ground to understand the shrinking. Ever flatfooted, I’ve treated 
the Goya and Veber illustrations as records of actual horrors 
visited on actual corpses. But we’d be horrified even if Goya 
and Veber invented these displays. We’d be horrified by chain-
saw massacre movies even if we understood they were done 
with clever digital wizardry, no actual actors or actresses any-
where in sight. So the skeptic can urge that our shrinking from 
what is done to these corpses makes perfectly good sense if 
it hangs on a detached conception. That’s compatible with his 
conviction that imagining injury to those corpses or to the 
persons whose bodies they once were, and so relying on the 
derivative conception, is nonsensical.
 Probably, too, the skeptic can fend off objections raised 
by considering the extraordinary care taken with corpses in 
some religious traditions. Take the practice of tahara, per-
formed in Orthodox Judaism by members of a chevra kadisha, 
who themselves have to be pure. I’ll be terse with the painstak-
29. For instance, State v. Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163 (2009).
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ing ritual’s details.30 The chevra kadisha bathe the corpse and 
dress it in plain white clothes. Addressing the dead person by 
name, the chevra kadisha ask forgiveness for any disrespect 
they’ve shown and place the body in a coffin. The ritual does 
not secure a happy afterlife for the dead person: the afterlife 
in any case is not prominent in Judaism. But the skeptic can 
pounce on the religious trappings of the ceremony and insist 
that it must be wrapped up with divine commandment. That’s 
compatible with their believing they do it for the person who 
died, but the skeptic can still protest that this practice can’t 
count as evidence against his hardnosed view.
 But what about time-honored military practices of tak-
ing significant risks to retrieve the fallen? In Mogadishu in 
1993, American troops kept trying to retrieve a helicopter pi-
lot’s body—they knew he was dead—even as they came under 
sustained fire. “Are they going to be able to get the body out of 
there?” demanded a general. “I need an honest, no shit, for-real 
assessment.” They needed twenty minutes more, the troops re-
plied. “We will stay the course until they are finished,” he de-
cided.31 In 2008, Israel traded five militants, one a convicted 
murderer, and the remains of some two hundred militants for 
the dead bodies of two Israeli soldiers.32 We struggle not only 
to reclaim corpses on the battlefield, but to find, identify, and 
respectfully bury corpses from wars that are years or even de-
cades old.33
30. For more, see Rochel U. Berman, Dignity beyond Death: The Jewish 
Preparation for Burial (Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2005).
31. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New 
York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 285.
32. Ayat Basma and Avida Landau, “Hezbollah Delivers Remains of Two 
Israeli Soldiers,” Reuters (16 July 2008).
33. See generally Michael Sledge, Soldier Dead: How We Recover, Identify, 
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 And what about the exquisite care the U.S. military takes 
in repairing the corpses of dead soldiers? This too happens 
on  an industrial scale, with numbers illustrating the grisly 
ramifications of being on a more or less permanent war foot-
ing: over sixty mortuary workers working in a building of sev-
enty-two thousand square feet. But once cargo jets bring back 
the corpses, every step is suffused with respect for these dead 
individuals. White-gloved men in uniform transfer the in-
coming coffins to white vans, which bring them back to the 
mortuary. Watch your tax dollars at work: morticians embalm 
the body, wash it, shampoo the hair, wire together broken 
bones, repair damaged tissue with stitches and suitably col-
ored wax, even try to get the facial wrinkles right: “ ‘It has to 
look normal, like someone who is sleeping,’ said Petty Officer 
First Class Jennifer Howell, a Navy liaison with a mortician’s 
license.” Not a single loose thread on the uniforms they’ll be 
dressed in and every medal accurate, even if the coffin will 
remain resolutely shut in the funeral ceremony.34
 Some of what these military morticians say is puzzling. 
Bury, and Honor Our Military Fallen (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005). On the heroic efforts to identify and respectfully bury the Union dead 
in the Civil War, see Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and 
the American Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), chap. 7: the War 
Department spent over $4m (236). On the use of embalming for shipping 
bodies back north, Faust, Republic, 92–98. The practice already inspired 
grumbling worries about ripoffs: for their full and hilarious flowering, see 
Jessica Mitford, The American Way of Death (New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 1963), esp. chap. 6.
34. James Dao, “Last Inspection: Precise Ritual of Dressing Nation’s War 
Dead,” New York Times (25 May 2013). Sutures aren’t mentioned in the 
print story, but are in the accompanying online audio snippet from William 
Zwicharowski, mortuary branch chief: www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/us/
intricate-rituals-for-fallen-americans-troops.html (last visited 8 December 
2014).
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One suggests that it’s important to make the bodies look real-
istic to make the surviving family members stop fantasizing 
that their soldier isn’t this dead one; another muses that he 
does this work for himself. Perhaps they’re abashed by know-
ing what a skeptic would say, so they don’t say what seems 
straightforwardly true: they work on behalf of dead soldiers, 
not as an anonymous or collective group, but for each and 
every one of them. It would be different to occasionally select 
a corpse at random and put it through this laborious process, 
just as the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier expresses something 
very different from the grave of any named soldier. That the 
military does this unhesitatingly when no one will ever see the 
restored corpse—that, as I suppose, they do it when no close 
family members survive—means it can’t be done solely as a 
consoling gesture to the living, either. This, thinks the military, 
is something we owe to the dead. As an official in charge of 
supplying the uniforms says, “ ‘That’s our job. . . . We’ll do ev-
erything we can to help honor any service member who gives 
the ultimate sacrifice for their country.’ ”35
 Not only the military thinks this way. On Facebook, 
someone posted the lead photo with the New York Times arti-
cle reporting this practice. It shows a sergeant tending to the 
uniform for Captain Aaron R. Blanchard, thirty-two years old, 
killed a few days after arriving in Afghanistan; there’s no corpse 
or body part anywhere in the photo, so it can’t be exercising 
a kind of repellent fascination. That Facebook post went viral, 
or close enough: 192,221 “shares”; 281,324 “likes”; and 24,210 
comments, with stinging denunciations of a woman who ex-
35. Beth Reece, “Uniforms for the Fallen,” www.dla.mil/Loglines/Pages/
LoglinesJA2011Story09.aspx (last visited 13 October 2014).
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pressed skepticism among the most liked ones.36 Some of the 
comments offer generic patriotism or support of the military. 
But some of the most liked ones focus precisely on the gesture 
of respect to individual dead soldiers. Here’s Kelsey Taylor: 
“Seeing my husbands casket arrive in Dover, watching him get 
received by a group of white gloves, carried (marched rather) 
to a van, then driven off only to see him 3–4 days later in a 
funeral home, dressed in a way that only he could dress him-
self. . . . I can’t thank these men enough. They showed the ut-
most respect to my husband. Someone they don’t even know.” 
And here’s Kathy Klumfoot Jacobson: “Thank God there are 
still men and women in our country who value and honor the 
people who serve and die in our country’s defense. I am moved 
to tears with respect for the people who do this every day as 
an act of love and honor to fallen fellow soldiers. Your acts of 
kindness are not in vain, nor unnoticed.” Finally, here’s Bar-
bara Cothran: “The respect is over the top. But think this guy 
gave his life for his country. He should get this kind of re-
spect!!” It would be captious for the skeptic to seize on Jacob-
son’s “Thank God” as a sign of the sort of religious background 
commitment I’ve forsworn in suggesting it’s bad for you if your 
corpse is desecrated. But the skeptic might well pause when he 
notices how many of us fiercely disagree and how we invest 
actual resources, not least emotionally excruciating work, in 
doing what we can to restore these dead soldiers’ corpses. We 
don’t adopt or even entertain the allegedly realistic view that 
once someone’s dead, he is no more and so has no interests, no 
claims on the living. We say instead that it is wonderful to pay 
him respect. And we say it effortlessly, as if it’s obvious. What 
36. See www.facebook.com/SheepDogIA/photos/a.120546321315282 
.8152.118696028166978/621789111190998 (last visited 10 October 2014).
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makes the skeptic want to roll his eyes or chortle? What makes 
him so confident that we’re wrong?
 Or consider the mortician, forensic pathologist, and 
trusty hands-on secretary confronted with “bits and pieces of 
people” after a German bomb killed around twenty in the 
Blitz. It was a “hideous human jigsaw puzzle,” but they got to 
work and managed to sort out all but a few stray pieces into 
individual corpses. “The job, beastly as it was, simply had to 
be done.” What was the necessity? Not, it seems, any legal re-
quirement: rather the respect owed to these particular dead 
individuals.37
 Likewise for the repulsion summoned up by mass graves. 
Let’s switch our focus from war to Catherine Corless’s explo-
sive allegation: that it seemed that at least 796 children who’d 
died in a home for unmarried mothers run by an order of nuns 
in Tuam, County Galway, Ireland had been buried in a mass 
grave—apparently in an abandoned septic tank.38 The septic 
tank is more gruesome yet, at least if it’s wrong to treat corpses 
like shit. Corless denied ever saying they were “dumped” in a 
septic tank. Church apologists seized on that concession to 
suggest she’d never made a claim about a septic tank, either.39 
37. Molly Lefebure, Murder on the Home Front (New York: Grand Cen-
tral Publishing, 2013), 171.
38. Alison O’Reilly, “A Mass Grave of 800 Babies,” Irish Mail on Sunday 
(25 May 2014). For the septic tank, Catherine Corless, “The Home,” Journal 
of Old Tuam Society (2012): 81, following up stories about “a sort of crypt” 
with “small skulls”: “By placing a tracing of the 2007 map on top of the 1905 
map, it is quite evident that this tank is right in the middle of the graveyard.”
39. The two charges are conflated in Rosita Boland, “Tuam Mother and 
Baby Home: The Problem with the Septic Tank Story,” Irish Times (7 June 
2014). Corless explicitly mentions the septic tank in the accompanying on-
line video: see www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/tuam-mother-and 
-baby-home-the-trouble-with-the-septic-tank-story-1.1823393 (last visited 
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Corless found the children’s names in the birth and death reg-
isters, but not in any burial records. The sister of one of those 
children is waiting for a response from the attorney general. 
Records show that her brother, who died as a baby, “was ema-
ciated with a voracious appetite.” She thinks he died of neglect 
and not of measles, as his death certificate reports while brand-
ing him “a congenital idiot.” So she wants the grave excavated, 
DNA used to identify her brother’s corpse, and, if possible, the 
true cause of death identified. Now consider this: “ ‘I want jus-
tice and I want closure for my brother and my mother, who 
didn’t get it when they were alive,’ ” she also says.40
 I don’t know if she’s a devout Catholic or if her brand of 
Catholicism would include the claim that her dead brother 
and mother are peering down from their perch in the afterlife, 
unable to rest without justice being done to them. Even on that 
13 October 2014). Contrast too Eamonn Fingleton, “Why That Story about 
Irish Babies ‘Dumped in a Septic Tank’ Is a Hoax,” Forbes (9 June 2014), with 
Amelia Gentleman, “The Mother behind the Galway Children’s Mass Grave 
Story: ‘I Want to Know Who’s Down There,’ ” Guardian (13 June 2014).
On the use of common graves for paupers and the desire of family mem-
bers to secure them individual burial in England around 1900, see Julie- 
Marie Strange, Death, Grief, and Poverty in Britain, 1870–1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 138–48. Close to one million are buried 
in New York City’s Potter Field on Hart Island, but for well over a century 
every body has gotten its own casket: Corey Kilgannon, “Visiting the Island 
of the Dead,” New York Times (15 November 2013). See too one soldier’s 
flinching at the 1815 mass burial of two hundred of the British war dead in 
New Orleans: “A more appalling spectacle cannot well be conceived than 
this common grave, the bodies hurled in as fast as we could bring them” (The 
Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith, 1787–1819, ed. G. C. Moore Smith [Lon-
don: John Murray, 1910], 241). Compare Nina Bernstein, “Bodies Given to 
N.Y.U. Ended Up in Mass Graves, Despite Donors’ Wishes,” New York Times 
(27 May 2016).
40. Alison O’Reilly, “ ‘Excavate Mass Grave to Find My Brother,’ ” Irish 
Mail on Sunday (28 September 2014).
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view, we can turn the skeptic’s deriding that “mysterious rea-
son” that souls have for caring about their corpses against 
him: just why would a dead soul care about the disposal of its 
corpse? The traditional Catholic answer can’t be that resurrec-
tion requires the corpse’s physical integrity: not because even 
burial in a septic tank doesn’t interfere with that, but because 
the church fathers considered the matter in their usual metic-
ulous way and decided that God can reassemble the particles 
of your body, however widely scattered they are. (Yes, they 
fretted too about the same particles appearing in different 
bodies, not least because of cannibalism.) Indeed in the early 
church some saints’ corpses were deliberately divided so they 
could be buried in different locations and attract more prayers.41
 Once again we see the role of convention and context: 
dividing a saint’s corpse is a mark of respect, even adoration. 
So too is festooning the remains in jewelry: gaudy, even garish, 
for some of us today, but a profound honor in the eyes of con-
temporary believers.42 The family members in saga Iceland 
who brandished severed heads and other bloody relics of the 
deceased to goad others into revenging them weren’t dishon-
41. Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western 
Christianity, 200–1336 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Eliza-
beth A. R. Brown, “Death and the Human Body in the Later Middle Ages: 
The Legislation of Boniface VIII on the Division of the Corpse,” Viator 
(1981). For the role of ghosts in popular Christian culture in the Middle 
Ages, see Jean-Claude Schmitt, Ghosts in the Middle Ages: The Living and the 
Dead in Medieval Society, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1998).
42. See the astonishing photographs in Paul Koudounaris, Heavenly Bod-
ies: Cult Treasures & Spectacular Saints from the Catacombs (New York: 
Thames & Hudson, 2013). A sampling is online at http://hyperallergic.com/ 
83446/medieval-bling-skeletons-encrusted-in-jewels-and-gold/ (last visited 
27 January 2015).
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oring the dead: quite the contrary.43 So too for those in today’s 
China who publicly display corpses to protest wrongful deaths.44 
Jeremy Bentham suggested that corpse displays could be end-
lessly intructive.45 The Soviet Union and its satellites knew that, 
too; so did Hugo Chávez, though his teary rhapsodies over 
Simón Bolívar’s bones hurtle us into bathos.46 Even cannibal-
ism can be a gesture of respect.47 Ordinarily, though, severed, 
decorated, and jumbled remains are a sign of contempt. Like-
wise for corpses left unburied.
 So there’s a general response to mass graves: as far as we 
can, we delicately excavate, sort out individual bodies, identify 
them, and accord them dignified burial. It’s possible, if tricky, 
to thread the needle here and argue that jumbling different in-
dividual corpses together is an affront not to those particular 
43. William Ian Miller, “Choosing the Avenger: Some Aspects of the 
Bloodfeud in Medieval Iceland and England,” Law and History Review (1983).
44. Yaqiu Wang, “Invasion of the Body Snatchers: Why Aggrieved Chi-
nese Citizens and Chinese Police Are Fighting over Corpses,” ChinaFile (6 
May 2015). Thanks to Mary Gallagher for the reference—and for reporting 
this: “A researcher on petitioning told me about meeting a woman who car-
ried her son’s head around in a bag while she went from office to office in 
Beijing trying to get a just decision on the cause of death.”
45. See Auto-Icon; or, Farther Uses of the Dead to the Living (not pub-
lished, 1842?), in Bentham’s Auto-Icon and Related Writings, ed. James E. 
Crimmins (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2002). Compare William Godwin, 
Essay on Sepulchres: or, A Proposal for Erecting Some Memorial of the Illustri-
ous Dead in All Ages on the Spot Where Their Remains Have Been Interred 
(London, 1809).
46. Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and 
Postsocialist Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); “Bolívar 
Exhumed,” Economist (22 July 2010).
47. Jerome T. Whitfield, Wandagi H. Pako, John Collinge, and Michael P. 
Alpers, “Mortuary Rites of the South Fore and Kuru,” Philosophical Trans-
actions of the Royal Society B (2008). Thanks to Scott Hershovitz for the 
reference.
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individuals, but to the detached value of human life: imagine 
learning that the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier had the body 
parts of two or three different soldiers. I don’t deny that regard 
for the detached value of human life helps motor widespread 
horror at mass graves, that it is one reason people do the gory 
work of patiently disaggregating the corpses and, as far as they 
can, according each one a respectful burial. But here’s the 
clincher against the view that it’s only a matter of detached 
value, that we don’t believe there is any wrong to the individ-
uals consigned to mass graves: over and over in these cases, 
family members come forward to claim their own loved one’s 
corpse. If mass graves were an affront only to the detached 
value of human life, you wouldn’t expect that. No, don’t say it’s 
just an efficient scheme to divide the labor.
 Many years after genocidal attacks in Srebrenica, the au-
thorities removed bodies from a mass grave, identified them, 
and put them in labeled coffins: “There were 500-plus coffins 
and large groups of family members. The people walk around 
and look for their loved ones. There is a name on the coffin. 
They are looking for their relatives, so there are lots of people 
coming and going between the coffins looking for their loved 
ones. Once they find them, they stop there and pray and touch 
the coffin and spend time with it.”48 Or again: during the po-
tato famine, many ailing Irish immigrants deboarding at Ellis 
Island were quarantined. The thousands who died were buried 
48. Kathy Ryan, “Under Cover: Paolo Pellegrin on Photographing Sre-
brenica, 20 Years after the Genocide,” The 6th Floor: Eavesdropping on the 
Times Magazine (30 May 2014), at http://6thfloor.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/ 
05/30/under-cover-paolo-pellegrin-on-photographing-srebrenica-20-years 
-after-the-genocide (last visited 14 October 2014).
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unceremoniously, “three and four deep,” behind the hospital. 
Then this, from coverage of a more respectful burial ceremony 
of the remains, carried out over 150 years later: “Jack King, 71, 
who said he believed that two of his ancestors were quaran-
tined after arriving from Ireland, will participate in the cere-
mony on Sunday. ‘I’m probably one of the proudest Irishmen 
that you could find, to know that relatives had gone through 
this and I have an opportunity to put them to rest,’ he said. 
‘This puts a final end to their sorrows.’ ”49 Or again: in 1948, 
federal authorities chartered a jet to deport Mexican farm-
workers, some undocumented, some outstaying their work 
permits.50 The plane crashed. “The bodies of the four crew 
members were shipped to family members, but the remains of 
the 28 Mexicans were buried in a mass grave.” Woody Guthrie’s 
“Plane Wreck at Los Gatos” limns the indignity: “You won’t 
have your names when you ride the big airplane / All they will 
call you will be ‘deportees.’ ” Decades later, a son and grandson 
of Mexican farmworkers spent two years identifying those 
twenty-eight by name. More than six hundred assembled for a 
memorial service and the unveiling of a new headstone nam-
ing every one of them. Then this:
 Caritina Paredes Murillo was 11 when news 
of her father’s death in a plane wreck reached her 
family in Guanajuato State in central Mexico. For 
days, everyone in her house wept. But after 65 
49. Edna Ishayik, “Refugees of Irish Famine to Get a Proper Burial,” New 
York Times (25 April 2014).
50. “32 Killed in Crash of Charter Plane,” New York Times (29 January 
1948).
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years, her memories of her father feel more like im-
pressions now: the way he left for long stretches to 
work, and the sound of his voice singing ballads to 
her mother when he returned home.
 “In my heart I feel happy and sad at the same 
time,” said Ms. Paredes, 77, who traveled from Mex-
ico to attend the ceremony. “It feels like they were 
all buried for the first time today.”51
Again, I don’t doubt that these stories also show regard for the 
detached conception of human life. Jack King didn’t instigate 
the reburial of those Irish remains. But he’s not there to vin-
dicate the value of human life as such. He wants to put his 
relatives to rest. Yes, his reference to ending their sorrows may 
well indicate he’s convinced he can resolve their unhappiness 
in the afterlife. But what about Caritina Paredes Murillo? She 
too didn’t instigate the reburial of her father and others. But 
this old woman comes from Mexico to Fresno for what seems 
to her a first burial, the first time her father’s remains have 
been treated with the dignity she thinks they deserve: not as a 
symbol of human life, not even as a representative of Mexican 
migrant labor, but as her father. The man who struggled to 
name the twenty-eight migrant laborers in a mass grave may 
have thought simply that all human corpses deserve names. 
His lineage, though, suggests he is acting on a broader notion 
than kinship, but one pointing to the same direction: that he 
owes this effort to Mexican migrant workers, but not finally as 
a category: rather to these particular workers, for their indi-
vidual sakes.
51. Malia Wollan, “65 Years Later, a Memorial Gives Names to Crash 
Victims,” New York Times (3 September 2013).
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What’s Law Got to Do with It?
Now I want to consider how the law has responded to com-
plaints about disturbing and desecrating corpses. Remember 
that corpse desecration is a crime, but that’s public law. The 
question is whether an affront to an individual corpse might 
register as a tort, or more generally in private law. Who would 
be claiming an injury? And just what would that injury be?
 There can be no property in a corpse: that principle is 
deep in the common law, or at least it comes to seem that way.52 
Coke’s Institutes declares, “The buriall of the Cadaver (that is, 
caro data vermibus) is nullius in bonis, and belongs to Ecclesi-
asticall cognisance, but as to the monument, action is given (as 
hath been said) to the Common law by defacing thereof.”53 
Corpses may be given over to the worms, as the Latin paren-
thesis has it, but Coke seems really to be saying that despite the 
ordinary jurisdiction of the church courts in such matters, the 
common law still has a role to play in actions about the mon-
ument. Perhaps Blackstone offers better support for the tra-
ditional reading. His startling example underlines the point. 
Even if we don’t know who owns some property, he reports, 
the law will permit criminal prosecution. “This is the case of 
52. For a first-rate review and apt skepticism about how some of the ca-
nonical sources have been enlisted, see Daniel Sperling, Posthumous Inter-
ests: Legal and Ethical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), chap. 3. More generally, see the breathless treatment in Percival E. 
Jackson, The Law of Cadavers and of Burial and Burial Places, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), chap. 2. For the suggestion that a corpse that’s 
been worked on—embalmed, say, or mummified—and attained some mon-
etary value does qualify as property, see Doodeward v. Spence, 6 C.L.R. 406 
(Australia 1908).
53. Edw[ard] Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 
(London, 1648), 203.
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stealing a shrowd out of a grave; which is the property of those, 
whoever they were, that buried the deceased: but stealing the 
corpse itself, which has no owner, (though a matter of great 
indecency) is no felony, unless some of the gravecloths be sto-
len with it.”54 Whatever its actual background in jurisdiction, 
the denial of property in a corpse hardens over time. “Our law 
recognises no property in a corpse,” bluntly declared the Court 
of King’s Bench in 1857.55 “A dead body by law belongs to no 
one,” as one late-nineteenth-century compendium of English 
law put it.56
 But this denial came under pressure. One man sued when 
the town selectmen decided to close a cemetery and transfer 
the buried bodies to a new one: he didn’t want his loved ones’ 
remains disturbed. The court scrutinized his claim: what rights 
could he be claiming? He didn’t own the soil they were buried 
in; he could plead no breach of contract. “But while [the corpse] 
is not property in the ordinary sense of the term, it is regarded 
as property so far as to entitle the relatives to legal protection 
from unnecessary disturbance and wanton violation or inva-
sion of its place of burial.”57 So this man stated a plausible legal 
54. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. 
(Oxford, 1765–69), 4:236; see also 2:429. See Guthrie v. Weaver, 1 Mo. App. 
136, 141 (1876) (echoing Blackstone, but denying property even in the 
shroud). See too Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 (1868); Bonham v. Loeb, 
107 Ala. 604 (1894) (suit alleging plowing and tilling over the bodies of 
plaintiff ’s relatives fails for lack of a sound property claim); Bessemer Land & 
Improv. Co. v. Jenkins, 111 Ala. 135 (1895). For an opinion tripping up on the 
question whether a corpse has property rights, see Lawson v. State, 68 Ga. 
App. 830 (1943), overruled by McKee v. State, 200 Ga. 563 (1946).
55. R. v. Sharpe (1857) 169 Eng. Rep. 1959 (KB).
56. Ephraim A. Jacob, An Analytical Digest of the Law and Practice of the 
Courts . . . of England, 11 vols. (New York, 1879–86), 3:4386.
57. Page v. Symonds, 63 N.H. 17, 20 (1883).
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claim, even if he wouldn’t prevail: there was nothing unneces-
sary or wanton about the selectmen’s action. It was regulation 
in the public interest, the sort of thing nineteenth-century 
American courts effortlessly upheld against claims of private 
right.58
 In another case, a widow and her children wanted to 
move her husband’s body to a nearby cemetery, but the hus-
band’s siblings opposed the move. “There is not a property 
right to a dead body in a commercial sense,” agreed the court, 
“but there is a right to bury it which the courts of law will rec-
ognize and protect.”59 So too another court agreed there is no 
property in a corpse, but promptly added that there is “quasi 
property,” with rights and obligations for disposing of it en-
forceable in equity.60 More recently, Tri-State Crematories didn’t 
cremate some bodies. Instead they left them jumbled on their 
property and returned concrete dust to the grieving relatives: 
or so a class action suit maintained. The court had no worries 
about the legal basis for the action: “Georgia recognizes a quasi 
property right in the deceased body of a relative, belonging to 
58. William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nine-
teenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1996). See too Kincaid’s Appeal, 66 Pa. 411, 424 (1870); Sohier v. Trinity 
Church, 109 Mass. 1, 21–22 (1871).
59. Neighbors v. Neighbors, 112 Ky. 161, 163 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901). Com-
pare In re Ackermann, 124 A.D. 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908); Wynkoop v. Wyn-
koop, 42 Pa. 293 (1861); Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422 (1881) (affirming a 
husband’s right to move his wife’s remains when he pleaded that he had suc-
cumbed to her sisters’ pleas while under great emotional strain).
60. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872). 
Compare Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566, 584–85 (1829). For many more such 
opinions, see Jackson, Law of Cadavers, 133 n. 57. On the law’s invoking 
quasi property in this setting and elsewhere, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
“Quasi-Property: Like, but Not Quite Property,” University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review (June 2012).
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the husband or wife, and, if neither, to the next of kin.”61 In the 
exasperated words of an old and frequently cited case, “this 
whole subject is only obscured and confused by discussing the 
question whether a corpse is property in the ordinary com-
mercial sense,” because some have rights to control and bury 
the body.62
 Not property in a commercial sense—you can’t buy or 
sell a corpse—but property, or quasi property, in other senses: 
you may have the right to control the disposition of a corpse 
and others may be obliged not to interfere. These courts, most 
of them writing decades before, adopt the view we associate 
with the legal realists of the early twentieth century, now ca-
nonically casting the right to property as a bundle of sticks, 
which the owner may hold more or fewer of, and not a unitary 
right.63 I think the insight is a lot older. It’s common to use 
Blackstone as the foil:64 “There is nothing which so generally 
strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind 
as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things 
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other indi-
vidual in the universe.”65 But Blackstone presents sole and 
despotic dominion as a popular—and, as he goes on to say, 
unconsidered—view. His ensuing hundreds of pages, catalog-
61. In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 697 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
62. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 310 (1891).
63. Key pieces include John R. Commons, The Distribution of Wealth 
(New York, 1893), 70, 92; Robert L. Hale, “Rate Making and the Revision of 
the Property Concept,” Columbia Law Review (March 1922); Morris R. Cohen, 
“Property and Sovereignty,” Cornell Law Review (December 1927).
64. For instance, in Felix S. Cohen’s characteristically hilarious “Dialogue 
on Private Property,” Rutgers Law Review (Winter 1954): 362.
65. Blackstone, Commentaries, 2:2.
Corpse Desecration 193
ing all kinds of restrictions on property, deftly undo this pop-
ular fantasy.
 So too whether a corpse counts as property will depend 
on what sort of legal claim is being pressed. When a young 
adult died without indicating how to dispose of his body, his 
divorced parents agreed on cremation. But they couldn’t agree 
on where the ashes should rest. The father petitioned probate 
court to treat the ashes as property and partition them equally. 
That court refused; citing Blackstone and King’s Bench as au-
thorities, an appeals court agreed.66 One woman filed a replevin 
action to get her brother’s corpse back from the undertakers, 
who were holding onto it because she hadn’t paid the bill. The 
court dismissed the claim: because corpses aren’t property, it 
didn’t make sense to invoke a legal remedy for reclaiming 
personal property.67 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
provide that neither the federal nor state governments may de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law. For purposes of that guarantee, ruled one court, a 
corpse won’t qualify as property either.68
 Property in some senses, not others, for some legal pur-
poses, not others; or quasi property, coupled with the relatively 
freewheeling approach to decision making that lawyers shelve 
under the name equity jurisdiction: this is one basic recipe al-
lowing courts to respond to claims that something has gone 
badly amiss in the treatment of a corpse. As an 1852 opinion 
put it, “It cannot be that it is necessary to produce formal proof 
of authority from a mother to a son to do all that was necessary 
66. Wilson v. Wilson, 138 So.3d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
67. Keyes v. Konkel, 119 Mich. 550 (1899). So too Lascurain v. City of 
Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 251, 267–71 (2002).
68. Albrecht v. Treon, 118 Ohio St. 3d 348 (2008).
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and proper for the burial of her deceased son in the family 
tomb. The law will imply a license from the nature and exi-
gencies of the case, the relation of the parties, and the well- 
established usages of a civilized and christian community.”69 
Here too the skeptic might pounce on the passing appeal to 
Christianity, but I think he won’t be able to show that such 
sentiments must depend on religious conviction.
 I want next to consider two sorts of cases: first, corpses 
damaged in transit; second, autopsies gone awry. Remember, 
the skeptic’s commitment to the oblivion thesis means that he 
will insist that nothing I shall report here could count as an 
injury to a dead person. His commitment to the hangover the-
sis means that he will insist that any intuitions to the contrary 
must depend on continuing to cling to older religious com-
mitments. As we’ll see, the doctrinal structure of these com-
plaints is slippery: interference with a quasi-property interest 
in exercising the right to bury a loved one, or—not formally 
available until the 1970s or so—the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, or something more or less unstated. The Sec-
ond Restatement sets out a special tort of corpse desecration: 
“One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, with-
holds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or 
prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liabil-
ity to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to 
the disposition of the body.”70 The reporters promptly explain 
that at bottom are claims about interference with quasi prop-
erty or the infliction of emotional distress, whether negligent 
or intentional. On any of these frames, the injury is to the sur-
69. Lakin v. Ames, 64 Mass. 198, 221 (1852). More pointedly, Osteen v. 
Southern R. Co., 101 S.C. 532, 543 (1915).
70. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 868.
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vivors, not the dead person. I’ll be putting pressure on that 
thought. Regardless, that it’s hard to say precisely what the legal 
complaint is does not mean the law thinks nothing wrong is 
going on. Quite the contrary.
 One caution: I draw freely on cases from different juris-
dictions over many decades. I claim neither that the law has 
shifted nor that it hasn’t: there just aren’t enough cases to be 
confident. It’s enough for my purposes to highlight the prob-
lems that tort law has responded to.
Misdelivery by Train
Your loved one dies hundreds of miles from home. You want 
to bury the corpse in the local cemetery, so you hire a railroad 
company to bring it back. They botch the job.
 Or they manage to transform a living person into man-
gled body parts strewn far and wide. In 1905, a man boarded a 
Southern Railway train in Statesville, North Carolina. The train 
was bound for Carrabis, some twenty miles away; he  intended 
to get off along the way to spend the night with his aunt. He 
never arrived. The Charlotte Daily Observer reported the trag-
edy: Bert Kyles, around twenty-six years old, “was killed last 
night by east-bound passenger train No. 12 at Barber’s Junc-
tion. Just how the accident occurred has not been learned.”71
 His widow, Hattie, sued the railroad company. He hap-
pened to be their employee, though that wasn’t an issue. Nor 
did Hattie allege that the railroad had caused his death. She 
sought to recover for the treatment of his corpse, but the trial 
court “nonsuited” her: they ruled that even if she could show 
the facts she alleged, nothing in the law would entitle her to 
71. “Killed by a Train,” Charlotte Daily Observer (21 January 1905).
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recover. She appealed that judgment and the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina overruled the trial court. Lest you fear I’d be 
brazenly overstating the facts, I’ll quote the court’s dispassion-
ate report:
The body was found on the defendant’s track—head, 
pool of blood, hair, eyeballs, etc., near the 4-mile 
post from Salisbury; arms and legs 75 yards farther 
in direction of Salisbury, and the body 250 or 275 
yards from head in the same direction; hair, blood, 
and parts of body along track, inside and outside of 
the rails, for some distance; and evidence that body 
was dragged and knocked from one side of the track 
to the other; hair on angle bars or nuts where the 
rails are joined. The body was stripped of its head, 
legs and arms and all clothing; overcoat found near 
the place, torn and cut; a piece of it was found one 
mile east of the body, and a pocket west of States-
ville, 27 miles therefrom, in a different direction. The 
drawers were picked up on the track one-fourth of 
a mile west from body. Between 9 o’clock on the 
evening of the 19th and 6 o’clock on the afternoon 
of the 20th the body and its fragments lay strewn 
up and down the track between the rails and were 
run over by every passing train. During this time 
fifteen or more trains passed over the defendant’s 
track—six or more during the night and six or more 
during the day—after the defendant’s agent discov-
ered the body, and one train was seen to strike the 
body as it lay upon the track. The watch that the 
deceased wore was mashed, and the hands pointed 
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to 7 1/2 minutes to 9 o’clock. Train No. 12 passed 
the four-mile post going towards Salisbury and the 
scene of the killing about this time, with a full 
headlight. The track was straight for one mile each 
way and no object was discovered upon the track, 
as the engineer swore. Train No. 35, from Salisbury, 
passed No. 12 near that city, and passed the four-
mile post a few minutes thereafter. This last train 
evidently struck the deceased first. That the body 
was further mutilated is shown by the fact that the 
headless body was 250 or more yards east of the 
four-mile post; the drawers were found 1 1/4 miles 
west; a part of the overcoat a mile east; pocket of 
overcoat 27 miles west; arms 75 yards east and on 
north side of track; legs still further east and on the 
south side of track; head near the four-mile post, 
and hair all along down the track on angle bars; 
trunk all rolled up in cinders and dirt, and mangled 
and mutilated beyond recognition. A dozen or more 
trains passed over the body, as already stated, and 
one was seen to strike it. This evidence of all these 
things can hardly be reconciled with the theory 
that only one train struck the deceased.
 The evidence indicates rather that the body 
was struck after death by different trains going east 
and west, and that it and parts thereof were thrown 
hither and thither, backwards and forwards, by the 
passing trains going in opposite directions. This was 
an infringement upon the legal right of the plaintiff 
to have the body for burial in the condition in 
which it was when life became extinct.
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The court scoffed at one defense the railroad offered:
It is no answer to such negligence or indifference 
to say that the defendant did not remove the body 
from the track because the section master was wait-
ing for the coroner. Humanity and decency required 
that the body and its scattered members should 
be reverently picked up, laid off the track in some 
nearby spot and sheltered by a covering from the 
sun and flies and dust and irreverent eyes, and pro-
tected from the dogs by some better agency than, 
according to the testimony, the volunteer aid of 
small boys attracted thither by curiosity, but who 
showed more respect for humanity than those who 
represented this defendant. On this condition of af-
fairs being reported to the proper official, he should 
have seen that such steps were promptly taken as 
were required by decency and the respect shown in 
all civilized communities to the dead. It could in 
nowise aid the investigation of the coroner to ex-
pose the headless body on the track beneath the 
passing trains, becoming begrimed with cinders 
and dust beyond recognition, nor was there excuse 
for leaving the other portions of the body uncol-
lected and scattered up and down the track, and for 
days even after a part of the body was sent home. 
Besides, there was negligence in keeping the body 
for eleven hours waiting for a coroner, when Salis-
bury was only four miles distant.
The court’s judgment didn’t mean that Hattie Kyles won her 
lawsuit. It meant only that the lower court was wrong to say that 
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these facts wouldn’t amount to a tort against her. “While the 
common law does not recognize dead bodies as property, the 
courts of America and other Christian and civilized countries 
have held that they are quasi property and that any mutilation 
thereof is actionable.”72 The railroad could still argue that these 
factual claims were wrong or misleadingly incomplete. But 
Hattie Kyles finally won a judgment of $1,000.73
 There are dispiritingly many published opinions about 
trains and damaged corpses. They must represent a proper 
subset of actual fiascos with trains and corpses: surely some 
cases settled outside court and others went to trial but weren’t 
appealed, which ordinarily would produce no published opin-
ion. I want to highlight the puzzles arising when the law tries 
to identify what is wrong with desecrating a corpse—and to 
whom the wrong is done. So I’ll select this way: if you had a 
corpse to transport in the early twentieth century, it looks like 
you didn’t want to hire the Louisville & Nashville Railroad 
Company.
 The Hull family was in Asheville when Mrs. Hull died. 
Mr. Hull bought three train tickets—for the corpse, himself, 
and their child—to go as far as Nashville. There he needed to 
pick up new tickets and transfer to get home to Slaughtersville, 
Kentucky. Anxious, Hull telegraphed ahead for the tickets to 
be ready, but the agent shooed him to the back of the line. He 
finally got his tickets and promptly alerted the baggage master 
to the need to transfer the corpse. The baggage master reas-
sured him and Hull took his seat. Seeing luggage being brought 
aboard, but not the coffin, he appealed to the conductor. The 
conductor went to check; two minutes later the train pulled 
72. Kyles v. Southern R. Co., 147 N.C. 394 (1908).
73. “Budget from Statesville,” Charlotte Daily Observer (3 June 1908).
200 Corpse Desecration
out and the conductor told Hull his wife’s remains were on the 
wrong train. “Hull said: ‘How did this happen? This is an awful 
thing.’ He said: ‘I don’t know. It is a terrible blunder. It is an 
inexcusable mistake.’ ” People had turned out for the funeral, 
but it had to be postponed. Everything was ready to go the 
next day, but it rained and attendance was bad.
 Hull sued the railroad, apparently on a breach of con-
tract theory, and won $1,640 in damages. Urging that there is 
no property in a corpse and that pain and suffering damages 
aren’t available for breach of contract, the railroad appealed the 
judgment. The appeals court remanded for a new trial—they 
thought $1,640 unreasonably high and they found some of 
Hull’s lawyer’s statements to the jury prejudicial. But the court 
shredded the railroad’s claims about property and damages. 
Imagine, the court remarked, that the railroad had lost the 
corpse. Would there really be no recovery? Ordinarily, breach 
of contract would not yield damage awards for emotional 
harm,74 but that rule didn’t apply here. (Today we’d say that 
that rule does not apply to contracts with “elements of per-
sonality,” an opaque suggestion raising the same difficulties as 
construing actio personalis.)75 “The tenderest feelings of the 
human heart cluster about the remains of the dead. The duty 
of Christian burial is one which loving hands perform as a 
privilege. An indignity or wrong to a corpse is resented more 
74. Consider Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 152 (1920) (no 
emotional damages available when woman, relying on negligently main-
tained railroad clock, fails to get back on board the train carrying her son’s 
corpse).
75. Consider for instance Valentine v. General Am. Credit, 420 Mich. 256 
(1984); thanks to Bruce Frier for the reference. More generally see Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, § 353; thanks to Veronica Aoki Santarosa for the 
reference.
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quickly than a wrong to the living, and, if mental suffering 
may be recovered for in the one case, it is hard to see why it 
may not be recovered for in the other.”76
 Penina Wilson hired Louisville & Nashville Railroad to 
get her husband Hamp’s remains from Atlanta to Warrington, 
over one hundred miles. Over her protest, the train company 
left the corpse out in the rain for several hours when it was 
transferred. Penina sought not just $75 for damages to the cof-
fin and shroud—remember Blackstone—but $2,000 for “great 
humiliation and shame and mental suffering.” The appeals 
court made short work of the railroad company’s plea that a 
corpse is not property: “It certainly can not be said by the 
defendant company that a corpse is sufficiently property for a 
railroad company to receive and accept pay for its transporta-
tion, but is not sufficiently property to authorize a recovery for 
a breach of duty arising therefrom, or to prevent any duty from 
arising under such circumstances.” The court didn’t quite com-
mit to the claim that Penina ought to be able to win emotional 
damages, but it did suggest that her action was more promis-
ing than one for emotional damages with no underlying phys-
ical harm: “Here the action is for a tort, and there is an allega-
tion of actual pecuniary damage to the coffin and shroud, and 
of injury to the body.”77
 That suggestion is utterly familiar when tort law is grap-
76. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561 (Ky. Ct. App. 1902). See too 
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bishop, 17 Ala. App. 320 (1919) (overturning on 
technical grounds a judgment of $833 for bungling a transfer and delaying 
the shipment of a corpse); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Hoeffner, 44 Ill. App. 137 
(1892) (upholding damages award for delayed shipment of a corpse); Ala-
bama C., G. & A. R.R. v. Brady, 160 Ala. 615 (1909) (affirming that in prin-
ciple emotional damages are available for delayed shipment of a corpse).
77. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62 (1905).
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pling with emotional damages. Probably the underlying worry 
is epistemic: in the absence of any physical harm, why should 
we trust the plaintiff ’s claim that she is emotionally worse off? 
No wonder then that another plaintiff didn’t recover on the 
allegation that a train—relax, from a different company—had 
struck the wagon conveying his dead infant to the funeral and 
the infant had landed on the ground. Here the record showed 
no mutilation or other damage to the corpse.78 But it didn’t 
seem to take much physical damage. Biscomb Hall was charged 
with getting the body of his seven-year-old sister home for 
burial. This time the railroad—yes, Louisville & Nashville 
again—negligently dropped the casket on the ground. Biscomb 
himself, with the help of other passengers, placed it on the 
train. What damage did the body suffer? “He describes it as 
being all spotted, and states that it had been disarranged in the 
casket.” That was enough to win $500 damages: the appeals 
court deemed the award large, but not unreasonably so.79 These 
78. Hockenhammer v. Lexington & E. Ry. Co., 74 S.W. 222 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1903).
79. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hall, 219 Ky. 528 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927). Con-
trast Long v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.,15 Okla. 512, 520 (1905) (because 
there is no property in a corpse, “Where a corpse is mutilated before or after 
the burial, in such a way as to render necessary the expenditure of extra 
money or labor in caring for it, or where injury is done to the coffin or 
clothes, the actual damages sustained may be recovered, and this rule was 
applied in the case at bar; but after carefully considering all of the authorities 
at our command, we are firmly convinced that no recovery can be had for 
mental pain and anguish caused by the negligent mutilation of such body”), 
with St. Louis S. R. Co. v. White, 192 Ark. 350 (1936) (railroad can be liable 
for negligently running over and mutilating corpse on tracks even when 
they did not put it there; far from being valueless, the corpse “had the right 
of sepulture, conferred by the simplest and earliest practices of civilized peo-
ples,” 352). Long is described as “practically without any support in the deci-
sions of recent years,” in Wilson v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 160 Mo. App. 649, 
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two Kentucky cases might of course be distinguished in other 
ways, but they show what’s odd about the thought that emo-
tional damages without underlying physical harm are espe-
cially difficult.80
Autopsies Gone Awry
Sometimes there are pressing reasons to perform an autopsy. 
The police need to know how someone was killed. Family 
members hope to gain knowledge that will assist their own 
medical care. But autopsy is already teetering dangerously close 
to corpse desecration. All it takes is one false step.
 One man sued when a coroner and undertaker plucked 
his son’s body from the coffin and dissected it against his will. 
Worse, perhaps, “the brain, liver and spleen were removed, and 
in the presence of friends and relatives were conveyed to and 
thrown into a privy or water-closet.” The coroner argued that 
he had a statutory right to perform the autopsy because the 
cause of death was unclear; he added for good measure that 
there is no property in a corpse. That was good enough for 
him to win on a general demurrer: once again, a trial court 
found that even if the father could establish the facts he al-
leged, he wasn’t entitled to legal relief. But the appeals court 
overturned that verdict. Maybe the coroner had the right to 
perform an autopsy, though it sounded like he hadn’t followed 
657 (1912) (collecting cases and affirming damages for emotional suffering 
when railroad kept dumping baggage on coffin, damaging coffin and ca-
daver alike, despite the husband’s protests).
80. See too Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of Sacred Hearts of Jesus 
& Mary, 262 N.Y. 320 (1933) (emotional damages available to widower 
when priest moves buried widow to a new plot and is verbally “harsh” in 
explaining why).
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mandated procedures for establishing that right and claiming 
the body. Still, nothing could excuse his dumping the body 
parts in the privy. “Such conduct violates every instinct of pro-
priety, and could not fail to outrage the feelings of the kindred 
of the deceased.” The law would properly recognize that as an 
injury.81
 Let’s continue with our usual transgressor, the Louisville 
& Nashville Railroad Co. After a train crash, the company sent 
a surgeon to attend to the badly injured engineer. The surgeon 
cared for him for thirty-six hours. Then the engineer died and 
the surgeon moved his body to an undertaker’s. Without the 
family’s consent, the surgeon then performed a splendidly 
brutal autopsy, “sawing said dead body from the top of the 
breast bone clear down nearly to the pelvic bone,” removing 
the internal organs, then restoring them. The widow didn’t see 
what had happened until the remains showed up for burial. 
She sued to recover for her “intense mental pain and anguish.” 
I don’t know what cause of action she alleged, but the court 
ruled that the railroad wasn’t liable for the surgeon’s conduct. 
(As the court could have said, the question was one of vicari-
ous liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Here 
the doctor was on a frolic, not a detour: his conduct, even if 
tortious, was far enough away from what the railroad com-
pany hired him to do that they couldn’t be liable for it.) Yet the 
81. Palenzke v. Bruning, 98 Ill. App. 644 (1901). So too Hassard v. Le-
hane, 143 A.D. 424 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911); Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698 
(1937); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lipscomb, 56 Ga. App. 15 (1937); Janicki v. 
Hosp. of St. Raphael, 46 Conn. Supp. 204 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999). Consider 
Sudduth v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 106 F. 822 (C.C.D. Ky. 1901) (refusing to con-
strue an insurance contract clause granting the company the right to “exam-
ine the person or body” as including autopsy or dissection); Travelers Ins. Co. 
v. Welch, 82 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1936) (on “examine the person,” same result).
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court ruled that the surgeon could be found liable on these dis-
couraging facts.82
 In September 1977, Edward Cramer robbed the Side-
track Bar in a tiny town in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and 
kidnapped twenty-one-year-old waitress Laura Lee Allinger. 
She was found beaten and strangled in a field; Cramer was con-
victed of murder. Doubtless her murder was the worst blow 
her parents suffered—but not the only blow. In November 
1977, the Allingers showed up in district court for Cramer’s 
preliminary examination. There they found their daughter’s 
hands in a plastic bag. When they’d buried her, they had had 
no idea that her hands had been removed. So they sued the 
funeral director and the medical examiner. I’ll ignore the ac-
tion against the director, which sounds in breach of contract.83 
The suit against the examiner alleged that learning about the 
amputated hands had caused them to “suffer outrage, shock, 
grief, humiliation and extreme and persistent mental anguish 
and emotional distress,” also that they had “become physi-
cally and morbidly depressed and distracted from the enjoy-
ments and activities of life that was their custom and nature 
prior to the discovery.”84 You might dourly suspect that their 
82. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Blackmon, 3 Ga. App. 80 (1907). See too 
Doxtator v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 120 Mich. 596 (1899) (railroad not re-
sponsible when hospital burns amputated limbs of fatally injured switch-
man). Deeg v. Detroit, 345 Mich. 371 (1956), denies a right of survival on 
widow’s lawsuit for wrongful autopsy of her husband.
83. Contrast Ginsberg v. Manchester Mem. Hosp., 2010 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 268 (Feb. 2, 2010) (negligent infliction of emotional distress claim 
available when funeral home negligently gashes forehead, bruises eyes, and 
breaks nose of corpse).
84. “Convicted in U.P. Murder Case,” Daily Globe (22 June 1978); “Re-
moval of Hands Shocks U.P. Couple,” Ironwood Daily Globe (18 April 1983). 
Cramer’s appeal failed: see People v. Cramer, 97 Mich. App. 148 (1980). The 
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depression was caused by the murder, not the amputation. But 
the Allingers could try to show that they were doing better be-
fore the preliminary examination than after—and that it wasn’t 
the reminder that Laura was dead that so upset them. The trial 
court dismissed this complaint. The emotional distress claim, 
it thought, foundered on the problem that the Allingers’ dis-
tress was triggered months after the autopsy.
 The appeals court rejected this analysis. That rule, they 
said, applied when parents complain that a wrong to their chil-
dren has caused them distress. But here the wrong was in the 
first instance to the living Allinger parents, not their dead 
daughter, so there was no reason to worry about the elapsed 
time. Yet the appeals court found another reason to dismiss 
the tort claims against the medical examiner: he enjoyed stat-
utory immunity. He hadn’t removed the hands for fun. He be-
lieved they were needed for evidence in the case: under the 
statute, that relieved him of the duty to get the parents’ con-
sent.85 The grant of immunity safeguards the state’s pressing 
interest in investigating and prosecuting crime. The case then 
underlines the point with which I started this section: what 
newspaper stories call the victim Allinger-Gardner and Gardner; the legal 
proceedings call her Allinger. She was estranged from her husband and liv-
ing at home with her parents. “Seek Dismissal of Amputation Suits,” Daily 
Globe (31 January 1979), says the parents were notified of the impending 
exhibit of the hands; it also says that Cramer stabbed Allinger and hit her 
with a tire wrench during an argument at the bar.
85. Allinger v. Kell, 102 Mich. App. 798 (1981). The case reports that the 
examiner also removed her hair: I don’t know why. The opinion is blurry on 
whether his belief had to be reasonable. “Removal of Hands” reports that the 
parents argued that he could have obtained fingerprints and blood samples 
without removing the hands. But a reasonableness standard, more searching 
on its face than the blunt factual question of whether the coroner actually 
believed it, is still highly deferential.
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might otherwise qualify as the grievous wrong of corpse dese-
cration isn’t wrongful in the law’s eyes if it serves some press-
ing public interest. Not, I add, that the Allingers needed to find 
that consoling. That public claims can override private ones 
does not mean that private ones are weightless or illusory.
 One last instance of autopsy gone awry. Seventeen-year- 
old Jesse Shipley was killed in a car accident. His father con-
sented to the autopsy, but asked the medical examiner to make 
the body “ ‘nice and clean because I wanted the boy to look 
good for his funeral and stuff.’ ” The examiner returned the 
body without the brain and without telling the Shipleys that he 
had held onto it: curious, since he’d already decided Jesse had 
died from a broken skull and brain hemorrhaging. Later, stu-
dents from Jesse’s high school touring the mortuary noticed a 
striking specimen among the jars: a brain labeled “Jesse Ship-
ley.” Word wound its way to his sister, a student at the same 
school, and that’s how his parents learned what happened. The 
relevant New York statute specifically provided for the return 
of body parts.86 The Shipleys won $1m at trial; on appeal a 
court found this unreasonably high and knocked it down to 
$600,000, which as usual the Shipleys could accept or appeal. 
They appealed—and eventually lost. The court of appeals 
ruled that the medical examiner was free to retain a body part 
and not inform the family.87 If you’re thinking something 
flukey must have happened, I regret to report that the New 
York City medical examiner’s office retained over ninety-two 
86. NY CLS Pub. Health § 4215.
87. Shipley v. City of New York, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6586 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Mar. 4, 2009); Shipley v. City of New York, 80 A.D.3d 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2010); Shipley v. City of New York, 34 Misc. 3d 1239(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); 
Shipley v. City of New York, 2013 N.Y. LEXIS 3314 (Dec. 12, 2013); Shipley 
v. City of New York, 25 N.Y.3d 645 (2015).
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hundred brains—some claim it was for pathologists to prac-
tice on, though the immense number suggests crazed bureau-
cratic routine.88
 Claims of infliction of emotional distress, whether inten-
tional or negligent, are notoriously hard to prevail on. That so 
many of these litigants prevail is evidence of just how seriously 
the law takes corpse desecration. The same extends to what we 
might think of as adjacent issues of mistreating corpses. In 
2009, a Connecticut funeral home accidentally swapped two 
bodies. So instead of preparing the body of ninety-five-year-
old Aurelie Germaine Tuccillo for a Catholic burial, they cre-
mated it. What to do? Why, dress the other body in Aurelie’s 
clothing and try to pass it off on the Tuccillo family. When the 
family protested at the wake that it didn’t look like their dear 
Aurelie, the funeral home director assured them that it was: 
embalming, he said, can change the appearance of a corpse. A 
court had no problems finding that these allegations made for 
a good claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.89 But 
not any tampering will be tortious. When an Ohio funeral 
home switched two bodies on display for the grieving families 
but righted the problem an hour later, an appeals court ruled 
that it was a legal error for the trial court to permit a jury to 
find negligent infliction of emotional distress. Not that it wasn’t 
upsetting: the bereaved widower “was throwing chairs around 
88. John Clarke, “Medical Examiner’s Office Refuses to Release More 
Than 9,000 Brains Belonging to New Yorkers so They Can Use Them for 
‘Experiments and Practice,’ ” Mail Online (29 October 2012). For more such 
cases, see Wendy Gillis, “Ontario Pathology Service Facing Deadline to 
Match Autopsy Organs to Families,” Toronto Star (23 October 2014).
89. Tuccillo v. Buckmiller Bros. Funeral Homes, Inc., 2013 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 323 (Feb. 13, 2013).
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the funeral home.”90 Rather that the conduct wasn’t outrageous 
enough, the distress not severe enough, to qualify for this cause 
of action in tort.
Taking Stock
Recall the dilemma faced by those wishing to bring legal com-
plaints about defaming the dead. They were stuck between 
actio personalis (the blanket denial that the dead have legal in-
terests) and the Palsgraf principle (to win in tort, you have to 
show that you’ve been wronged, not that you’ve been harmed 
by a wrong to someone else). The way to slip through the 
prongs of the dilemma was what I dubbed the Gugliuzza solu-
tion, after the case where it was approved: the living family 
members could argue, “when you defamed our dead loved one, 
you wronged us.” But defamation law overwhelmingly rejects 
the Gugliuzza solution: indeed, in Gugliuzza itself, the solu-
tion was rejected on appeal. Defamation, the law is convinced, 
is a wrong to the person defamed, not to family members 
harmed as a result.
 But the abstract structure of the Gugliuzza solution reigns 
triumphant in cases about corpse desecration. The law doesn’t 
even pause at the thought that corpse desecration wrongs liv-
ing family members, at least those closest to the deceased. So 
90. Audia v. Rossi Bros. Funeral Home, Inc., 140 Ohio App. 3d 589, 591 
(2000). For another case of swapped corpses yielding damages, this time 
without any added duplicity but after the corpses had been prepared for 
burial in the wrong religious traditions, see Lott v. State, 32 Misc. 2d 296 
(N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1962). I owe this last citation to Norman L. Cantor, After We 
Die: The Life and Times of the Human Cadaver (Washington, DC: George-
town University Press, 2010), 255–56.
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these actions are brought, not by the estates of the deceased, 
but by living family members. Those living members have 
nothing to fear from actio personalis or its living remnants 
in law. And their complaints comport with the Palsgraf princi-
ple. So they win over and over. That’s why it’s hard to find any 
tort cases about defaming the dead—people learn not to bring 
such unpromising charges—and those few cases are failures to 
boot, but it’s easy to find winning tort cases about corpse des-
ecration. I want to explore just a few more, with an eye to the 
following question.
 Your loved one dies and her corpse is desecrated. (You 
may be as detailed and gruesome about that as you like.) You 
find this intensely distressing. But what does that distress hang 
on? I suspect it’s the thought that your loved one has been 
wronged. That wouldn’t eliminate the possibility that you’ve 
been wronged, too. Remember that some injuries to your 
spouse will simultaneously enable you to file an action for loss 
of consortium: those injuries then count as wrongs to each of 
you. But if you don’t think your loved one has been wronged, 
what exactly are you so distressed about? Not that she’s dead: 
she is, but we’re trying to grasp the additional distress you suf-
fer from corpse desecration.
 Two more cases will help dramatize the question. If you 
didn’t want your corpse on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 
you sure don’t want it deposited in the Hamilton County, Ohio, 
coroner’s office. In January 2001, over three hundred photo-
graphs surfaced of dead bodies in the morgue, “bodies in un-
natural ‘artistic’ poses, often employing props for effect.” For 
instance, “Christina Folchi, who was photographed with sheet 
music placed on her body and a snail near her groin area as 
well as other items pressed into her hand and mouth.” The cor-
oner had given a photographer free rein to enter the morgue: 
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he wanted to produce an art book. (You could get in with the 
onerous security code *7. Morgue employees had no guidance 
on who should be coming and going.)91 In August 2014, the 
same morgue was back in the news for just-discovered events 
from the 1980s. Kenneth Douglas, an attendant there, liked to 
have sex with the corpses. How many corpses? “It could have 
been a hundred,” he offered. “I would do crack and go in and 
I would drink and go in.”92 The victims included Charlene Ap-
pling. My imagination is not as depraved as the skeptic feared: 
she was six months pregnant and Douglas had his way with 
her the day she was strangled.93
 I probably shouldn’t help myself to the view that Appling 
was the victim. Her father is party to the suit against Douglas 
and the county: so at law he will argue that he was the victim. 
That is, he will argue that in penetrating his daughter, Douglas 
wronged him. That seems decidedly odd. Or ponder the words 
of the judge sentencing the photographer to two and a half 
years in prison for gross abuse of a corpse and excoriating those 
photographs: “ ‘They’re not art,’ he said. ‘They’re sick, they’re 
disgusting, they’re disrespectful and really the worst invasion 
of privacy.’ ” Whose privacy? Folchi’s survivors? Really? Isn’t it 
an invasion of Christina Folchi’s privacy? (Recall the court rul-
91. Chesher v. Neyer, 477 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2007).
92. Print descriptions vary. I’m quoting Douglas from the bits of his 
deposition aired on television news: see the video at www.wcpo.com/news/
local-news/court-oks-trial-in-hamilton-county-corpse-abuse-lawsuit (last 
visited 23 October 2014).
93. Greg Noble, “Kenneth Douglas: Sex-with-Corpses Lawsuit against 
Hamilton County Can Go to Trial, Court Rules,” Associated Press (19 August 
2014); Esther Tanquintic-Misa, “Sex with the Dead: Ohio Man Admits Doing 
It with 100 Corpses,” International Business Times Australia (19 August 2014); 
Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2014).
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ings that FOIA requests may be denied if they would invade 
a dead person’s privacy.) As quoted at that sentencing, her fa-
ther’s language was garbled, whether in the saying or the re-
porting I don’t know, but still moving: “I’d like to know what a 
symbolic object would be taking a picture of my daughter’s 
pubic hair.”94
 You might think these cases are evidence for an inverted 
Palsgraf principle: a harm to one party can count as a wrong to 
someone else. So: by harming my daughter in this way, you 
wronged me. That way of putting it would depend on thinking 
that it’s possible to harm a dead person. But then why isn’t it 
also possible to wrong her? Ordinarily of course it is wrong to 
harm others. In some settings, the law tracks everyday moral 
intuitions by labeling some conduct that does indeed set back 
others’ interests as privileged. If your employer fires you be-
cause someone better suited to the job waltzes in, your inter-
ests have been set back. But (in a world of at-will employment) 
neither your employer nor the new employee has acted wrongly. 
It’s hard to see any parallel to such settings here. So if it harms 
Folchi to rape her cadaver, why doesn’t it wrong her? It would 
be eccentric, to put it mildly, to think: “Okay, so dead people 
have enough moral standing that you can harm them, but not 
enough that you can wrong them in so doing.”
 If you configure the tort here as a wrongful invasion of 
a quasi-property right, it more straightforwardly qualifies as a 
wrong to the next of kin: “I had a right to bury a corpse that 
hadn’t been mistreated.” But notice what mistreated already 
summons up. If you think of it as negligent infliction of emo-
94. Quoted in Maria Rogers, “Death of Innocence,” City Beat (18 April 
2002).
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tional distress, it sounds awfully like the cases in which a par-
ent watches his or her child being struck by a driver.95 All those 
cases depend crucially on the undeniable premise that a griev-
ous tort has been committed against the child: the law’s puzzle 
was whether that act would also qualify as a tort against the 
parent. The next of kin’s tort claim for corpse desecration also 
seems to hang on the thought that they’ve become aware of 
a grievous injury to someone else: not, again, to the corpse; 
rather to the person whose corpse it is. The law then seems 
convinced that there is more than what the skeptic is willing to 
concede, our regard for the detached value of human life. The 
law is convinced, just as we are—recall for instance the mili-
tary’s painstaking efforts to repair the corpses of dead soldiers—
that corpse desecration wrongs dead individuals.
 If the survivor’s actions here depend on the thought that 
the dead person has been wronged, how might we apprehend 
that wrong? Let’s consider one last case, curiously straddling 
corpse desecration and defaming the dead.
 In 1956, Louie Elmer Gillikin died when a truck hit his 
car. The truck driver was an agent of the coroner, who soon 
popped up at the scene. “He refused to permit a highway pa-
trolman or the sheriff ’s department of Carteret County to take 
charge of and assume responsibility for the investigation. He 
refused to hold an inquest.” Gillikin’s father thought he would 
have had a promising wrongful death action, but claimed that 
the coroner conspired with a patrolman, a photographer, and 
insurance company agents to make it look like his son was at 
95. The classic line of cases is Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 (1934); 
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295 (1963); Dillon v. Legg, 
68 Cal. 2d 728 (1968); Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644 (1989).
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fault. He alleged that they had coerced his son’s passenger 
into giving false testimony. But—this is our concern—he also 
claimed that the coroner
covertly and with malicious intent did secure a beer 
can and a 7-Up bottle and placed them in a promi-
nent position in the car and directed a commercial 
photographer, who had been called to the scene of 
the accident, to make faked-up and trumped-up 
pictures to not only defame and degrade the good 
name and reputation of Louie Elmer Gillikin but 
directed the taking of pictures for the wicked and 
wrongful purpose of framing and shaping testimony, 
evidence and facts to fit in with his own selfish in-
terests and in order that he might prevail in any 
litigation to be brought.96
These explosive allegations produced a flurry of lawsuits and 
counterclaims. Gillikin’s father did press a claim that the pho-
tograph had defamed his dead son. But the court balked for 
a reason that won’t surprise you: Louie Gillikin was dead. The 
common law was clear: any defamation claim was then going 
nowhere fast. If the legislature wanted to change the law, they 
could. But they hadn’t.97
 Seeing your dead son presented as a drunk when he 
wasn’t one is surely distressing, over and above the fact of his 
death and the belief that the coroner is going to dastardly 
lengths to blame him for the accident and thus let others es-
96. Gillikin v. Springle, 254 N.C. 240 (1961).
97. Gillikin v. Bell, 254 N.C. 244 (1961).
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cape legal liability. Let’s assume the father’s allegations are true. 
Then the photograph makes a false, defamatory statement of 
fact. (The law doesn’t pause in thinking photos can make fac-
tual claims. That ad suggesting that the horseback rider had a 
giant penis just happened not to press a factual claim.) That’s 
a dignitary harm: it lowers Louie’s standing in the community. 
It’s okay to drive, okay to drink, and decidedly not okay to do 
both at once: in North Carolina in 1961, a respectable part of 
the community can think that.
 Our cases of corpse desecration, too, present dignitary 
harms, or so I want to suggest. It’s insulting to let train after 
train run over a corpse. It’s contemptuous to put a kid’s brain 
in a jar and stick it on a shelf. It’s lamentably easy to slide into 
imagining the nub of dignitary harm is the hurt feelings of the 
victim or target, and then to pounce on the reminder that dead 
people don’t have hurt feelings. But dignitary harms are pub-
lic, objective, sociological. A diminution of your reputation 
doesn’t happen in your head, though you might well feel bad 
about it. It happens in how others discuss you, in how they 
think of you, in how they treat you.
 Compare California’s provision in the code governing 
funeral directors and embalmers: “Using profane, indecent, or 
obscene language in the course of the preparation for burial, 
removal, or other disposition of, or during the funeral service 
for, human remains, or within the immediate hearing of the 
family or relatives of a deceased, whose remains have not yet 
been interred or otherwise disposed of constitutes a ground 
for disciplinary action.”98 This law prohibits undignified lan-
98. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7700. See too Nebraska Admin. Code Title 
172, 67–011.04(3); MCLS § 339.1810(e).
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guage around a corpse. The presence of a family member is not 
a required element of the offense; nor, indeed, is the presence 
of anyone else. Surely the worry is the insult to the dead per-
son. There’s no way to discard this law as a bit of curious rent- 
seeking or regulatory capture. It’s the opposite: it burdens the 
funeral industry.
 When Kenneth Douglas has sex with Charlene Appling’s 
corpse, you can insist the corpse is indeed worse for wear: if 
being spotted and jostled around in a coffin qualifies, why not 
having semen in your vagina? But what about propping up 
Christina Folchi’s corpse to take an offensive photograph? 
There’s no permanent effect on the corpse, but it’s still tortious 
as well as a crime. Back to quasi-property: conversion of prop-
erty is also a tort. The core of the tort is asserting control over 
someone else’s property: using it in unauthorized ways as if 
it’s your own, or exceeding your authorized use of it. Nothing 
in that tort requires that you damage the property. Suppose 
you’ve given me your apartment key so that if you lock your-
self out, you can knock on my door. Then knowing that you’re 
out of town for three weeks, I move in. I’m liable for conver-
sion of property even if I do a meticulous job cleaning up and 
you can’t show the place is any worse for wear.99 So too a com-
pany that “despite adamant protests by the property owners” 
drove over their snowy land to deliver a mobile home was lia-
ble for trespass to the tune of $1 compensatory damages and 
$100,000 punitive damages, a verdict finally upheld despite 
99. Compare for instance State v. McKinnon, 21 Ohio Dec. 346 (Ohio 
C.P. 1911) (tortious of state treasurer to withdraw money from treasury and 
use it to earn interest himself even if he returns the money to the treasury). 
State v. McKinnon, 1912 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 172 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1912) extends 
liability to the bondholders.
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the Supreme Court’s worry about the ratio between those two 
kinds of damages and the due process clause.100 No matter that 
the property was none the worse for wear.
 So what’s wrong with posing Christina Folchi’s corpse 
and taking that photo? Whatever the law says to award relief, I 
don’t think the injury is properly understood as infringing in 
some significant way on her father’s property right in her body. 
Yes, he’d never consent to that use of the body. But that’s be-
cause it’s not just disgusting, but insulting to her. I think the 
injury is the affront to her. Her being dead doesn’t preclude 
her body’s being used in such a demeaning way; it makes it 
possible, as if she were alive and drugged into a stupor. That’s 
the core of the injury, I think, whatever doctrinal hoops the 
law requires parties to jump through.
 It matters that the law does not talk this way and indeed 
sometimes explicitly denies it. “Who has been hurt?” demanded 
one court in a case where a murdered body was left on the 
train tracks and negligently run over. “The man was dead when 
he was put there; he has suffered no pain, no mental anxiety, 
no doctor’s bill, no loss of time; there is nothing on which to 
assess damages.” Nor could the administrator of his estate 
claim anything. “What can he do with a dead, buried, and de-
composing body? Literally nothing, the worms are rioting in 
the corpse before the administrator has the right to possess the 
estate.”101 The skeptic might grin triumphantly: and I concede 
that in this way my account is revisionist as against the law. 
But I do think it’s hard to unpack the injury to the survivors 
100. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 209 Wis. 2d 605 (1997); BMW of N. 
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
101. Griffith v. Charlotte, C. & A. R.R. Co., 23 S.C. 25 (1885).
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without invoking the claim that corpse desecration is an in-
jury to their dead loved one.
 In that way, corpse desecration and defamation are very 
close. Here’s a conjecture: both at bottom are dignitary claims. 
No wonder some critics likened speaking ill of the dead to can-
nibalism. The law smiles on lawsuits brought to protest corpse 
desecration. It frowns on lawsuits brought to protest defaming 
the dead. Here as always, you can find some way to distinguish 
the two issues. (All lawyers have to be expert at two maneu-
vers: these two things look different, but they’re really the same; 
these two things look the same, but they’re really different.) 
But how compelling would that distinction be?
 I presume our skeptic will want to resolve the apparent 
inconsistency not by extending tort liability for defaming the 
dead but by eliminating it for corpse desecration. What reason 
do we have to take the opposite approach and make it tortious 
to defame the dead?
VI
“This Will Always Be There”
We don’t believe that the dead have no interests,  no claims on us, no standing. (These are not  three ways of saying the same thing, but we  needn’t pause over the distinctions.) We pay 
more than lip service to the thought that we should speak no 
ill of them. We respect their wishes about how to handle their 
corpses. I could add that we respect their wishes for how to be 
posed at their funerals: on a motorcycle, in a boxing ring, re-
laxing with a beer and a cigarette.1 Even when advised they’re 
under no legal obligation, surviving family members some-
times pay the debts of their loved ones.2
 Nor does the law does believe the dead have no interests, 
no claims, no standing. It is routine for estates—the collection 
of legal interests and obligations, centered on property, broadly 
understood—to show up in litigation. The law takes the fidu-
1. Campbell Robertson and Frances Robles, “Rite of the Sitting Dead: 
Funeral Poses Mimic Life,” New York Times (21 June 2013).
2. David Streitfeld, “You’re Dead? That Won’t Stop the Debt Collector,” 
New York Times (3 March 2009).
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ciary obligation of the executor—the obligation to represent 
the interests of the estate—very seriously. In 2014 an Iowa 
court decided it was an abuse of discretion (a hard standard to 
meet) for a trial court not to remove an executrix on a record 
showing self-dealing in arranging the sale of the estate’s farm.3 
That fiduciary obligation runs not only to the living beneficia-
ries of the estate, but also to respecting the wishes of the dead.4 
And when there’s a will, so the law doesn’t turn to the default 
rules for intestates, the beneficiaries are the beneficiaries pre-
cisely because the dead so designated them. “Despicable,” sniffed 
one court at the self-dealing of one executor;5 “contemptible,” 
sniffed another;6 “outrageous,” sniffed a third, upholding a 
$1.5m judgment.7 After you die, the law will respect not just 
the terms of your will, but also in some settings your privacy, 
and more. The criminal law will take an interest in anyone des-
ecrating your corpse, and your close survivors will win a tort 
action against any such miscreant.
 So we don’t accept the oblivion thesis and neither does 
the law. Does our skeptic insist that we and the law are horri-
bly confused? Let’s distinguish soft and hard versions of skep-
ticism. On both versions, the skeptic will hold that what we 
and the law think and say is in fact confused. But the soft ver-
sion defangs the apparent force of that skepticism: here the 
skeptic will assure us that our practices can be reframed to 
avoid the allegedly indefensible belief that the dead have inter-
3. Poll v. Kemp (In re Estate of Kemp), 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 482 (2014).
4. See for instance Will v. Northwestern Univ., 378 Ill. App. 3d 280, 292 
(2007).
5. Robertson v. Robertson, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5007 (Jul. 17, 
2014).
6. Carrellas v. Carrellas, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 153 (2001).
7. Estate of Anderson, 149 Cal. App. 3d 336 (1983).
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ests and rightful claims on us. On the hard version, more charm-
ing in its bellicose way, our practices are indefensible and need 
to be scrapped. We’ve encountered both kinds of skepticism 
along the way, but let me draw out the contrast.
 The soft skeptic’s target isn’t anything we actually do or 
any particular legal doctrine. Fine by him, he cheerfully con-
cedes, if we painstakingly enforce the terms of wills, shrink 
from invading the privacy of the dead, and so on. These first- 
order practices don’t concern him. His target instead is the 
thesis that we can justify such practices by appealing to the in-
terests of the dead. That, he insists, makes no sense. But he 
thinks we can replace that thesis with ones he has no objection 
to, and that the replacements will leave our practices standing 
more or less as they were. So for instance: “The real reason to 
be so assiduous about respecting the terms of wills is to en-
courage the living to provide for those who will outlive them8 
or to assure the living that their own wishes will be respected. 
For all I know or care, the living are irrational in turn for wor-
rying about that: I needn’t adopt any view about that. It’s 
enough that they do worry and they do want to be able to be-
queath their property after they die. We console them when we 
respect the terms laid down in wills.”
 This isn’t what we think we’re doing. “But so what?” de-
mands the skeptic. “I can give you a suitably hardheaded reason 
8. Again, see Ernest Partridge, “Posthumous Interests and Posthumous 
Respect,” Ethics (January 1981): 260–61. More generally, consider the thesis 
that utilitarians and their opponents have no first-order moral disagree-
ments: Derek Parfit, On What Matters, ed. Samuel Scheffler, 2 vols. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), chaps. 17, 23. And notice the cursory treat-
ment of first-order moral issues in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter 
Railton, “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends,” Philosophical Review 
(January 1992).
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for continuing to do just as you do. All my disagreements here 
are what we might call second-order: how best to make sense 
of what we do.” We might counter that one thing we do is talk 
about why we’re doing what we’re doing. But the skeptic needn’t 
be fazed. He can argue that our insisting that we care for the 
dead is the best kind of assurance we can offer those anxious 
living property holders. “After all,” he can add mischievously, 
“if we said we were doing it for the living, that would redouble 
their anxiety, at least if they were alert: each one would fret, 
‘but when it comes time to enforce my will, I’ll be dead, and 
my interests won’t count at all. My security would be thinking 
that respecting my will still will be required to reassure the 
living. But maybe people will figure out a clever way of distin-
guishing my will from the kind others write, or for that matter 
distinguishing me from people alive, or just a credible way of 
distinguishing the world up to the moment I died from the 
world after that.’ So it’s best, all things considered, for us to 
think and say things that really are nonsensical. All I insist on 
is that when we retreat from everyday life to do theory, we talk 
straight. I do suppose that we can wall off that discussion from 
what we say and do once we return to the world.”9 Or perhaps 
instead of conjuring up a separation in social space, where we 
permit ourselves deep insight in one setting but blithely ignore 
or forget it elsewhere, he will invoke a separation among the 
population. Sophisticated theorists will understand the full 
story about the putative interests of the dead, so they’ll con-
descendingly see through the nonsense spouted by the hoi 
polloi. (Yes, my language betrays irritation with the venerable 
9. On that last, compare, canonically, David Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 7.
“This Will Always Be There” 223
conservative lineage of such views.)10 Either way, philosophy 
“leaves everything as it is,” he might conclude.11 Well, not quite 
everything—not the status of what we’d imagined the real jus-
tifications were—but pretty close.
 Whatever you make of soft skepticism, notice that it un-
dercuts any ground the skeptic has to oppose making it tortious 
to defame the dead. All he could say was that in the hidden 
preserves of theory, we couldn’t justify such a cause of action 
by saying the dead have reputational interests. But provided 
that we came up with some other justification—an obvious 
one would be protecting survivors from poignant emotional 
distress—he’d have no objection. Indeed he wouldn’t object to 
people and lawyers in everyday life talking about the reputa-
tional interests of the dead.
 The hard skeptic’s target is our actual social practices, in 
and out of law. He might think it lily-livered of the soft skeptic 
to be so intent on framing replacement justifications, to want 
to leave those practices standing. Regardless, he will say that he 
is happy to take us at our word: we do these things for the 
dead. And that, he insists, makes no sense. So we have to stop. 
However he thinks about the reliance interests people—the 
living? the dead?—have in current legal arrangements and 
about the best transition rule for a saner legal regime, he will 
be adamant that the last thing we should do is extend the law’s 
irrational reverence for the dead.
10. For more, see my Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). In contemporary legal scholarship, 
compare Meir Dan-Cohen, “Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law,” Harvard Law Review (January 1984).
11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. 
Ans combe, 3rd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), § 124, p. 42e.
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 A skeptic needn’t be hard or soft across the board. A 
skeptic might think for instance that we should go on enforc-
ing wills, even if what we say we’re doing is indefensible, but 
that we should stop worrying about corpse desecration and 
doing the other nutty things we do on behalf of dead persons. 
So too both soft and hard skepticism can be elaborated or re-
fined in various ways. But the bald or stylized distinction I’ve 
offered will suffice.
 So far as my purpose is to propose tort reform, then, I’ve 
nothing to fear from soft skepticism. But the hard skeptic of-
fers what he takes to be a fatal objection: he too sees no way to 
make sense of the claim that a dead person still has interests, 
but he’s not willing to entertain the thought that somehow the 
real parties in interest would be the living. The skeptic thinks 
Epicurus had it right: when we are, death is not; when death is, 
we are not.12 There are more or less fancy ways of buttressing 
this objection.13 The view is often styled a metaphysical one, 
but I have to confess I don’t grasp what that means.14 (That’s 
not an arch way of objecting to it.) What should we make of it?
12. Epicurus to Menoeceus, in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Phi-
losophers, bk. 10.
13. For a helpful exploration, see Stephen E. Rosenbaum, “How to Be 
Dead and Not Care: A Defense of Epicurus,” American Philosophical Quar-
terly (April 1986).
14. “It is not easy to say what metaphysics is,” begins the Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy entry. None of the topics canvassed there under the 
rubric “modern metaphysics” comes close to the oblivion thesis. See http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/ (last visited 17 November 2014). Put 
differently, it is an unfathomably long way from the likes of Saul A. Kripke, 
Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), to 
questions about whether we can make sense of posthumous interests and 
whether or in what respects the law ought to safeguard them.
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 In my more-philistine-than-thou pragmatist mood, which 
I lapse into more than occasionally, I’m inclined to shrug it off. 
On one side, we have ongoing social practices, centuries of 
legal doctrine, and endless writing by countless thoughtful 
figures approving of at least some claims of the dead. On the 
other, we have a metaphysical objection. Why believe that the 
latter is enough to make us renounce the former? What sort of 
leverage is this sort of philosophical argument supposed to 
have? Why not be nonchalant and dismissive?
 Or one might turn the tables instead of shrugging. If 
there’s a mismatch between a theory about death and our so-
cial practices, you might think the sensible inference is that 
there’s likely something wrong with the theory. Okay, but then 
it would be nice to explain just what is wrong with it. Instead 
of thinking the skeptic has a fatal objection, think of him as 
stating a puzzle: how could it be that dead people have inter-
ests or claims? Having interests, he can plausibly think, de-
pends on your life still being under way. And he can think that 
without thinking that all that matters is desirable conscious-
ness. So why doesn’t death commit us to the oblivion thesis?
 Let’s start here. What is a person? And what is personal 
identity, anyway? I don’t propose to turn now and suggest we 
are incorporeal souls somehow communing with our bodies, 
maybe via the pineal gland, and that those souls outlast the 
bodies. I’ll take any such dualism, even if put in secular terms, 
to be the sort of view I disavowed when I promised not to de-
pend on any religious belief.
 It might help to recur to John Locke. The view he out-
lines in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding has re-
mained powerfully influential, whatever its difficulties; and it 
is more promising as a launching pad for thinking about post-
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humous wrongs than you might imagine.15 I want my account 
of posthumous harm not to hang on any contentious account 
of the self. “Well, they’re all contentious.” In a way, sure. But 
then it’s a good idea to choose a widely adopted account often 
thought most at home with the sort of consequentialist views 
I oppose. Kant explicitly affirms that it is wrong to defame the 
dead (and explicitly denies that this claim has anything to do 
with souls or the afterlife).16 But I’d hate you to think that my 
view rests on any commitment to transcendental metaphysics, 
not only but not least because I’d hate you to believe that our 
moral, political, and legal views need to be secured by any 
philosophical foundations at all.
 Locke begins by distinguishing man, soul, and person.17 
Let’s ignore soul. “I know,” Locke offers, “that in the ordinary 
way of speaking, the same Person, and the same Man, stand 
for one and the same thing.” Well, not always. The referent of 
first-person talk—what you refer to when you say “I” or “me” 
or “my” or “mine”—varies in interesting ways. It’s idiomatic to 
15. See Locke’s Essay, bk. 2, chap. 27; for typography I’ve followed John 
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). See too the characteristically illuminating 
treatment in J. L. Mackie, Problems from Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1976), chap. 6.
16. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 110–11. Thanks to Arthur 
Ripstein for reminding me of this.
17. Commentators have been puzzled by Locke’s claims about self- 
ownership in the Second Treatise, where he seems to vacillate between say-
ing that God owns us and that we own ourselves. But he’s fully consistent. He 
claims God owns us as men. So, however eccentrically, that’s why suicide is 
wrong: it would violate God’s property right in our bodies. We have property 
in our own persons: we are responsible for our actions. See my Without 
Foundations: Justification in Political Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), 70–72.
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say, “I am six feet tall,” where I is what we can also call my body, 
though it would take an odd context to make “My body is six 
feet tall” a sensible thing to say. It’s also idiomatic to say, “I hate 
opera,” but it would be hard to construe that as a claim about 
your body.18 Still, the distinction between man and person is 
helpful. “For I presume ’tis not the Idea of a thinking or ratio-
nal Being alone, that makes the Idea of a Man in most Peoples 
Sense: but of a Body so and so shaped joined to it; and if that 
be the Idea of a Man, the same successive Body not shifted all 
at once, must as well as the same immaterial Spirit go to the 
making of the same Man.” (This will entail that someone in a 
state of persistent vegetative unconsciousness is only a body, 
not a man or human being at all. That might be a reformist 
proposal, not an account of ordinary meaning, for both today’s 
English and that of the seventeenth century. But it’s not wacky.)
 Locke’s gloss on person is closer to Kant than some fables 
about the empiricist tradition would suggest: “a thinking intel-
ligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider 
it self as it self, the same thinking thing, in different times 
and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is 
inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to 
it  . . . ” (This gives you not only something like deliberative 
capacity and responsiveness to reasons, but also something 
vaguely gesturing toward the unity of apperception, even if 
Locke’s presentation of both is utterly skeletal.) Personal iden-
tity, though, is just the same consciousness, with a more or less 
18. On this sort of thing, see Eric T. Olson, “The Person and the Corpse,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Death, ed. Ben Bradley, Fred 
Feldman, and Jens Johannson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 84–
85. Olson adds that he doubts such linguistic points “offer any metaphysical 
insight”: again, count me as completely unsure what that might mean.
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continuous chain of memories over time. Locke notices that 
forgetfulness is a problem for his view, though he probably 
underplays how severe a problem it is.
 Regardless, the distinction between man and person is 
immediately helpful in focusing one issue at stake in making 
sense of defaming the dead. If I break your arm, I have com-
mitted the tort of battery against you. But defamation is a 
harm to your reputation, which is not part of your body. So we 
needn’t try to figure out if your corpse is you,19 or the closest 
continuer of you,20 or what if anything would count as an in-
jury to a corpse, or anything like that. Those problems might 
arise in making sense of corpse desecration as an injury to the 
dead person. (Remember, here the law adopts the Gugliuzza 
solution and counts it an injury to close survivors.) But even 
if I’m right in conjecturing that defaming the dead and dese-
crating their corpses are both dignitary harms, they are im-
portantly different in this way.
 Nor is your reputation part of your mind or person. 
Again, it is public, objective, sociological; it’s what the commu-
nity thinks of you, or, to recur to the doctrinal structure of the 
tort, what at least some respectable segment of the community 
thinks of you. So whether we are thinking of man or person, in 
even roughly Lockean ways, there is no reason to think that 
making it tortious to defame the dead would founder on some 
inability of the dead to make out some constitutive element of 
19. Fred Feldman, Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study 
of the Nature and Value of Death (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
chap. 6.
20. For the argument that identity is being the closest continuer—and 
close enough—see Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press at Harvard University Press, 1981), 29–37.
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the tort. Remember that living plaintiffs can collect damages 
for emotional harm or pain and suffering. Those, obviously, 
would be unavailable to the dead, because they have no mental 
states at all. But remember too that emotional harm is no ele-
ment of the tort, even if learned authorities sometimes miss 
the point: in 2011, Scottish authorities balked at making de-
faming the dead tortious because they couldn’t reconcile “the 
traditional notion of the hurt feelings of the defamed person 
being at the heart of a defamation action with the idea of cre-
ating a cause of action for a person who is no longer alive.”21 I 
want to be blunt: there is no such tradition.
 Whatever startling puzzle cases we can construct (and 
Locke is already constructing them, wondering for instance 
what we’d make of putting the soul and consciousness of a 
prince into a cobbler’s body, or again presenting a case in which 
your body is occupied by one continuous consciousness every 
day and another every night), as a matter of contingent fact it 
looks like personal identity depends on having the same cen-
tral nervous system. Brain death doesn’t look anything like what 
we mean by death of a person—we can imagine you magically 
taking up residence in someone else’s brain and body, or, if 
you’re as optimistic or credulous about the future of comput-
21. Death of a Good Name: Defamation and the Deceased; A Consultation 
Paper (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2011), 15, available at www.gov 
.scot/Resource/Doc/337251/0110660.pdf (last visited 1 May 2015). The Law 
Reform Commission of Western Australia endorsed a cause of action in 
1979: see www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/_files/P08-II-R.pdf, chap. 9 (last visited 
23 November 2014). For a survey of various legal regimes stretching back to 
ancient Rome, but mostly common law and American sources, see “Libel—
Defamation of Dead Person—Injury to Reputations of Surviving Relatives,” 
Columbia Law Review (November 1940).
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ing as some, uploading your consciousness22—but it looks 
contingently like the best bet for a criterion.
 So let’s take the skeptical objection this way. You’re dead. 
Your once spiky brain waves are now serenely, distressingly flat. 
Your consciousness is snuffed out, never to return. How can 
you be wronged? (I wonder how the skeptic wants to handle 
the case in which you’re permanently comatose, but your body 
will survive for years. Can that entity be wronged? Should it be 
allowed to file a tort claim if it’s battered?)
 Recall the garden-variety case of having a project thwarted, 
an interest set back, while you’re still alive. Long devoted to 
bicycling, you decide to bike all the way across the country. 
You adopt a prudent workout regimen and negotiate a seven- 
week leave from your job and buy a sturdy bike and learn a ton 
about bike maintenance and get a little hand-crank charger for 
your iPhone and—and then a drunk driver runs you over and 
shatters your left leg. You are harmed, wronged too, and your 
damages could include what tort law calls loss of enjoyment: 
you can no longer take the bike ride. You might wonder how a 
jury could assign a dollar value to that, but plenty of damage 
awards depend on an intuitive assessment of what the law calls 
nonpecuniary damages.
 Now some of your projects may be thwarted by your 
death. You’ve decided to explore the Galápagos Islands. You’ve 
purchased the plane tickets, bought a fancy new camera, and 
made sure your camping gear is in great shape. But you have 
a massive heart attack and die a week before you’re supposed 
22. Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biol-
ogy (New York: Viking Press, 2005), 199–200. See too http://mindclones 
.blogspot.com (last visited 20 February 2015); thanks to Jill Horwitz for the 
reference.
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to leave. Your survivors will shake their heads sadly and say, 
“Such a shame she didn’t get to take that trip, she was so look-
ing forward to it.” On their view, anyway, your death sets back 
your interest: not just your general interest in living, but your 
specific interest in taking this trip. In that way it’s no different 
from the shattered leg. This example qualifies as harm but not 
wrong, misfortune but not injury, barring some further story 
about the heart attack. But we could provide such a story: it 
was triggered by medical malpractice, say the overdose of an 
anesthetic during routine surgery.
 Can your projects be thwarted after your death? Not, 
surely, any project that involves your still doing something, be-
cause you’re no longer around to do it. But people adopt plenty 
of projects that don’t involve such continuing action. You set 
up an organization to renew the city’s sadly neglected public 
parks. You donate money and work hard at securing dona-
tions from others. Your plan is to set everything in motion and 
then stand back: you’re no good at the physical work involved. 
You round up volunteers to rip out old play structures and in-
stall snazzy, safe new ones; to design and install new landscap-
ing; and so on. The actual work has begun when you die, but 
then a court order freezes the work—with giant holes in the 
ground and some of the parks now closed. You invested end-
less hours, money too, and your project will not be realized. 
Your project was not to set up the organization. It was to ren-
ovate the park. Why not say that here too your interest has 
been set back, that you’ve been harmed?
 “Well, because you don’t exist.” That can’t be enough. You 
can be harmed by things that happen before you’re born. Your 
mother drinks heavily and you’re born with fetal alcohol syn-
drome. (If you think you exist once you’re a zygote, suppose 
instead your mother takes drugs and suffers genetic damage, 
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some of which you’ll inherit, before you’re conceived.) A nasty 
corporation fouls the water supply of the community you’ll be 
born into or leaves toxic waste in the municipal dump. Dieth-
ylstilbestrol (DES), once prescribed to pregnant women, is 
alleged to injure not just their children but also their grand-
children. Tort law wrestled with whether the grandchildren 
should be able to prevail in claims against the drug manufac-
turers.23 Regardless of the answer, if the allegation is true, surely 
the unborn grandchildren are harmed by their grandmother’s 
taking the drug. “Well, you will exist. But I think the asymme-
try about time makes all the difference. Once your life is over, 
everything is different. Before you’re born, you can be harmed 
but you can’t harm. After you’re dead, maybe you can harm, 
but you can’t be harmed.”
 Let me put more pressure on that gambit. Why think that 
you still have to exist to have your interests set back? “Because 
your interests go poof! when you do.” All of them? Let’s revisit 
a sentiment I voiced in the first chapter, about how you might 
now think about the well-being of your loved ones after you 
die: “They’ll still have interests and I now care about whether 
they’ll flourish or not, even though I won’t be around to see 
it.” Suppose you do what you can to help ensure that they will 
be well positioned to succeed, by their lights, after you die. You 
help pay for appropriate schooling; you bequeath them money; 
you encourage them to tackle some chronic health problems. 
And now suppose that after you die their lives go badly. No 
one will dispute that this is bad for them. No one will dispute 
that while alive you took an interest in its not happening: you 
made it a project of yours to help secure good lives for them. 
23. See for instance Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 63 Ohio St. 3d 756 (1992); 
Reeves v. Eli Lilly & Co., 368 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2005).
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So again why not think that their failure is also bad for you? 
“Well, I don’t exist anymore.”
 I take it that this too is not in dispute: if you were alive to 
see it, it would be bad for you. Not merely bad for them, though 
of course it’s that. And not merely distressing to you: that dis-
tress registers that something bad has happened, though not 
necessarily to you; it isn’t solely what that bad thing consists in. 
But there is more here than their foundering plus your distress 
at their foundering. There is the failure of your own (financial 
and emotional) investments in their success. So why isn’t it bad 
for you even if it happens while you’re dead? Is it that you don’t 
know about it? But again while you’re alive all kinds of bad 
things can happen to you that you don’t know about: someone 
steals your money, you get pancreatic cancer, you’re raped while 
you’re unconscious, and so on. “But you could know about 
those.” But you could know that your loved ones’ lives were 
going badly: you would know, had you only lived longer. So 
yes, there’s a counterfactual that takes care of harms you don’t 
notice while you’re still alive. But there’s also a counterfactual 
that takes care of harms occurring after you’re dead. It’s glib to 
assert that the latter counterfactual is too far away from the 
actual world. It might not be: it might be the merest happen-
stance that you died when you did. (If only they’d gotten you 
to the hospital sixty seconds sooner, you’d have survived.) And 
it could be that everything would have had to be very different 
for you to discover the pancreatic cancer. (Without symptoms, 
you’d never ask for the relevant tests and no doctor would run 
them anyway.) Maybe there is some way to finesse the two 
counterfactuals to redeem the intuition that death means that 
you have no interests. But I doubt that the stubborn embrace 
of the oblivion thesis depends on a finicky construction of the 
difference between two counterfactuals.
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 Person, Locke also claims, is “a Forensick Term appro-
priating Actions and their Merit.”24 To be a person is to be an 
agent, responsible for some deeds, and so to be the proper 
object of praise and blame, reward and punishment. Locke 
doesn’t offer this as an alternative account of person: he wants 
to defend the view that it makes sense to treat (the bearers of) 
unified chains of consciousness in this way. He offers a moti-
vational principle: because you care about your future pleasure 
and pain, you can guide your conduct by thinking about the 
prospect of reward and punishment. That might sound conse-
quentialist, but Locke also thinks it would be unfair to punish 
you for something that some other person did. He grants that 
we punish sober people for things they did while they’re drunk, 
even when they can’t remember, and likewise that we punish 
people for things they did while ostensibly sleepwalking. But 
he thinks this is epistemic: we doubt our ability to tell when 
such a story is a lie. God at judgment day, he suggests, will take 
a different view.
 You might well not wish to subscribe to even the outlines 
of this account. You might for instance demur that we hold 
people responsible for their drunken deeds in part because 
while sober they choose to drink, and they know or should 
know what might follow. But let’s pursue the intuition that to 
be a person is to be the proper object of praise and blame, re-
ward and punishment; and let’s again turn to the law for illu-
mination. Consider the case of delayed murder. Hannah stabs 
Marguerite. Rushed to the hospital, Marguerite is in critical 
condition. Hannah’s arrested; eventually the prosecutor charges 
24. This strand of Locke’s treatment is emphasized in [Edmund Law], A 
Defence of Mr. Locke’s Opinion Concerning Personal Identity (Cambridge, 
1769).
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her with aggravated assault as Marguerite continues to lan-
guish in a hospital bed. If Marguerite dies as a result of the stab 
wound, weeks or months or years later,25 the prosecutor will 
promptly upgrade the charge against Hannah to murder. (I 
leave aside whether it’s some version of homicide or of man-
slaughter.) For that is what she now becomes guilty of. She 
wasn’t yet guilty of murder when she stabbed Marguerite; after 
all, Marguerite could have gotten better.
 But suppose Hannah happens to die before Marguerite. I 
want to say that Hannah is still guilty of murder and she still 
becomes guilty of murder when Marguerite dies. (I touched 
on this point earlier, with the example of poisoned Tylenol.) 
While alive, Hannah set in motion a causal ripple that led to 
Marguerite’s death. Again, she wasn’t guilty of murder when 
she stabbed Marguerite, because Marguerite was still alive. 
And it seems contrived, even absurd, to say that just because 
Hannah is dead, she can’t be guilty of murder. Why ever not? If 
you’re worried that mere contingency is determining the sever-
ity of Hannah’s guilt, notice that that’s just a standard problem 
of moral luck. Whether Hannah’s alive or dead has nothing to 
do with it.26
 It’s a further question whether it would make sense to 
25. For a stab wound that turned into murder some fifty-five years later, 
see J. David Goodman, “A Twist in the Murder of a 97-Year-Old Man: He 
Was Knifed 5 Decades Ago,” New York Times (24 January 2015).
26. Compare McKee v. State, 200 Ga. 563, 565 (1946) (“ownership of 
property stolen may be properly laid in the owner as of the date of the of-
fense, and notwithstanding the fact that the owner may have died after the 
theft and before the return of indictment”); Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 802 
(1999) (citing McKee to approve of trial court’s rejecting criminal defen-
dant’s proposed instruction that “if Ms. Chancey was dead when her rings 
were removed, there was no taking from a person, and therefore no armed 
robbery”).
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prosecute Hannah. Criminal prosecution of the dead might 
seem perverse, but I think mostly for pragmatic reasons: we 
can’t punish them. Civil law countries are happier with trials 
in absentia than are common law countries—for us they would 
raise constitutional difficulties about the right to confront 
one’s accusers—but that can’t be an absolute bar either. Any-
way it’s been done. Pope Formosus died in April 896. In Janu-
ary 897 Pope Stephen VII decided to try Formosus for various 
crimes. Formosus’s body was exhumed, dressed in papal vest-
ments, and propped up in court to, um, hear the charges. A 
deacon stood behind the body and responded. Formosus was 
found guilty. The fingers of his right hand that he once dis-
pensed blessings with were chopped off, his body dumped into 
the Tiber River.27 Now that’s grotesque, risible too: but agree-
ing that Hannah becomes guilty of murder after her own death 
doesn’t entail any commitment to dig up Hannah’s body and 
put it on trial.
 If I’m right, Hannah doesn’t need to be alive to become 
a murderer. Locke’s helpful thought, that person is a forensic 
term, seems right even when tweaked to cover the case when 
the person is no longer alive: that person can still properly be 
the object of praise and blame, reward and punishment. The 
deaths of Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot and their loathsome likes do not 
absolve them of responsibility for ongoing human suffering. 
That thought neatly parallels the law’s use of the estate: the 
27. Peter Heather, The Restoration of Rome: Barbarian Popes and Imperial 
Pretenders (London: Macmillan, 2013), 361–62. Recently, Russia prosecuted 
Sergei Magnitsky four years after he died. See David Herszenhorn, “Dead 
Lawyer, a Kremlin Critic, Is Found Guilty of Tax Evasion,” New York Times 
(11 July 2013).
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bundle of rights and obligations, centered on property, that 
will survive your death. That estate, remember, can sue and be 
sued. Those claims don’t disappear when you do. Death is the 
end of conscious experience. But your life leaves causal ripples 
that survive you—and plenty of those causal ripples have nor-
mative implications, for better or worse. To emphasize the point: 
on your death bed, you ignite a well-hidden slow-burning 
fuse. Two days after you die, it sets off a bomb that destroys an 
apartment building and kills everyone in it. You’re not respon-
sible? Really?
 Try this:28 you spend twelve years on a scholarly book of 
great ambition. It will make a big splash, you confide in your 
closest friends. You finish the manuscript. The referees for the 
press love it. You eagerly await its appearance and reception. 
Now imagine four possible paths forward:
(1)  It’s instantly celebrated. “Better than I dared 
hope!” you tell people—and you mean it. It’s 
promptly installed on reading lists all over the 
country. Published reviews in scholarly journals 
and popular media alike are highly congratula-
tory. And they’re right: the book is a gem.
(2)  It’s a flop. Reviewers press devastating objec-
tions. You wonder how none of those com-
menting on the manuscript alerted you to these 
problems. But you don’t imagine that it’s their 
28. George Pitcher, “The Misfortunes of the Dead,” American Philosoph-
ical Quarterly (April 1984): 185; and Steven Luper, “Retroactive Harms and 
Wrongs,” in Oxford Handbook, ed. Bradley, Feldman, and Johannson, 322, 
deploy similar examples.
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fault. It’s yours. Twelve years of your life, wasted. 
Worse than wasted: you’ve labored mightily so 
that you can be pelted with contempt.
(3)  The book disappears on publication. Not liter-
ally, but no one seems to be reading it, no jour-
nal ever gets around to reviewing it. It slinks its 
forlorn way to the remainder tables in record 
time. You gave copies to friends and colleagues. 
They muttered the usual polite phrases, but they 
didn’t glance at it.
(4)  It’s a flop—but that’s wholly unfair, and you’re 
not just being defensive when you think so. 
Though you can’t prove it or find even a scrap of 
evidence, your paranoid suspicions are exactly 
right: your enemies are plotting against you. At 
the leading journals, the fix is in to ensure the 
first reviews are negative. And because they 
are, pointedly and nastily so, most people don’t 
bother picking up the book to read and assess 
it for themselves. (The few who do quite like it, 
but they sheepishly submit to the consensus.) 
You could try glumly consoling yourself with 
the thought that posterity will rediscover your 
work, but you know better.
I assume it’s uncontroversially true that (1) is good for you, 
(2) and (3) are bad for you, and (4) is not only bad for you but 
is also a wrong against you. And again, the goodness of (1) is 
not exhausted by your experiencing praise and beaming, or 
getting a prize, or anything like that. That sort of thing is trig-
gered by confirmation, by reliable judges, that your work is 
good. The confirmation is itself a good thing. But that too 
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doesn’t exhaust matters. Everything finally hangs on the un-
derlying fact that the work is awfully good. That’s not the eval-
uatively neutral ground on which good things happen: it is 
itself of great value.
 To relax the omniscience or certainty built into the way 
I framed these paths, suppose you believe the work is awfully 
good, and so do the reviewers and prize committees, but you’re 
all wrong. I wouldn’t say that nothing good happens to you 
when the work is well received. But I would insist that that’s 
a much less valuable state of affairs than the one in which the 
reception is sound and the work is in fact good. Deserved suc-
cess is better than undeserved success, even if you can’t tell the 
difference. I suspect resistance to that thought hangs again on 
the claim that all the matters in life is subjective experience, or 
perhaps on the claim that judgments of quality are subjective 
folderol. I commented earlier on what’s deficient in the first 
view and shan’t dignify the second with a response.
 Likewise, what’s bad in (2) is not just the dismay you suf-
fer on reading those reviews. And it’s not just learning the fact 
that your alleged masterwork is junk, speeding its crestfallen 
way to the remainder tables. It’s the fact itself and what it means: 
that you did indeed waste twelve years of your life. Not that 
nothing you did in those years was valuable. But those endless 
hours of work? They might have been engaging, which is worth 
something, but had you known then what you know now, you’d 
never have tackled the project. Sometimes we can tell a story 
about nobility in majestic failure, but not here.
 The badness of (3) is different. You’ve suffered a misfor-
tune. You properly want the book to have some uptake. You 
want it to find its way to the relevant readers and you want 
them to wrestle with it and embrace it, or at least to make rea-
sonable efforts and judgments. (Imagine the perversity of writ-
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ing a really good book and then burning it without showing it 
to a soul.)
 In (4), you’re wronged. You’ve suffered an injury, not a 
misfortune. Now the book is still awfully good, and I’ve said 
that that, finally, is what you want. But once again the book has 
no uptake. So your conspiratorial enemies have also injured 
those readers. But it’s also true that in injuring them, they have 
injured you: they haven’t given you what you deserve and they 
have deprived your twelve years’ work of its proper uptake. 
And surely this chorus of negative reviews is going to shake 
your confidence and cause you pain. You’ll have to squirm in 
the nauseating fear that your book stinks and you wasted years 
of your life.
 Now—you saw this coming, right?—suppose you die 
while the book is in press. Let’s rehearse the same four paths. 
Now (1) no longer has the pleasure you experience at reading 
the reviews and winning the prizes. Nor do you experience the 
confirmation that you’ve written a good book. But you have. 
We could get fussy over the senses in which the public confir-
mation is and isn’t good for you. But in one way it seems to me 
indisputably true that it’s good for you: it’s what makes readers 
read your work. That’s the uptake you rightly wanted. Then 
(2) means you died in blissful ignorance. The best thing would 
have been for that omniscient futurologist to persuade you 
twelve years before not to get started, but once again he forgot 
to show up. Would it be better for you to have learned the 
truth before you died? Maybe. People might well say that at 
least you died without having to confront the awful news. That 
that dismay would indeed be bad, though, doesn’t entail that 
the underlying fact—the book’s badness—is irrelevant if you 
don’t know about it. Regardless, I’m more confident that these 
negative reviews don’t wrong you. You got just what you de-
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serve. It’s still bad in (3) that the book has no uptake, but at 
least you don’t have to squirm or writhe about it.
 The chips are down for us in (4). You suffer no emotional 
turmoil, so that can’t count as harming you. But the malicious 
conspiracy does prevent readers from grappling with your 
work. That, I suggest, is still bad for you. Not that you find it 
disappointing: you don’t. Not that you would bask in fair re-
views: you wouldn’t. Instead, here’s one way to think of why it 
matters: you should be known as the guy who wrote that great 
book that made such a dent in the field. Instead, if anyone 
bothers noticing, you’ll be labeled as that clown who wasted 
all that time at the end of his career—and life. This way of put-
ting the point leans hard on the concept of reputation, but we 
needn’t think of that as the exclusive injury, either. Part of your 
interest in writing, again, is in finding readers. That interest is 
frustrated or set back by your enemies. Nothing about that de-
pends on your knowing about it—or on your being alive to 
notice it.29
 Driven by the putative weirdness of interests that survive 
one’s death, some authors have suggested that we shift the 
temporal location of the harm. When is he harmed? Here’s Joel 
Feinberg: “I think the best answer is: ‘at the point, well before 
his death, when the person had invested so much in some 
post dated outcome that it became one of his interests.’ From 
that point on (we now know) he was playing a losing game, 
betting a substantial component of his own good on a doomed 
29. Here I have found useful J. David Velleman, “Well-Being and Time,” 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1991), reprinted in his The Possibility of 
Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); free online at Scholarly 
Monograph Series, http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/spobooks.6782337.0001.001 
(last visited 26 May 2016).
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cause.”30 I think this answer is mistaken, even extravagant. 
Doomed suggests some fatal necessity, the inexorable grinding 
gears of causal determinism. But the bad outcome here is ut-
terly contingent, just like Marguerite’s death. Feinberg’s sug-
gestion seems to me far weirder than embracing the view that 
some of your interests linger on after your death. If and when 
they’re set back, that is when you’re harmed. So too on the 
question of prenatal injury: I’d say you’re harmed when your 
future mother takes the drugs that damage her chromosomes—
and later yours—or when the corporation fouls the water sup-
ply. It’s tempting to think you’re injured when you’re conceived 
or born. But it matters whether we frame the injury as “your 
mother having you, given her chromosomal problems,” or 
“your having chromosomal problems.” Put differently, it mat-
ters whether your complaint is: “I should never have been 
brought into being, given my mother’s chromosomes,” or “I 
shouldn’t have this chromosomal damage.”
 Back to Hannah and Marguerite. Suppose Hannah is 
wrongly accused of stabbing Marguerite. Another woman did 
the deed and rushed off. Eyewitnesses were confused; Han-
nah’s fingerprints were on the weapon only because she scram-
bled over to help. Surely it would be gravely unjust to convict 
Hannah of murder were she still alive. Why would that change 
if she died before Marguerite? The claim that Hannah was a 
30. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 92. See too Pitcher, “Misfortunes.” I prefer the contours of Feinberg’s 
earlier treatment of posthumous interests in his “Harm and Self-Interest,” in 
Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart, ed. P. M. S. 
Hacker and J. Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 304–6. For more sus-
tained pressure on the view of Feinberg quoted in my text, see Daniel Sperling, 
Posthumous Interests: Legal and Ethical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 21–25.
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murderer would still be unjust. In fact, it would be a particular 
kind of injustice. It would be a false defamatory statement of 
fact: defamation per se, in fact, because murder is the quintes-
sential serious crime. Doctrinally, we don’t call false conviction 
defamation. But its structure is identical.
 No wonder some are offended by the Mormon practice 
of proxy baptism, used to convert the dead. Official church 
policy is that one may convert only one’s own relatives, and 
that their souls are free to decline the conversion. But zeal-
ous church members have converted the likes of Anne Frank 
and Daniel Pearl.31 No wonder descendants of the unjustly 
convicted sometimes struggle to have those convictions over-
turned. So President Clinton pardoned the first black graduate 
of West Point: 
 “I welcome you all to an event that is 117 years 
overdue,” Mr. Clinton said today at a White House 
ceremony attended by several dozen people, includ-
ing military officers and Lieutenant Flipper’s de-
scendants. . . . “This good man now has completely 
recovered his good name.”
 A number of Lieutenant Flipper’s descendants 
applauded. “Like the rest of the family, I’m relieved 
that this has come full circle,” said Dr. William King, 
a great-nephew of Lieutenant Flipper. Dr. King’s 
mother, Irsle Flipper King, had been pushing for a 
pardon for some 40 years.32
31. Mark Oppenheimer, “A Twist on Posthumous Baptisms Leaves Jews 
Miffed at Mormon Rite,” New York Times (2 March 2012).
32. David Stout, “First Black from West Point Gains Pardon,” New York 
Times (20 February 1999).
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You needn’t be a religious believer to object to Anne Frank’s 
conversion. You needn’t be crassly self-interested and think 
that your dead great-uncle’s conviction is somehow bad for 
you to want to clear his name. It’s enough to think that these 
dead individuals have been insulted. Here again the link be-
tween defamation and dignitary harm is very tight.
 Let’s step back. The skeptic wielded the oblivion thesis—
the thought that once you’re dead, you have no interests—to 
urge that it’s nonsensical to think that defaming the dead in-
jures them. (Even a soft skeptic will assent to that formulation.) 
I’ve treated that as a legitimate explanatory query and tried to 
respond. Now the skeptic also appealed to the hangover thesis, 
the claim that our lingering regard for the dead is best regarded 
as a remnant of religious beliefs about the afterlife, on which 
the dead are aware of what we’re up to, possibly vengeful about 
it. We could take that as a paratheory, an explanation of why 
we’re so misguided that would kick in only after the oblivion 
thesis did its destructive work. But we could also take it as it-
self an effort to undercut or corrode our commitments to re-
specting the dead. Here I want to turn the tables on the skeptic. 
My diagnosis is that the hangover thesis depends on the view 
that all that matters is conscious experience, or all that’s valu-
able is Sidgwick’s desirable consciousness: only if your soul 
notices what’s going on, the thought is, could it qualify as an 
injury. That allegedly commonsense view is deeply defective. 
It often stands behind the hangover thesis and the oblivion 
thesis alike. If there is to be talk of the furtive appeal of illicit 
views, then, I propose that we stop worrying about religious 
hangovers and start worrying about the seductive fantasy that 
only experience matters. So I’ll reverse the skeptic’s challenge. 
Cast that seductive fantasy aside: what else might properly mo-
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tivate the skeptical view? Why not embrace the view that the 
dead have interests that we need to consider?33
Reputation of the Dead
To say the dead have interests is not to say that they have rep-
utational interests coextensive with those of the living, or even 
any reputational interests at all. If we set aside the wholesale 
objection that there are no posthumous interests, we still have 
to deal with the retail worry that it wouldn’t make any sense to 
recognize a cause of action in tort for defaming the dead, be-
cause whatever wrongs we might do the dead, invading their 
reputational interests isn’t among them.
 Let’s start by considering what interests the living have in 
their reputation. And let’s stick to the contours of the tort of 
defamation. What injury do you suffer if someone publishes a 
false, defamatory factual claim about you? Say he claims you’ve 
embezzled, diddled, and popped. Let’s distinguish three kinds 
of injury at stake in defamation:
(1)  Defamation is upsetting. It’s awful knowing that 
this charge is spreading. Remember that plain-
tiffs in defamation actions can recover for pain 
and suffering. But remember too that emotional 
harm is no constitutive element of the tort, so 
33. Sperling, Posthumous Interests, chap. 1 (esp. 40) suggests that we dis-
tinguish a person, who “has” interests, from a Human Subject, which (who?) 
“holds” them; and that we ascribe symbolic existence to the latter. This 
seems to me fussier than we need to make sense of posthumous interests, 
less apt too.
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they need not allege such injury to prevail in a 
lawsuit.
(2)  If you’re defamed, others are far less likely to 
cooperate with you, in the relevant community 
or a respectable part of it. They might think you 
unreliable. Or they might think you something 
like ritually unclean and contagious: better to 
steer clear. Your reputation is then an instrumen-
tal good. I’m no Rawlsian, but if you unpack 
the social bases of self-respect, which is one of 
Rawls’s primary goods, “things that every ratio-
nal man is presumed to want,” I think legal pro-
tection from defamation should be in the mix.34
(3)  Defamation is intrinsically bad for you. This 
language might sound like a worrisome way of 
refusing to provide a reason. But the point is 
that the reason needn’t take the form of instru-
mental rationality, on which the defamation is a 
means to a bad end, or causes some further out-
come that is the real problem. You can reason-
34. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press at Harvard University Press, 1999), 54. Rawls thinks of primary goods 
as all-purpose means, “things that men generally want in order to achieve 
their ends whatever they are,” 288. But the language I quote in the text could 
also be glossed as making primary goods intrinsic, and the way would then 
be clear to defending the role especially of the social bases of self-respect as 
marking one’s status as a dignified equal. In “The Basic Liberties and Their 
Priority,” Rawls excepts defamation from a general commitment to free speech 
in part because it is “a private wrong,” but he doesn’t explore a potential link 
to the social bases of self-respect: John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), 336. For connected themes about dignity, 
see Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012).
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ably care that others not traffic in such nasty 
charges about you. At stake is something like 
dignified personhood, understood not as some-
thing you just plain have no matter what, but as 
having face, or the kind of self-presentation you 
can credibly offer—and yourself believe in—in 
public.35 It’s not (only) that defamation causally 
undercuts that stance, so that an explanation of 
why you no longer enjoy it as securely will recur 
to the independent fact of a prior defamation. 
It’s (also) that defamation already constitutes a 
depredation of it. It’s pernicious to imagine that 
all that matters is how you carry yourself or what 
you believe. A clown pretending to be a noble 
lord doesn’t redeem his status. He redoubles the 
contempt he’s held in.
 All three surface routinely in defamation actions. Con-
sider a grotesque case. Over a century ago, Augustus M. Flood 
of Charleston, South Carolina, sued the News and Courier for 
libel.36 The newspaper had published a story about “Augus-
tus M. Flood, colored,” suing after a street car hit him. Flood 
complained that he was “a white man of pure Caucasian 
blood,” and he had “always enjoyed the respect and confidence 
of his white fellow-citizens, the same having been of value to 
plaintiff in his business, and a source of pride and pleasure to 
35. Compare Stephen L. Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics (Octo-
ber 1977).
36. Flood v. News & Courier Co., 71 S.C. 112 (1905). For contemporary 
comment and survey of caselaw on point, see The American and English 
Annotated Cases, ed. William M. McKinley et al., 53 vols. (Northport, NY: 
Edward Thompson, 1906–18), 4:689.
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him in his social life.” He urged that it was libel per se for the 
newspaper to publish the claim that he was colored: that is, 
without any evidence of special damages he’d suffered, he was 
entitled to legal relief. If you’re imagining that no one could 
mistake a white man for a colored man, dwell for a second on 
the racist one-drop rule and its attendant anxieties.
 The trial court had granted the newspaper a demurrer, 
approving their argument that the Reconstruction amendments 
barred a court from taking any such claim as defamatory. The 
appeals court made short work of overturning the trial court’s 
verdict. “To call a white man a negro, affects the social status 
of the white man so referred to.” Or again, “When we think of 
the radical distinction subsisting between the white man and 
the black man, it must be apparent that to impute the condi-
tion of the negro to a white man would affect his, the white 
man’s, social status, and in case any one publish a white man 
to be a negro, it would not only be galling to his pride, but 
would tend to interfere seriously with the social relation of the 
white man with his fellow white men.” They also brushed aside 
the constitutional objections, the merits of which needn’t con-
cern us here.37 Like it or not, as a matter of social fact the news-
paper’s claim threatened Flood’s livelihood and social life. No 
wonder he sued.
 Flood complains that the newspaper story has lowered 
his social status. It has robbed him of the pleasure he took in 
being a first-rate member of the community: so he wants emo-
tional damages. His reputation, he adds, had been of value to 
37. For a more general analysis of how the law deals with illicit third-party 
preferences, see my “The Kerr Principle, State Action, and Legal Rights,” 
Michigan Law Review (October 2006).
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him in his business: there’s an instrumental interest. Finally, he 
claims he had enjoyed the confidence and respect of his fellow 
citizens, and that’s been shredded. His added reference to pride 
might be another kind of emotional injury or it might under-
line his eroded social status: either way the language of confi-
dence and respect points to the intrinsic injury he alleges. The 
court endorses all three.
 On (2), what sort of instrumental concerns matter? Coke 
didn’t only prosecute the hapless likes of Lewis Pickering, that 
Puritan student hauled before Star Chamber for his poetaster’s 
defamation of Archbishop Whitgift. Coke himself sued one 
Thomas Baxter for defamation. Baxter, he complained, had 
said, “Master Coke, at the last assizes in Norfolk, was of coun-
sel with both the plaintiff and defendant, and took fees and was 
retained by them both.” The allegation that he had so grossly 
travestied legal ethics, Coke went on, had led prospective cli-
ents not to hire him, so he had “lost many gains, profits and 
fees.”38 Loss of employment or work opportunities is just one 
instrumental interest, though it surfaces frequently in defama-
tion actions. But one could also allege other instrumental harms. 
Consider a much-quoted gloss from a 1933 New York opin-
ion: “Reputation is said in a general way to be injured by words 
which tend to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, 
contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, deg-
radation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the 
minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their 
confidence and friendly intercourse in society.”39 Suppose 
38. Coke v. Baxter (KB 1585), in Select Cases on Defamation to 1600, ed. 
R. H. Helmholz (London: Selden Society, 1985), 67.
39. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102 (1933).
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Flood has been courting a young white woman. Imagine what 
she does—and what her parents do—the next time he knocks 
on the door.
 Which community matters? On (2), consider a whimsi-
cal case. In a small village in Bhutan, people despise you. They 
believe you’ve embezzled, diddled, and popped. They vocifer-
ously abuse life-size posters of you and they teach their chil-
dren to regard you as a bogeyman. You don’t know anything 
about this. Neither does anyone you know and deal with, nor 
anyone you will ever know and deal with. Suppose no wander-
ing traveler or the internet will bring the story home, as it were, 
to people and places on your mattering map. Then I think the 
mere fact that these Bhutanese believe these defamatory things 
about you is irrelevant—as far as (2) goes. They might as well 
be on another planet. It’s too narrow to say the relevant com-
munity is the one you actually deal with. But it can’t be anyone, 
anywhere, anytime either.
 So these are the sorts of injuries a living person can suffer 
when defamed. What about a dead person? Once again, I’ve 
no interest in making out a case for emotional injury: the dead 
have no emotions. Any instrumental injuries? Once dead, you’re 
in no position to adopt new projects. But some of your old 
projects might well outlive you; this is of course contingent on 
what particular projects you’ve adopted and where they stand 
at your death. Return to the case where you’re spearheading a 
drive to renovate the city parks. You die when work is just get-
ting underway—and someone at your funeral whispers that 
you’ve embezzled, diddled, and popped. The story gets around. 
Who wants to keep working on what’s mordantly dubbed the 
Child Molester Park Project? Your one-time associates with-
draw. Just as if you were still alive, the defamation corrodes 
your reputation and makes others unwilling to cooperate with 
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you. Even though dead, you have the same instrumental inter-
est you’d have if you were still alive.
 It seems contrived to insist that your real interest is in 
their working on it only as long as you’re around to see it. Dis-
miss the zany image of your corpse suddenly speaking out and 
think instead about what you would say while still alive about 
work on the park being disrupted by your death. Imagine hap-
pily conceding, “Oh, I don’t care if the thing actually gets done. 
I just want to know that it’s in progress up until my death. 
After that do as you will.” Those pitching in would find that 
baffling, not shrewd or tough-minded. Defamation aside, they 
will feel like they’re letting you down if they fail to see the proj-
ect through after you die, or at least if they fail to take reason-
able steps to do so; just as they will happily name the park for 
you if they complete the work and they will not fantasize that 
they do so to incentivize sick or elderly others to take on such 
projects.
 So too, I suggest, for the intrinsic interest. Suppose that 
within days of your funeral no one remembers you. Not liter-
ally, as if they all contracted a curiously selective case of am-
nesia. Rather they never think about you, fondly or other-
wise. That’s sad, arguably bad for you too—was your life that 
weightless?—but it isn’t a wrong. It’s not as though you’re enti-
tled to have people remember you. But suppose again that the 
story spreads that you’ve embezzled, diddled, and popped. 
Absent any further instrumental interest, this is bad for you. 
You may not be entitled to have anyone keep score, but if peo-
ple are thinking about your life, they wrong you if they attri-
bute to you crimes or other wrongs you haven’t committed: if 
they offer a false, defamatory statement of fact about you. Again, 
we are vanishingly close to the case where we wrongly blame 
dead Hannah for Marguerite’s murder.
252 “This Will Always Be There”
 As far as you’re concerned, people in the more distant 
future might as well be people in Bhutan. You might properly 
feel differently about your own descendants, but even then, I 
suppose, not infinitely, not even indefinitely. I doubt we take 
any interest in what our great-great- . . . -great-grandchildren 
think of us; if we do happen to take such an interest, I doubt it’s 
one that we or the law will think worth protecting. (Solon tells 
Croesus that Tellus the Athenian was the most fortunate of 
men, in part because his children were noble and all his grand-
children survived.40 The sentiment is already pressing on trans-
forming the traditional “call no man happy till he is dead” into 
something like “call no man happy till some time after he is 
dead and we can see how things turned out,”41 but also sug-
gesting a limit to the time horizon which can still affect his 
well-being, even when his descendants are involved.) But your 
actual community, and those reasonably nearby in (social) 
space and time: you can properly care whether someone pub-
lishes to them the claim that you’ve embezzled, diddled, and 
popped. It would not be irrational to swap tasty French fries 
for mediocre ones to make sure that that not happen. It would 
not be irrational to surrender a good deal more. Not only for 
the benefit of your surviving loved ones, but also for your own 
benefit. But you shouldn’t have to surrender anything.
 So posthumous harm is possible, even straightforward. 
The dead can claim some of the same interests as the living in 
their reputations. Whatever metaphysical queasiness you might 
suffer, the law is already heavily invested in respecting the in-
40. Herotodus, Histories 1:30.
41. Here’s where I’ve hidden the inevitable citation: Aristotle, Nicoma-
chean Ethics 1:10.
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terests of the dead and claims on their behalf. Why treat repu-
tation differently?
New York, Rhode Island, and the Case for 
Tort Reform
Marilyn Hioki’s son, Kevin Aissa, was murdered in Queens, 
New York, in 1979. She was then confronted with a newspaper 
story claiming that Kevin was a member of Carmine Galante’s 
Mafia crime family and had been murdered in an ongoing gang 
war.42 This claim, insisted Hioki, was blatantly false. It meant 
that witnesses who feared the Mafia refused to help the police. 
“She and her family suffered the embarrassment of gawkers 
stopping to watch and photograph her house. . . . Her children 
were bothered at school.”43
 This sort of thing inspired Manny Gold of the state senate 
to introduce legislation providing a cause of action for defam-
ing the dead. Indefatigable, Gold introduced versions of this 
measure session after session. In 1986, the senate unanimously 
passed the measure.44 But apparently Governor Mario Cuomo 
was considering a veto and civil liberties groups were out in 
force against the bill.45 Gold and the sponsor of the measure in 
42. Sam Rosensohn, “2 Galante Men Beaten to Death,” New York Post (27 
July 1979).
43. Paul Grondahl, “Libel Bill Debated: Media Square off with Victims’ 
Kin,” Times Union (26 March 1987).
44. Jeffrey Schmalz, “Bill on Libeling of Dead People Makes Progress,” 
New York Times (28 June 1986).
45. Jeffrey Schmalz, “Sponsor in Senate Withdraws a Bill on Libeling 
Dead,” New York Times (1 July 1986).
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the assembly, Alan Hevesi, withdrew it.46 But Gold continued 
to introduce the measure session after session. “You have to 
tell people that they cannot spit on the graves of our children,” 
pleaded another aggrieved survivor at a 1987 hearing. “You’ve 
got to give us this law. You’ve got to let us set the facts right.”47
 Later in 1987, fifteen-year-old Tawana Brawley was found 
beaten in Wappingers Falls, New York. Not just beaten, but 
in a plastic bag, with shit smeared over her body, “Nigger” and 
“KKK” scrawled on it for good measure. The story became 
even more explosive when Brawley alleged that she’d been kid-
napped and raped by six white men, one with a police badge.48 
Al Sharpton, Louis Farrakhan, and others got involved. The 
authorities could find no evidence supporting Brawley’s story; 
in October 1988, after considering the case for some seven 
months, a special grand jury rejected it wholesale. None of 
the evidence, they decided, was inconsistent with Brawley 
smearing and marking herself and crawling into the bag. All 
the preparatory materials were in a nearby apartment she had 
access to.49 That grand jury had only two black members and 
46. Bennett Roth, “Intense Media Lobby Kills ‘Libel from Grave,’ ” Times 
Union (1 July 1986).
47. Mark A. Uhlig, “Debate Resumes on Libel Protection for Dead,” New 
York Times (29 March 1987).
48. Esther Iverem, “Bias Cases Fuel Anger of Blacks,” New York Times (14 
December 1987).
49. “ ‘We, the Grand Jury’: Text of Its Conclusions in the Tawana Brawley 
Case,” New York Times (7 October 1988), is a summary of the grand jury’s 
170-page report. For the full text, see Report of the Grand Jury and Related 
Documents Concerning the Tawana Brawley Investigation ([New York]: State 
of New York, Department of Law, 1988). See too Robert D. McFadden, 
“Brawley Made up Story of Assault, Grand Jury Finds,” New York Times (7 
October 1988).
“This Will Always Be There” 255
Brawley refused to appear before it.50 No wonder controversy 
continued—and, at least in brackish recesses of the internet, 
continues—to simmer along.
 In March 1988, though, Brawley’s advisors fingered 
Dutchess County assistant prosecutor Steven Pagones as one 
of her attackers. That same day, Pagones announced he’d sue.51 
He sought $395m from Brawley, Sharpton, and two other ad-
visers. Brawley never responded to the suit. In 1998—the mills 
of civil justice grind slowly—Pagones won a total of $530,000 
from the four. (Johnnie Cochran, who later became famous de-
fending O. J. Simpson, helped pay Sharpton’s damages.)52 Pa-
gones was still collecting damages from Brawley’s advisers in 
2001.53 In 2012, the New York Post found Brawley living under 
an assumed name in Virginia,54 and a court ordered that her 
wages be garnished to pay Pagones. With interest, she now 
owes Pagones over $400,000. Pagones says that he’d forgive the 
debt were she to admit that she was lying. She’s not budging: 
50. E. R. Shipp, “The Case without Brawley: A Grand Jury’s Rare Role,” 
New York Times (16 March 1988).
51. Robert D. McFadden, “A Dutchess County Prosecutor Vows Brawley 
Case Slander Suit,” New York Times (14 March 1988).
52. Laura Italiano, “Now Pay up, Tawana,” New York Post (25 December 
2012). In 2009, Sharpton said he still believed Brawley’s story: www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=IJFAyt5MN4E (last visited 21 November 2014).
53. Alan Feuer, “Adviser in Tawana Brawley Case Pays off Defamation 
Award,” New York Times (7 November 2001). Pagones won a summary 
judgment motion that one adviser’s debt to him couldn’t be discharged in 
bankruptcy: Pagones v. Mason (In re Mason), 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 90 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1999).
54. Michael Gartland, “25 Years after Her Rape Claims Sparked a Fire-
storm, Tawana Brawley Avoids the Spotlight,” New York Post (23 December 
2012).
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the checks have started rolling in.55 In 2013 the Post covered a 
fundraiser for her: “Infamous rape hoaxster and court dead-
beat Tawana Brawley got rock-star treatment in New Jersey yes-
terday, posing for photos with dozens of supporters honoring 
her as a courageous victim of injustice—as they stuffed enve-
lopes full of cash for her.”56
 I wouldn’t call Pagones lucky. Not by a long shot. But at 
least tort law afforded him a way to clear his name and be 
compensated for his injury. Less lucky yet was Harry Crist, Jr., 
a part-time policeman in the area. Crist committed suicide 
four days after Brawley was found in the plastic bag. Authorities 
took his suicide note and later explained that Crist “was de-
spondent over failed efforts to become a state trooper and that 
the suicide had no connection to the Brawley case.”57 Brawley’s 
advisers disagreed. They fingered Crist as another of her at-
tackers and surmised that he’d been murdered in a coverup.58 
Indeed they went after Pagones only after Pagones offered an 
alibi for Crist.59
 The grand jury specifically cleared both Pagones and Crist 
of any wrongdoing.60 Crist’s girlfriend, it turned out, had bro-
ken up with him just before he killed himself. A decade later 
his mother, “Cornelia Crist, sitting with her husband in the 
55. Michael Gartland, “Pay-up Time for Brawley: ’87 Rape-Hoaxer Fi-
nally Shells out for Slander,” New York Post (4 August 2013).
56. Rebecca Rosenberg, “Hoaxer Tawana Brawley Celebrated in New Jer-
sey Fund-Raiser,” New York Post (13 May 2013).
57. Ralph Blumenthal, “Questions and Answers in the Brawley Inquiry,” 
New York Times (24 February 1988).
58. Frank Bruni, “Mourning a Son Tied to the Brawley Case,” New York 
Times (5 April 1988).
59. Italiano, “Now Pay up.”
60. Report of the Grand Jury, 76–82.
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living room of their home . . . recalled the prophecy of a lawyer 
they spoke to after the accusations against her son surfaced. 
‘He told us, for the next 100 years, Tawana’s name will live on,’ 
Mrs. Crist, 68, said, adding that the lawyer also said that her 
son’s name would be linked to Ms. Brawley’s. ‘This will always 
be there. He told us that.’ ” The same grand jury recommended 
amending New York state law to give survivors in such situa-
tions standing to file slander suits.61
 If Governor Cuomo had had reservations about that legal 
change before, he had none after the grand jury report. In his 
annual Message to the Legislature of 1989, Cuomo cautiously 
demurred, “We may never know the full story about Tawana 
Brawley.” But he went on to declare forthrightly, “Current law 
does not permit the survivors of a deceased person to bring an 
action for civil damages against a person who defames the de-
ceased. Such defamation can impose tremendous pain and suf-
fering on survivors at any time, but especially if it occurs soon 
after death.” He promised to introduce legislation offering “such 
a cause of action where the defamation is intentional, malicious 
and follows immediately upon the decease of its object.”62
 I don’t know if Cuomo followed through. Manny Gold 
retired in 1998; others in the New York legislature have con-
tinued to sponsor and introduce such bills.63 The current ver-
sion gives the spouse, parent, or child of a dead person the right 
to bring an action if the defamation occurs within five years of 
death. The remedy on offer is a declaratory judgment—that is, 
61. Bruni, “Mourning.” Compare to Mrs. Crist’s language Veritas to Mr. 
Urban, 6 June 1800, Gentleman’s Magazine (June 1800).
62. New York State Legislative Annual 1989, 42–43.
63. Most recently, S01332 (12 January 2015), at https://legiscan.com/NY/
bill/S01332/2015 (last visited 30 April 2015).
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a ruling that indeed the person was defamed—but no mone-
tary compensation. (Initially Gold had wanted to offer mone-
tary compensation, too. When he withdrew the version that 
received unanimous support in the senate, he shifted to declar-
atory judgment. But that didn’t satisfy opponents in the news 
media.)64 Apparently the proposed measure has the form of 
the Gugliuzza solution. The party suing would argue, “when 
you defamed my dead loved one, you wronged me.” But when 
sixty-eight-year-old Cornelia Crist sadly contemplates her dead 
son being linked to Tawana Brawley for a century, she’s not 
thinking of her own pain and suffering. She’s thinking that this 
is bad for her dead son.
 The Rhode Island statute with which I began this book 
with is different. It was adopted in 1974. Here’s the text:65
§ 10-7.1-1. liability for damages for libel of 
a deceased person
 Whenever a deceased person shall have been 
slandered or libelled in an obituary or similar ac-
count in any newspaper or on any radio or televi-
sion station within three (3) months of his or her 
date of death, and the account would, if death had 
not ensued, have entitled the party injured to main-
tain an action and recover damages in respect to the 
libel, the person who or corporation which would 
have been liable if death had not ensued shall be 
liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding 
the death of the person.
64. Roth, “Intense Media Lobby.”
65. R.I. Gen. Laws § 10–7.1.
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§ 10-7.1–2. action by executor or adminis-
trator—persons benefited—limitation of 
action
 Every action under this chapter shall be 
brought by and in the name of the executor or ad-
ministrator of the deceased person, whether ap-
pointed or qualified within or without the state, 
and of the amount recovered in every action under 
this chapter one-half (1/2) shall go to the husband 
or widow, and one-half (1/2) shall go to the chil-
dren of the deceased, and if there are no children 
the whole shall go to the husband or widow, and, 
if there is no husband or widow, to the next of kin, 
in the proportion provided by law in relation to the 
distribution of personal property left by persons 
dying intestate. Provided, that every action under 
this chapter shall be commenced within one year 
after the death of the person.
It’s a tight time window and only defamation in an obituary 
counts, though it also makes it possible to win cash damages, 
not simply a declaratory judgment. I don’t know why Rhode 
Island passed this law. Apparently there’s no surviving press 
coverage and the state librarian reports that the legislature then 
kept no records of committee or floor debates.66 Nor is the law 
66. Email from Thomas Evans, 6 October 2014. Thanks to Ross Cheit for 
conjecturing that the law was a response to Barrett v. Barrett, 108 R.I. 15 
(1970), in which a widow sued over a Providence Journal obituary labeling 
her estranged husband a bachelor. But she claimed that this defamed her, by 
implying that she was guilty of fornication. And thanks to Sharon Krause for 
turning my plaintive e-query into a productive email chain.
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well known. The reporter who covered law for the Providence 
Journal for forty years had never heard of it.67 And when New 
York was considering its measure years later, First Amend-
ment expert Floyd Abrams “said no other state had enacted 
such a law.”68
 Only if there is no executor or administrator of the es-
tate, the Rhode Island law continues, or if that person declines 
to bring an action within six months, may the estate’s bene-
ficiaries bring an action. And it’s the beneficiaries, not some 
specified list of close family members: here too the dead per-
son’s intentions are controlling.
 Rhode Island, then, believes that defaming the dead is a 
legal injury—to the dead, not to the survivors. So what? There 
are all too many screwy laws on the books. I don’t think the 
existence of the law goes to show its desirability. Nor do I think 
it should assuage any suspicion that I am baying at the moon. 
I introduce it only to show that it is possible for a legislature 
to offer legal relief in tort for defaming the dead. The best evi-
dence that something is possible is that it’s actual.
 There is a reasonable case against extending tort liability 
this way. It’s not the oblivion thesis. Again that’s a wholesale 
attack on settled law in different domains, and it’s decidedly 
wrongheaded anyway. Nor is it the thesis that the dead have 
no reputational interests: they do. Instead the reasonable case 
is more retail or local yet. Start here: on my account, the dead 
do have reputational interests. But theirs are a proper subset of 
the interests the living can claim. They can’t claim emotional 
damages. And their instrumental interests are limited to proj-
ects they’d adopted before dying that could continue after their 
67. Email from Tracy Breton, 21 November 2014.
68. Schmalz, “Bill on Libeling.”
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deaths. On the other side, the defense would lose one powerful 
strategy they currently have: putting plaintiff on the stand and 
trying to show that the putative defamation is actually true. 
The ongoing cultural force of de mortuis makes it less likely 
anyway that people will criticize the dead, let alone defame 
them: many are inclined to let sleeping dogs lie.
 More pressing, perhaps, are worries about free speech. 
As the Supreme Court put it, “Whatever is added to the field 
of libel is taken from the field of free debate.”69 That’s not yet an 
argument: it just reminds us of a logical relationship. (It’s the 
same, that is, as saying, “Whatever is added to the field of free 
debate is taken from the field of libel.”) It’s tempting to respond 
that the social practice of free speech works better without def-
amation, just as it ordinarily works better without deliberate 
falsehoods, intemperate abuse, and the like.70 But this evades 
the real point. If the law provides a cause of action here, defen-
dants will have to respond to meritorious and unmeritorious 
claims alike—at least claims plausible enough to pass the well-
pleaded complaint rule.71 Those costs and the attendant chilling 
effect on free speech are worth considering. Compare a famil-
iar debate about antidiscrimination law.72 Some opponents of 
that law think that employers, as holders of private property, 
should enjoy the right to discriminate at will. Other oppo-
69. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964), quoting 
from Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
70. But see my “Romantic Anarchism and Pedestrian Liberalism,” Politi-
cal Theory (June 2007).
71. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009).
72. Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case against Employ-
ment Discrimination Laws (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) 
is cheerfully on both sides of this debate.
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nents think that the problem is that whenever an employer fires 
someone who happens to be a member of a protected class, 
she’ll face the risk of litigation, even if she fired the employee 
for, say, simple incompetence or excessive absenteeism, and 
would herself never act against someone on the basis of their 
race or sex or. . . . 
 Who should have standing to bring such actions? While 
the estate still has an executor, she’s the likely candidate. But 
barring protracted disputes in probate, estates don’t linger long. 
So-called civil recourse theorists might think that here lies the 
fatal objection to making it tortious to defame the dead.73 If 
the point of tort is to allow wronged parties a forum to redress 
their wrongs, but those wronged parties no longer exist, it seems 
like a nonstarter for tort law. But such a stance will produce 
confounding paradoxes: batter someone and break her arm 
and she can sue you; batter her and leave her comatose and 
there’s no one to sue you. In fact, the law gives agents standing 
to assert the interests of others incompetent or unable to assert 
them for themselves. A “next friend” can represent a minor, 
a mentally disabled party, a party (think Gitmo in its earlier 
years) squirreled away without access to a lawyer.74 I’m in-
clined to think that in the ordinary run of cases, members of 
the dead person’s immediate family should be granted the right 
to bring such actions. But—recall the Gugliuzza solution—that’s 
not to say they should vindicate their own putative interests in 
73. See for instance John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
“Civil Recourse Revisited,” Florida State University Law Review (Fall 2011). 
I wouldn’t have read civil recourse theory this way myself, but Goldberg tells 
me he would.
74. Consider too In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976).
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the matter. They should have a fiduciary duty to represent the 
dead person and the compensation they seek should be for the 
injuries suffered by that person.
 Whoever represents the dead defamed person might face 
an intriguing conflict. The fiduciary duties here run both to 
respecting the wishes of the dead and to the welfare of his ben-
eficiaries. The representative might rightly think that the dead 
person wouldn’t have sued even if he were still alive, even if 
he knew he might win substantial damages, even if he knew 
he would pass those on to his beneficiaries. But is it because he 
disapproves of lawsuits or because he wouldn’t want to plunge 
into the agony of litigation himself? Or the representative might 
rightly think that the dead person might not want to sue be-
cause he feared that the byzantine and glacial legal proceedings 
would distress his beneficiaries—and the beneficiaries might 
assure the representative that that’s just wrong, and they’d 
rather see the dead person’s reputation vindicated.
 However we sort out such conflicts, weighing a potential 
action for defaming the dead suggests this balance: fewer in-
terests to muster on behalf of the pool of plaintiffs coupled with 
the usual worries about the costs, broadly conceived, of tort 
law. This framing does seem a reasonable basis on which to 
oppose extending defamation law to defaming the dead. But 
I’m not persuaded. Representatives of the dead considering 
launching defamation actions face the same caution that living 
people do: the one sure thing is that suing will bring more at-
tention to the alleged defamation. That we continue to resonate 
to de mortuis just as easily cuts the other way: it means, not 
just fewer likely instances of defamation, but also fewer likely 
plaintiffs. An injury can be worth guarding against even if it 
seldom occurs. And as we saw in canvassing figures who de-
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plore speaking ill of the dead, the dead can’t speak up to defend 
themselves against defamation. Look at one justification the 
Supreme Court offered for thinking that the First Amendment 
inverts the structure of scandalum magnatum (no, they didn’t 
put it that way) and makes it harder for public figures to win a 
defamation action: “The first remedy of any victim of defama-
tion is self-help—using available opportunities to contradict 
the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse 
impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures usu-
ally enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effec-
tive communication and hence have a more realistic opportu-
nity to counteract false statements than private individuals 
normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulner-
able to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is cor-
respondingly greater.”75 Dead individuals have no opportunity 
for self-help. I presume the state interest in protecting them is 
greater yet.
 But here’s the consideration that finally pushes me toward 
embracing tort reform. Yes, the dead’s reputational interests 
are a proper subset of those of the living. But we want to do 
more than count how many sorts of interests qualify. We want 
to think about how weighty they are. Surely the dead’s intrinsic 
interest in reputation is especially poignant. Your reputation 
after death is a final settling of accounts, unlike your reputa-
tion while alive, ordinarily in flux as you continue to act. When 
that account is damaged by defamation, it’s all too likely to stay 
that way. “This will always be there.” Ordinarily, that’s the most 
pressing injury to reputation a dead person can suffer. It isn’t 
illusory. Offering a legal remedy for it isn’t a mask behind which 
75. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
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we find the face of incentives to the living or good conse-
quences or the public interest or anything like that. Like any 
other cause of action in tort, it provides a remedy for one party 
wronged by another. Sometimes what you see is what you get.
 I have no model statute up my sleeve. Framing one would 
require answering a host of difficult questions. Among them: 
how long after death should defamation be actionable? (And 
that’s both how long after death is the actual defamation, and 
how long after that does the estate have to file an action?) 
Should tort law notice the possibility that celebrities’ reputa-
tional interests last longer than those of the rest of us? For 
most of us, anyway, people in the more distant future are like 
the people I imagine in Bhutan. They’re not part of any social 
world that we have reason to care about. Our reputational in-
terests survive our deaths, but not forever. Even if Julian or 
Nathaniel Hawthorne defamed Margaret Fuller, I don’t think I 
should be liable for republication for dredging up the episode 
here, and not only because Fuller was a public figure.
 Many questions remain. What sort of relief should be 
available? What evidentiary rules make sense when the plain-
tiff can’t be deposed and can’t appear on the stand? And so on, 
and on, and on. I’m not inclined to underestimate how intri-
cate or important such problems are. But such bromides as actio 
personalis and the oblivion thesis, however soothing, supply 
no reason to dismiss the task of solving them.
 The skeptic, soft or hard, wants us to be clear-sighted 
about death. But the skeptic is confused about life: about how 
some of our interests linger past our deaths and about how 
central that fact is in our lives. I don’t see any demand of ratio-
nality requiring us to blinker our vision or shrink our hori-
zons. If you properly don’t want your will ignored, and if you 
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properly don’t want your corpse desecrated, why resist the 
claims that you properly don’t want to be defamed after you 
die, either? and that you’re injured when you are? and that the 
law should provide succor?
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